A
FRESH LOOK AT THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE
John
M. Frame
Note:
I submitted this paper as an article for a multi-author book. After some years
it was determined that the book would not be published. JF
The “regulative principle” is the
Reformed view of how God regulates our worship and provides that worship is by
divine appointment. Everything we do in worship must be divinely warranted. And
since Scripture is the sufficient Word of God, everything we do in worship must
be “prescribed in the Holy Scripture.”[1]
So defined, the regulative principle
is eminently scriptural. In biblical worship, we seek God’s glory, not our own
pleasure. And we have no sure way of determining what pleases God in worship
except God’s own revelation of Himself in Scripture. So Scripture is sufficient
to tell us God’s will for worship. We dare not add to, or subtract from, God’s
own Word (Deut. 4:2, 12:32, Rev. 22:18-19).
WORSHIP AND LIFE
But when you think about it, the
regulative principle is not limited to worship services. It is God’s regulative
principle for all areas of human life. It is not only in our Sunday worship
services that we seek to please God rather than ourselves (1 Thess. 4:1, 2, 2
Tim. 2:3, 4). Indeed, says Paul, “whether you eat or drink or whatever you do,
do it all for the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). How do we find out how to
glorify God in all of life? The same way we find out how to glorify God in
worship: we consult His Word. So the sufficiency of Scripture is for all of
life, not merely for one segment of it. The passages listed in the previous
paragraph deal with all of life; they are not limited to the governance of
worship meetings. The Apostle Paul tells us in 2 Tim. 3:16-17 that God-breathed
Scripture is sufficient “so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for
every good work.” So the Westminster
Confession of Faith (WCF) declares that Scripture is sufficient “concerning
all things necessary for (God’s) own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life”
(1.6).
In everything we do, we seek to obey
God’s commands. There are, of course, human activities for which there are no
explicit biblical prescriptions. Scripture doesn’t tell us how to change a
tire, for instance. But there are biblical commands that are relevant to tire
changing, as to everything else. In all activities, we are to glorify God (1
Cor. 10:31). In everything we are to be motivated by faith (Rom. 14:23) and
love (1 Cor. 13:1-3). In everything, we are to act in the name of the Lord
Jesus (Col. 3:17), with all our heart (3:23). When I change a tire, I should do
it to the glory of God. The details I need to work out myself, but always in
the framework of God’s broad commands concerning my motives and goals.
Here too, worship is parallel with
the rest of life. In worship also, there are some activities for which there
are no explicit biblical prescriptions. Scripture does not tell us specifically
when or where to meet for worship, or how many hymns to sing, or precisely what
words to use in offering prayer. These decisions require the use of godly
reasoning, guided by the general teachings of the Word (WCF 1.6).
The parallel between worship and
other areas of human life should not surprise us, because, in one sense,
worship is all of life. Paul
describes the Christian life in sacrificial imagery: it is offering our bodies
as “living sacrifices, holy and pleasing to God” and adds, “this is your
spiritual act of worship” (
To say that all of life is worship
is not to deny that there is something special about public worship services. Certainly
God has ordained public worship services, and He calls us not to neglect them
(Heb. 10:25). And His Word contains specific prescriptions to govern those
meetings, to which we must give heed, just as the Word gives special
instruction to us about church government, theology, evangelism, ethics,
marriage, parenting, etc. I am not saying, therefore, that “anything goes” in
worship, or that we may do anything in a worship service that we may do outside
it.[3]
These meetings are for such things as praise, prayer, teaching, and sacraments.
Scripture tells us how to do these things, and so we must constantly search the
Scriptures to determine how God wants us to conduct each particular service.
My point is rather that Scripture
functions the same way in the area of worship services that if functions in any
other area of human life: we seek to find out what God says, and we apply His
prescriptions to specific situations by the use of godly wisdom, itself subject
to the Word. In other words, the regulative principle for worship is the same
as the regulative principle for all of human life.
THE TRADITIONAL
VIEW
The discussion above, in my view, is
a fairly complete statement of the regulative principle, both as it is found in
the Bible and in the explicit statements of the Reformed confessional
standards. But to those who have studied the traditional discussions of the
regulative principle, it will seem rather sketchy. In those discussions,
Reformed thinkers have labored over concepts like elements, parts, substance, essence, accident, forms, expressions, and
circumstances (further subdivided
into circumstances with and without religious significance, and those necessary
and unnecessary to the orderly conduct of worship). In my opinion, these
concepts are not helpful, and using them to add further restrictions to the
broad regulative principle is not scriptural. In this part of my essay, I will
describe those additional restrictions and explain why I object to them.
