Presuppositional Apologetics
1. Presupposing God in Apologetic Argument
Presuppositional apologetics may be
understood in the light of a distinction common in epistemology, or theory of
knowledge. In any factual inquiry, it is important to distinguish between the
ideas we have prior to the inquiry and those we gain in the course of the
inquiry. No one, of course, embarks on an investigation with an empty mind. If
indeed we had done no previous thinking, nothing would motivate us to seek
further information.
Now, a process of inquiry often
corrects ideas we held previously. But it is also true that our previous ideas
often serve as assumptions governing the inquiry: defining the field of
investigation, determining the methods of study, governing our understanding of
what results are possible, thus limiting what conclusions may come from the
study. So there is usually a dynamic interaction in any study between
assumption and investigation: the investigation corrects and refines our
assumptions, but the assumptions limit the investigation.
There are some kinds of assumptions
we usually consider immune from revision. Among these are the basic laws of
logic and mathematics: what factual discovery could possibly persuade us that 2
+ 2 is not equal to 4? The same is true of basic ethical principles, especially
those governing the inquiry itself: For example, no factual discovery could
legitimately persuade a researcher to be less than honest in recording data.
What about religious faith, as an
assumption governing human thought? Scripture teaches that believers in Christ
know God in a supernatural way, with a certainty that transcends that
obtainable by investigation. Jesus himself reveals the Father to those he
chooses (Matt. 11:25-27). Believers know God’s mysteries by revelation of his
Spirit, in words inspired by the Spirit, giving them “the mind of Christ” (1
Cor. 2:9-16, compare 2 Tim. 3:16). So, by believing in Jesus, they know that they have eternal life (1 John
5:7).
In many respects, this supernatural
knowledge contradicts the claims of people who don’t know the true God. There
is an opposition between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world (1 Cor.
1:18-2:16, 3:18-23). Wicked people (including all of us, apart from God’s
grace) “suppress” the truth of God, exchanging it for a lie (Rom. 1:18, 25).
The apostle Paul claims that his supernatural knowledge is powerful to
“demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the
knowledge of God” so that he can “take captive every thought to make it
obedient to Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). Spiritual warfare in Scripture, then, is
intellectual as well as moral.
So when some claim that Christ will
not return because “everything goes on as it has since the beginning of
creation,” Peter opposes them, not by an empirical inquiry to ascertain the
relative uniformity of physical law, but by citing the Word of God, his source
of supernatural knowledge (2 Pet. 3:1-13).
The supernatural revelation of
Scripture, therefore, is among the assumptions, what we may now call the
presuppositions, that Christians bring to any intellectual inquiry. May a
Christian revise those presuppositions in the course of an inquiry? He may
certainly revise his understanding of
those presuppositions by inquiring further into God’s revelation in Scripture
and nature. But he may not abandon the authority of Scripture itself, as long
as he believes that Scripture is God’s Word. God must prove true, though every
man a liar (
Indeed, Christians believe that the
very meaningfulness of rational discourse depends on God, as everything depends
on God. Indeed, it is Christ “in whom all things hold together” (Col. 1:17) and
“in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:3). It is
the “fear of the Lord” that is “the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. 1:7) and
“the beginning of wisdom” (Psm. 111:10, Prov. 9:10).
These facts pose a problem for
apologetics. Non-Christians do not share the presuppositions we have discussed.
Indeed, they presuppose the contrary, as they suppress the truth. The job of
the apologist, trusting in God’s grace, is to persuade the non-Christian that
the biblical presuppositions are true. What sort of argument can he use? If his
argument presupposes the truths of Scripture, then his conclusions will be the
same as his presuppositions. He will argue from Christian presuppositions to
Christian conclusions. But since the unbeliever will not grant the Christian
presuppositions, he will not find the argument persuasive. But if the apologist
presents an argument that does not presuppose the truths of Scripture, how can
he be faithful to his Lord? And how can he produce an intelligible argument
unless he presupposes those conditions that are necessary for intelligibility?