Many Reformed thinkers also would be
unsatisfied with my assertion that the regulative principle for worship is the
same as the regulative principle for the rest of life. Many in the Reformed
tradition have insisted that there is a separate regulative principle for
worship alone, narrower and more stringent than God’s regulation of the rest of
life. So in worship, but not in the rest of life, the calculus of elements,
circumstances, etc. noted above plays a major role. I hope to show here that
the claim of a special, narrower regulative principle for worship alone,
requiring the use of these extra concepts is unscriptural.
These additional concepts
(“elaborations,” as I shall call them) entered the discussion because some
early Reformed thinkers[4]
feared that the regulative principle, taken it its broad sense alone, allowed
too much room for human discretion. A worship regulated exclusively by God’s
commands, they thought, should be very sharply restricted, and therefore the
regulative principle must be made more precise than it would be on the broad reading
alone.
Elements
The argument goes like this: It is
not enough for God to reveal in general terms what He wants His people to do in
His presence. Rather, He must reveal the specific actions to be performed in
any particular service, such as burnt offering, prayer, preaching, Lord’s
Supper. These specific actions are the “parts” or “elements” of worship, the
“essence” or “substance” of which everything else is an “accident.” Bushell
says that
“An
essential or substantial element of worship . . . is any action which has been
invested, by divine or human prescription, with religious or spiritual
significance.”[5]
He
adds that the element may be either an “act” or “an aspect of an act.” These
elements, (also called “parts” or “substances”) are “beyond the discretionary
power of the church.”
How do we determine what elements
God has prescribed? Most defenders of this traditional view suggest that that
we may determine these prescriptions from Scripture, either by express
commands, approved examples, or theological inferences.[6]
But these prescriptions must be specific
to a particular kind of worship. It will not do, of course, to argue that since
the Old Testament temple worship included burnt offerings, we should include
such offerings in the worship of our churches today. The burnt offering was an
element of temple worship, but there is no divine warrant for burnt offerings
in the worship of the New Testament church. Lacking such a specific warrant, we
know that the practice is now forbidden. For us it is not an element of
worship. The synagogue, the temple, and
New Testament Christian worship are all specific kinds of worship. We
must find the specific elements God has prescribed for each specific type of
worship, if we are to follow the regulative principle.
On this view, the elements or
substantial parts of worship are also independent
of one another in an important sense. “Substance,” in Aristotelian
philosophy, is what stands alone, what exists “in itself.” Similarly, each
element of worship, in the Puritan view, has its own independent scriptural
justification. For example, John Murray, convinced that song is an “element” of
worship, argues that
“In
dealing with this question [the question of whether we should sing only Psalm
versions in worship—JF], it should be appreciated that the singing of God’s
praise is a distinct act of worship. It is to be distinguished, for example,
from the reading of Scripture and from the offering of prayer to God. It is, of
course, true that songs of praise often include what is of the nature of prayer
to God, as it is also true that in the offering of prayer to God there is much
that is of the nature of praise and thanksgiving. But it is not proper to
appeal to the divine authorization or warrant we possess as to the content of
prayer in order to determine the question as to the content of song. Prayer is
one element of worship, singing is another.”
He
then gives examples “of the necessity and importance of guarding the
distinctiveness of each of the several parts of worship and of determining from
the Scripture what its prescriptions are respecting each element.”[7]
In other words, on
According to the Scottish and
Puritan view, then, “elements of worship” are the distinct actions performed in
worship, all the actions deemed to have “religious significance.” Each is
independent of the others in the sense that each requires its own distinct
scriptural warrant. And the biblical warrant of each must be specific to the
particular type of worship being considered (tabernacle, temple, synagogue, New
Testament church).
Circumstances
The Puritan and Scottish tradition
understood, however, that there are many things we do and should do in worship
that do not have the kind of specific and independent biblical justification
required of elements. Worship activities without specific biblical warrant fall
into two categories. The first category consists of circumstances (category 1). The WCF, for instance, speaks of
“circumstances . . . common to human actions and societies, which are to be
ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence, according to the
general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed.” (1.6). These
circumstances usually include such matters as the time and place of worship, and
whether to sit on chairs or pews. All human societies (including governmental
bodies, clubs, schools, etc.) must resolve such questions. The second category
involves the specific ways in which we
carry out the elements, such as the specific words of hymns, prayers, and
sermons in a particular service (category 2), which are not “common to human
actions and societies.” They are distinctly religious and ought to be
distinctively Christian.
Sometimes in the literature the term
“circumstance” is reserved (as in the WCF) for activities of category 1, while
another term, like “forms” or “expressions” is used for those of category 2.
Bushell uses “circumstance” for both categories, but he distinguishes between
those that have “spiritual meaning” or “sacred significance” (roughly equal to
my category 2) and those that do not (my category 1).[9]
Therefore, for Bushell, the categories “circumstances” and “elements” are not
mutually exclusive:
“There
are, in other words, some circumstances of worship which are essential or
substantial parts of the act of worship itself. Over such circumstances the
Church has absolutely no discretionary or prescriptive authority.”[10]
Bushell
then applies this principle to the question of the content of song in worship,
though what he says would apply equally to the specific content of prayer or
preaching:
“The
content of any verbal utterance is circumstantial to the act itself. But
because the words of the songs sung in religious worship necessarily have
spiritual and religious significance, they must also be considered to be
substantial parts of worship, and do not therefore lie within the discretionary
power of the Church.”[11]
This
argument proves too much, for it seems to imply that not only the words of
songs (as Bushell insists in his argument for exclusive use of Psalm versions
in worship), but also the words of prayers and sermons, must be found on the
pages of Scripture. But Bushell does recognize that there are some
circumstances of a religious character that cannot be determined from
Scripture, such as the specific words of prayers and sermons. He says, “ . . . the specific content of
worship-song is determinable from Scripture, while the specific content of
preaching is not.”[12]
Bushell also mentions another kind
of circumstances, namely those “which have no connection at all with worship per se and the alteration of which has
no effect on the act of worship itself. “[13]
One example is the “kind or color of clothing” people wear to church.[14]
Unlike the time and place of worship, these are “separable” from worship.
Bushell explains,
“The
circumstances which the Church may appoint, in other words, must be such that
the worship of the Church could not be conducted in a decent and orderly
fashion without their appointment.”[15]
So
the church may not dictate what we may or may not wear to church or even that
“the architecture of the church building be of a certain type.”[16]
To summarize: circumstances are the
“accidents” of worship as opposed to the elements which are the “substance.”
“Circumstances” may refer to all the accidents (as in Bushell) or only to some
of them. On the former alternative, they overlap the elements. The Church may
determine the circumstances only to the extent that those elements are
necessary for worship to be conducted in a decent and orderly fashion and to
the extent that those circumstances cannot be determined by Scripture.
OBJECTIONS TO THE
TRADITIONAL VIEW
I object to the accretions to the
regulative principle inherent in the traditional view for a number of reasons.
1. Not
Warranted by Scripture
The most important objection to the
traditional view is that it is not warranted by Scripture. That is a great
irony, for the Puritan system has the laudable aim of making worship thoroughly
subject to the Word of God.[17]
But where does Scripture talk about or even imply a distinction between
elements or circumstances? Where does Scripture define elements in contrast
with circumstances? Where does it say that the elements of worship must be
independent of one another in
Certainly Scripture nowhere defines
these terms or formulates these principles in so many words. Is there any
biblical passage where God rebukes someone for failing to distinguish properly
between an element and a circumstance, or for trying to legislate the wrong
kind of circumstances? I have not found any. The literature defending these
restrictions appeals to Scripture only to defend the regulative principle in
its “broad meaning” as I have defined it at the beginning of this article. These
appeals legitimate the principle that worship is by divine appointment. But
they do not vindicate the traditional calculus of elements and circumstances.
2. Aristotelian, Not Biblical
To be more specific, the
distinction between “substance” and “accident” is Aristotelian, rather than
Scriptural. And the idea that worship must be divided into certain elements
independent of other elements is a form of philosophical atomism, rather than
anything that can be derived from Scripture. I would not say that Scripture
disagrees in all respects with Aristotelian or atomist philosophy; but we
should not presume its agreement with them. If someone tells us we must divide
worship into substances and accidents, they should provide us with a biblical
argument for doing so. So far, none has been produced to my knowledge.