Many schools of apologetics
(sometimes called “classical” or “traditional” or “evidentialist”) either
ignore this question or take the second alternative: they present arguments
that avoid any use of distinctively Christian presuppositions. When they take
the second alternative, they defend their faithfulness to biblical revelation
by saying that the presuppositions they adopt are neither distinctively
Christian, nor distinctively non-Christian, but “neutral.”
Presuppositional apologists claim
that there is no neutrality, invoking Jesus’ saying that “one cannot serve two
masters” (Matt. 6:24). There can be no compromise between the wisdom of God and
the wisdom of the world. Unbelief leads to distortion of the truth, exchanging
the truth for a lie (Rom. 1:25). Only by trusting God’s Word can we come to a
saving knowledge of Christ (John 5:24, 8:31, 15:3, Rom. 10:17). And trusting
entails presupposing: accepting God’s Word as what it is, the foundation of all
human knowledge, the ultimate criterion of truth and error (Deut. 18:18-19, 1
Cor. 14:37, Col. 2:2-4, 2 Tim. 3:16-17, 2 Pet. 1:19-21). So the apologetic
argument, like all human inquiries into truth, must presuppose the truths of
God’s Word.
2. The problem of circularity
The presuppositionalist then faces
the problem I mentioned earlier. If he proceeds from Christian presuppositions
to Christian conclusions, how can his argument be persuasive to a
non-Christian? And how can he avoid the charge of vicious circularity?
Presuppositionalists have given
different answers to this question. (1) Edward J. Carnell, who is sometimes
described as a presuppositionalist, affirms the Trinity as the “logical
starting point” which “gives being and meaning to the many of the time-space
universe” (An Introduction to Christian
Apologetics, p. 124). But his apologetic method treats the Trinity, not as
an ultimate criterion of truth, but as a hypothesis to be tested by “both logic
and experience” (Gordon R. Lewis, Testing
Christianity’s Truth-Claims, p. 179). He never indicates in any clear way
how logic and experience themselves are related to Christian presuppositions.
(2) Gordon H. Clark, who accepted
the label “presuppositionalist,” held that Scripture constitutes the “axiom” of
Christian thought, drawing an analogy between religion and geometry. The axiom,
or first principle, cannot be proved. But axioms of different worldviews can be
tested (1) to determine their logical consistency, and (2) to determine which
of them is most fruitful in answering the questions of life. (See Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, pp.
26-34.)
(3) Cornelius Van Til accepted the “presuppositionalist” label somewhat reluctantly but admitted straightforwardly
that the argument for Christianity is in one sense circular. But Van Til
believes that the non-Christian’s argument, too, is circular: “…all reasoning
is, in the nature of the case, circular
reasoning. The starting-point, the method, and the conclusion are always
involved in one another” (Van Til, The
Defense of the Faith, p. 101). It is part of the unbeliever’s depravity to
suppress the truth about God (Rom. 1:18-32, 2 Cor. 4:4), and that depravity
governs their reasoning so that unbelief is their presupposition, which in turn
governs their conclusion.
How, then, can believer and unbeliever debate the truth of Christianity, given that the issue is already settled in the presuppositions of both parties? Van Til recommends a kind of “indirect” argument:
The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument’s sake, in order to show him that on such a position the “facts” are not facts and the “laws” are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument’s sake in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do “facts” and “laws” appear intelligible. (Van Til, Defense, 100-101)
But in this strategy, how does the
apologist argue that the non-Christian’s “facts” are not facts and his “laws”
not laws? Should he argue on presuppositions acceptable to the unbeliever? If
so, then on Van Til’s account, he can reach only non-Christian conclusions.
Should he argue on Christian presuppositions? Then the problem of circularity
returns.
I would say that it is best for
presuppositionalists to respond to the question of circularity as follows: (1)
As Van Til says, circular argument of a kind is unavoidable when we argue for
an ultimate standard of truth. One who believes that human reason is the
ultimate standard can argue that view only by appealing to reason. One who
believes that the Bible is the ultimate standard can argue only by appealing to
the Bible. Since all positions partake equally of circularity at this level, it
cannot be a point of criticism against any of them.