3. Worship
Actions Not Atomistic
As a matter of fact, the actions
we perform in worship are not atomistically independent of one another. As
4. Difficulty
Determining “Religious Significance”
It is not easy to distinguish
those aspects of worship that have “religious significance” from those that
don’t. As Bushell points out, even the issue of the time and place of worship
can have religious significance, as indicated by the examples of the Sabbath
and the temple.[20]
Beyond that, if the elders of a church ordain 4:00 a.m. as the time of worship,
it certainly would affect the religious quality of worship. Even the clothing
worn by the leaders and the worshipers contributes to the overall tone of the
service; it communicates something. And in an important sense, we must confess
with Abraham Kuyper that all of human life is religious.[21]
Indeed, as I indicated earlier, for the Christian all of life is worship in a “broad sense.” So the
distinction between that which is religious and non-religious is highly
questionable, and in any case will not help us to distinguish elements from
circumstances (or, alternatively, between circumstances within the discretion
of the Church and those without).[22]
5. No
Divine List of “Elements”
Even granting the legitimacy of
the concept “element,” the claim that God provides a list of elements specific
to each particular form of worship will not withstand exegetical scrutiny.
Indeed, the Old Testament sets forth many details concerning the sacrifices of
the tabernacle and temple. But beyond the descriptions of the sacrifices
themselves, there is no temple liturgy. There is no description of what is to
be done beyond the sacrifices, by way of acts such as prayer and instruction.
There were “hours of prayer” in the temple (Acts 3:1), but we have no specific
information as to what went on in those meetings, let alone divine
prescriptions.
As for the synagogue, Scripture
contains no hint of any divine requirement for the elements of its meetings. We
should presume that God approved of the synagogue, because of Jesus’s
attendance and participation (Luke 4:16). But Scripture gives us nothing like a
list of elements for this particular kind of service, either by precept,
example, or inference. God does prescribe a “sacred assembly” for the Sabbath
day (Lev. 23:3), but He says nothing about what should be done there. Doubtless
the Israelites reasoned that since God is generally pleased with public prayer
and with the reading and teaching of His Word, that these are appropriate
activities for the Sabbath meeting. That is a kind of theological inference,
and it is correct; but it falls short of a divine prescription of the
particular elements of this specific form of worship.
The same is true of the Lord’s
Day worship of the New Testament church. We do find in the New Testament some
examples of worship activities which most likely[23]
occurred in Christian Lord’s Day worship: the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor. 11:17-34),
hymns (chosen by the congregation!--1 Cor. 14:26), instruction (1 Cor. 14:26),
and the reading of Paul’s letters (Col. 3:8).[24]
But nothing is said specifically about baptism as an activity of Sunday worship
(New Testament examples of baptism take place outside of regular public
worship). We may determine by theological inference that baptism is an activity
appropriate to public worship, but that inference falls short of demonstrating
that God requires baptism as an element of the specific service held on the
Lord’s Day.[25]
And certainly we have no
normative list of elements for many other forms of worship: private worship,
family worship, devotions at community events,[26]
hymn sings, impromptu prayers, to say nothing of worship in the “broad sense.”
There is, therefore, no form of worship for which Scripture yields a list of
elements as required by the narrow reading of the regulative principle.
6. No Divine Definition of “Circumstances”
Just as Scripture fails to define
and use “element” (or some equivalent concept) in its doctrine of worship, so
it fails to define or use the concept “circumstance” in any of the meanings
suggested by proponents of the traditional view; nor does it distinguish, as do
such proponents, what kinds of circumstances the church is able to determine
from those it is unable to determine.
7. Difficulties Applying the Distinction between “Elements” and
“Circumstances”
Even granting the legitimacy of
the distinction between elements and circumstances, applying it is not easy. Is
song in worship an element, as John Murray taught, or is it a “form” or
“circumstance,” a way of praying and
teaching? Is instrumental music an element (as the covenanter tradition holds)
or a circumstance (helping the congregation to sing in a decent and orderly
way)? Is a marriage essentially a taking of vows and therefore a proper element
of worship, or is it part of a broad group of activities that should be
excluded from worship because it is not prescribed?
All these questions have been
disputed among those who have accepted the distinction between elements and
circumstances. But how can these questions be answered? What biblical data is
actually relevant to their resolution? Or do these questions require a kind of
extra-biblical insight, an Aristotelian philosophical ability to distinguish
precisely between substance and accident? In any case, these concepts, intended
to enable us to make precise judgments about what belongs in worship, may
actually contribute more confusion than they alleviate.
8. The
Do the Westminster Standards
require the traditional view of the regulative principle? They were written by
Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians who personally held varieties of the
traditional view. But the actual language of the Confession and Catechisms does
not require it, in my opinion. And Presbyterian officers are committed to the
actual language of the Standards, not in a general way to the theology of the
The Confession, however, does
distinguish between the role of God’s Word in “matters of faith, or worship,”
and outside those spheres, which may be thought to contradict my equation
between the regulative principle of worship and the regulative principle of
human life in general:
“God
alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and
commandments of men, which are, in any thing, contrary to His Word; or beside
it, if matters of faith, or worship” (20:2).
I
have no trouble agreeing with this statement, including the last clause
following the semicolon. We are certainly free in worship from commandments of
men beside the Word of God. Therefore, I literally agree with everything in
this sentence. But I believe that there also is a sense in which God has given
us this freedom in all other areas of life as well. We are talking here about
ultimate norms, not subordinate authorities. As a matter of fact, we are
subject to human subordinate authorities in worship as in other spheres. The
worship leader has the authority to announce what hymn we are to sing. But he
is subject to the Word of God as the sole ultimate
authority. The same is true for authorities in other spheres(civil magistrates,
husbands, fathers, teachers). They have genuine subordinate authority, but
there is only one ultimate authority, the Word of God. In that sense, we are
always free from anything “beside” the Word, and we have this freedom in all
spheres of life. The Confession concedes as much in 1.6, when it applies the
sufficiency of Scripture to all of life, that is, to “all things necessary for
[God’s] own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life.”
9. No Need to Add to Scripture
What lies behind the
element/circumstance distinction, I think, is the thought that some such
distinction is needed to put teeth into the regulative principle in its broad
meaning. What good is it, some may ask, for worship to be divinely mandated,
unless God has given us specific lists of what to do in every type of service
(“elements”) and has drawn a precise line between what we may determine
(“circumstances,” or some of them) and what we may not? But one may ask equally
well what good it is for human marriage to be divinely regulated, unless God
gives us a complete list of what husbands and wives are to do in the marriage
and to what extent they may make their own decisions.[27]
But God never rules His people by giving them exhaustive lists of things they
must do, and forbidding them to do anything else.[28]
Rather, He teaches them in general terms what pleases Him, and then He allows
them to work out the specifics through their own godly wisdom, in line with the
broader principles of His Word. That is what it means to live according to
divine prescription.
The regulative principle itself
warns us not to add to the Word of God. We need to remind ourselves that one
way we are tempted to add to the Word is to try to make it more precise and
specific than it is. That was one error of which Jesus accused the Pharisees.
We might wish that God had given us more specific guidance as to what pleases
Him in public worship and in the rest of life. But we must be content with what
He has actually revealed to us, turning neither to the right nor to the left.[29]
SOME REPLIES TO T.
DAVID GORDON
In his essay in this volume, Gordon spends most of his space criticizing my view of the regulative principle. I had hoped, rather, that he would have focused his attention on trying to prove the traditional view from Scripture. For those of us who question the traditional view, only such an exegetical study will suffice. Where is the biblical argument for dividing worship into elements and distinguishing them from circumstances? Where is the biblical ground for the traditional view of what is and is not within the discretion of the church? Gordon’s article does include some biblical support, but that support is focused polemically against my view, rather than developed systematically to establish Gordon’s, and his polemic is pretty wide of its intended targets. I have replied to some of his points in earlier notes, but some of his arguments require responses of greater length.
Obedience to Subordinate
Authorities
I argued that we are free from
commands “beside” God’s Word, not only in worship, but in all of life. Gordon
says that “If Frame’s view were correct (that we are free from any command that
is “beside” God’s Word, then civil authority could not require our submission
to any ordinance or law that did not enjoy the endorsement of God’s Word.” So
he thinks that on my position a Roman magistrate could not tax his citizens
unless he could find in Scripture a precise indication of the amount of the
tax. Or, alternatively, if “Render unto Caesar” is unqualified in Scripture,
the magistrate could tax any amount at all without being unjust.
Here Gordon misunderstands the
nature of sola Scriptura, the
sufficiency of Scripture.[30]
Nobody has ever claimed that Scripture is sufficient for every detail of life.
Scripture is sufficient, not as an encyclopedia of laws or facts, but as the
Word of God. To say that Scripture is sufficient (in public worship or
elsewhere) is simply to say that Scripture contains all the divine words that
we need. Scripture is sufficient for the
civil magistrate, not by telling him exactly how much to collect in taxes, but
in giving him all the divine norms he needs to make his decisions.
I believe that Scripture authorizes
governments to collect taxes but requires no maximum or minimum, though there
are some kinds of taxation that Scripture condemns as unjust (1 Sam. 8:10-18).