(2) Narrowly circular arguments, like “the Bible is God’s Word, because
it is God’s Word” can hardly be persuasive. But more broadly circular arguments can be. An example of a more broadly
circular argument might be “The Bible is God’s Word, because it makes the
following claims…, makes the following predictions that have been fulfilled…,
presents these credible accounts of miracles…, is supported by these
archaeological discoveries…, etc.” Now this argument is as circular as the last
if, in the final analysis, the criteria for evaluating its claims, its
predictions, its accounts of miracles, and the data of archaeology are criteria
based on a biblical worldview and epistemology. But it is a broader argument in
the sense that it presents more data to the non-Christian and challenges him to
consider it seriously.
(3) God created our minds to think
within the Christian circle: hearing God’s Word obediently and interpreting our
experience by means of that Word. That is the only legitimate way to think, and
we cannot abandon it to please the unbeliever. A good psychologist will not
abandon reality as he perceives it to communicate with a delusional patient; so
must it be with apologists.
(4) In the final analysis, saving knowledge of God comes supernaturally. We can be brought from one circle to another only by God’s supernatural grace.
3. Transcendental Argument
Van Til and those who closely
follow him hold that apologetic argument must be transcendental. He also calls it “reasoning by presupposition” (Van
Til, Defense, p. 99). A transcendental argument tries to show the conditions
that make anything what it is, particularly the conditions or presuppositions
necessary for rational thought. This understanding of apologetics underscores Van
Til’s conviction that the Christian God is not merely another fact to be
discovered alongside the ones we already know, but is the fact from whom all
other facts derive their meaning and intelligibility.
Van Til was convinced that his
transcendental argument was very different from traditional proofs for God’s
existence and the usual treatments of the historical evidences for
Christianity. He speaks of his argument as “indirect rather than direct” (Van
Til, Defense, 100), as a reductio ad absurdum of the
non-Christian’s position, rather than a direct proof of the Christian’s. He
intends to show that the alternatives to Christian theism destroy all meaning
and intelligibility, and, of course, that Christian theism establishes these.
These statements, however, raise some questions:
(1)
Is it possible for an apologist to refute all the alternatives to Christian
theism? Van Til thought that it is possible, for in the final analysis there is
only one alternative. Either the biblical God exists or he doesn’t. And if he
doesn’t, Van Til claims, there can be no meaning or intelligibility.
(2)
Is a negative or reductio argument the only way to show that Christian theism alone
grounds intelligibility? Van Til thought it was. But (a) if, say, Thomas
Aquinas was successful in showing that that the causal order begins in God,
then God is the source of everything, including the intelligibility of the
universe. Aquinas’s argument, then, though it is positive rather than negative,
proves Van Til’s transcendental conclusion. And (b) if, say, physical law is
unintelligible apart from the biblical God, why should we not say that physical
law implies the existence of God? In
that way, any transcendental argument can be formulated as a positive proof.
(3)
Is the transcendental argument a simplification
of apologetics? Presuppositionalists sometimes seem to suggest that with the
transcendental argument in our arsenal we need not waste time on theistic
proofs, historical evidences, detailed examinations of other views, and the
like. But presuppositionalists, like all apologists, have to answer objections.
If the apologist claims that physical law is unintelligible without the
biblical God, he will have to explain why he thinks that. What other possible
explanations are there for the consistency of physical law? What does each of
them lack? How does the Christian view supply what is lacking in the other
explanations? Thus the presuppositional transcendental argument can become as
complicated as more traditional arguments. And the presuppositionalist may
often find himself arguing in much the same way traditional apologists have.
4. Conclusion
Despite these difficulties, the
presuppositional approach has these advantages: (1) It takes account of what
Scripture says about our obligation to presuppose God’s revelation in all our
thinking and about the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth. (2) It
understands what according to Scripture must be the goal of apologetics: to
convince people that God’s revelation is not only true, but the very criterion
of truth, the most fundamental certainty, the basis for all intelligible
thought and meaningful living.
Bibliography
G. L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ, 1998)
E. J. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI, 1948)
G. H. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Grand Rapids, MI, 1952)
J. M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg, NJ, 1994)
--, Cornelius Van Til: an Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ, 1995)
G. R. Lewis, Testing Christianity’s Truth-Claims (
C. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia, PA, 1955, third edition,
1967)