In other words, my view of the magistrate’s taxing power is not very different
from Gordon’s, if at all. Within these rough biblical guidelines, I would not
say that a magistrate goes “beyond” Scripture in the relevant sense by choosing
an amount of tax to collect.
People violate sola Scriptura, not by asserting that there are truths to be found
outside of Scripture, but by claiming that there are extra-biblical words that
have the same authority as Scripture, or higher. Those who believe in sola Scriptura hold that no
extra-Scriptural words have divine authority, and therefore supreme authority.
People violate the principle when they claim that their ideas, their norms,
their political philosophy, their view of taxation, etc., have authority equal
to or greater than Scripture. To accept such claims is to subject oneself to
norms “beyond Scripture.” We are free from such norms in all areas of life. When Jesus invokes this principle in Matt.
15:8-9, he applies it, not to public worship specifically, but to the
Pharisees’ failure to adequately support their parents.
Obedience to Ecclesiastical Authorities
Gordon says, as he has said in other
publications, that for me “what is lawful and proper in other aspects of life
is lawful or proper in this aspect as well.” This is a very misleading
statement of my position. It accurately describes what I believe about worship
in the broad sense, but certainly not
in the narrow sense. As for the narrow sense, with which Gordon’s and my
articles are primarily concerned, I believe as he does that many activities are
appropriate in human life generally that are not appropriate in public worship
services.[31]
My difference with him is that I deny that there are different regulative principles governing these
two areas. For example, he and I would agree that although marriage and music
are two different things, governed in part by different norms, we nevertheless
find God’s will for them in the same way: by taking relevant Scripture norms
and applying them by means of our extra-biblical knowledge. Similarly, on my
view, with public worship and other
human activities.
Gordon cites several biblical
passages to show that some behavior “is lawful if privately practiced, apart
from the church’s exercise of authority, but unlawful if required or practiced
by the church.” Again, I am not at all opposed to this principle. Certainly I
have the right as an individual to attend a baseball game. I would, however, be
opposed to any church presuming that it had the right to command me to attend a baseball game. There are some limits to
church authority, and these have been explored in the theological literature.
My view of sola Scriptura does not forbid me to acknowledge limits to church
authority. All it requires is that the church be subject to Scripture and that
the limits of its authority be established biblically. As to the specifics of
those limits, Gordon is certainly right to say that the church has more
authority in the area of worship than, say, on the issue of what baseball game
I should go to. That is one difference between worship (in the narrow sense)
and other areas of life. But that is not a difference between two different
regulative principles. It is rather a
difference in the specific application of a common regulative principle.
Is My Position Lutheran, Rather
than Reformed?
Gordon thinks my view is
“practically indistinguishable from the Lutheran view,” namely the view that in
worship we may do anything Scripture doesn’t forbid. Certainly that is not true
of my formulation as such. For I have affirmed that in worship “everything must
be divinely warranted” and “everything we do in worship must be “prescribed in
the Holy Scripture.” These formulations are precisely opposite to the
Lutheran-Anglican ones.
I grant, however, that in
practice my approach would be somewhat less restrictive than Gordon’s. And it
is probably more important on my view than on Gordon’s to take notice of what
Scripture forbids and doesn’t forbid. For on my view, God’s prescriptions for
worship are somewhat general, and when we consider alternative applications of
those general prescriptions it is important to ask if any are forbidden by
Scripture. As we consider Scriptural prohibitions, of course, our discussions
will sound somewhat like discussions among Lutherans. So I am willing to grant
that in some ways my approach brings Reformed and Lutherans closer together
than does Gordon’s.
Is that bad? I find it
interesting that some Reformed people tend to reject any idea (say, “view A”)
that they see as muting somewhat the traditional Reformed polemics against
historic opponents, even if that idea has much otherwise to recommend it.[32]
From such people we hear that “view A is not distinctively Presbyterian” or
“view A does not set us sharply enough over against the (Lutherans, Catholics,
et al).” On the contrary, I think that the visible unity of the church is
important to God.[33]
If we can find genuinely scriptural formulations that bring historically warring
parties together, that is a good thing. If we can find some legitimate common
ground with Lutherans, Anglicans, Charismatics, even Roman Catholics, shouldn’t
that be cause for praise? Shouldn’t we be pleased with such discoveries, even
if they force us to amend our traditional formulations (and polemics) in some
way? I for one will be delighted if my formulation in some small way brings
Reformed, Lutherans, and Anglicans closer together. But of course our views
must ultimately be determined by Scripture, not by the course of historical
debate.