Determinism, Chance and Freedom
Determinists believe that every
event (or every event in a certain category) has a cause that makes it happen
exactly as it happens. Among the varieties of determinism are the views of (1)
Plato, who held that one’s ethical choices are determined by his view of what
is good, (2) B. F. Skinner, who believed that stimuli, dispositions and motives
govern all human behavior. (3) Democritus, Hobbes, Spinoza, and many others,
who have held that every event in the universe is determined by a physical
cause. Of special interest to us are (4) theological determinists, who hold
that all events occur exactly as God has foreordained them. These would include
Calvin and others in his tradition. The classic exposition of theological determinism
is Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the Will.
Note that it is possible to be a determinist in sense (4) without being a
determinist in sense (3). That seems to be the position of the Westminster Confession of Faith, which
says in 3.1 that “God did… ordain whatsoever comes to pass,” but also says in
9.1 that man’s will “is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity
of nature, determined to good, or evil” (compare 5.2).
William James, in his article “The
Dilemma of Determinism,” distinguished between “hard” and “soft” determinism.
On his view, soft determinists hold that all events, including human decisions,
are determined, but that some kind of freedom and moral responsibility also
exists. Hard determinists hold (what James thought was the more consistent
position) that the determination of human decisions requires us to reject the
concept of moral responsibility. Other writers, however, have used the
hard/soft distinction differently, defining soft determinism as a view that is
largely deterministic but that allows for some uncaused or self-caused human
choices
Chance can refer (1) to uncaused events, or (2) to events of which the causes are
uncertain and normally uncontrollable. When we throw dice, we often say that
the result is “by chance;” but we then don’t usually mean that the result is
uncaused, only that the causes are hard to ascertain or control. Laws of
probability enable us to predict the results of such chance events over the
long term (for example, 50% of coin flips come out tails), but not in
individual cases. Chance can also be
(3) a synonym of fate, conceived as
an impersonal force that makes everything happen as it happens. In the first
sense, chance is incompatible with determinism. In the second sense, it is
compatible with determinism. In the third sense, it presupposes determinism.
Freedom is a more complicated notion. Generally speaking, a person is free when (1) he
has the ability to do something, (2) there is some obstacle or barrier that
might have prevented him from exercising that ability but is not now preventing
him. Someone is “set free” from prison, for example, when he can go where he
likes without the barriers of prison walls, bars, guards, etc. People have
political freedom when they are able publish political opinions,
organize political parties, etc., without government interference. So freedom
is always “freedom to” and “freedom from:” freedom to do something, and freedom
from some obstacle.
On this account, there are many
different kinds of freedom, since there are many different things we can be
free to do, and many obstacles we can be free from. So we speak of economic
freedom, political freedom, religious freedom, freedom
from illness, and many others.
The following kinds of freedom are
of particular interest to theologians and apologists: (1) Moral freedom, or the ability to do good,
despite the barrier of our sinful condition. God gives us this freedom by his
grace (John 8:32-36, Rom. 6:7, 18-23, 8:2). When Scripture speaks of human
freedom, it is almost always in this sense.
(2) The freedom to act according to
our own desires. This kind of freedom is sometimes called compatibilism, because it is
compatible with determinism. Scripture doesn’t describe this capacity as
“freedom,” but it does ascribe this capacity to all human beings. Jesus
teaches, for example, that the good person acts out of the desires of his good
heart, the wicked person out of his wicked heart (Matt. 12:35). There are
times, of course, when we are unable to do what we “want” to do, at some level
of wanting (as Rom. 7:15). But in most of the decisions of life, we do what we
want, in the face of potential obstacles.
(3) Freedom from natural necessity, the freedom to act without the constraint
of natural causes. This is the freedom mentioned in my earlier reference to the
Westminster Confession. Its theological importance is its implication that
human choice is not necessarily or always the result of natural causes. As
image of God, we have dominion over the earth and in some ways transcend the
world process. And we may not excuse our sins by saying that they were forced
upon us by heredity or environment.
(4) Freedom from all causation,
sometimes called libertarianism. I
have freedom in the libertarian sense when, no matter what I choose to do, I
might equally have chosen the opposite. So my choices are not only free from
natural causes (as in (3)) but also from divine causation. Indeed, my
libertarian choices are also free from myself in a way, for they are not
determined by my character, dispositions, or desires. These inner motives may influence a free decision in this sense,
but they never determine it. So a
libertarian free decision is entirely indeterminate, uncaused. Thus
libertarianism is sometimes called incompatibilism, since it is incompatible with determinism.
Libertarianism has been taught by a
number of philosophers from ancient Greece (Epicurus) to the present (Alvin Plantinga). It was the position of some church Fathers
including Justin Martyr and Tertullian, Pelagius, the
opponent of Augustine, the Jesuit Luis Molina, Fausto
and Lelio Socinus, Jacob Arminius, and present-day Arminians,
open theists and process theologians.
Libertarians argue that we must
have this kind of freedom because (1) our intuition reveals that we have it,
and (2) it is necessary for moral responsibility, for we cannot be held
responsible for anything we are determined to do.
Opponents of libertarianism,
however, reply that (1) Human intuition reveals that we choose among various
alternatives, but it never reveals to us that any of our choices are absolutely
uncaused. Intuition cannot prove a universal negative. (2) Far from teaching
that libertarian freedom is essential to moral responsibility, Scripture never
mentions libertarian freedom. (3) This doctrine would make it impossible for us
to judge anyone’s guilt in a court of law. For to prove someone responsible for
a crime and therefore guilty, the prosecution would have to take on the
impossible burden of proof of showing that the decision of the accused had no
cause whatsoever. (4) Law courts, indeed, assume the opposite of
libertarianism, namely that people are responsible only for actions that they
are sufficiently motivated to
perform. If it could be shown that an accused person committed a crime without
any sufficient cause or motivation at all he would most likely be judged insane
rather than guilty. (5) Scripture contradicts libertarianism, by ascribing
divine causes to human decisions (Exod. 34:24, Is.
44:28, Dan. 1:9, John 19:24, Acts 13:48, 16:14), even sinful ones (Gen. 45:5-8,
Ps. 105:24, Luke 22:22, Acts 2:23-24, 3:18, 4:27-28, Rom. 9:17). In none of
these (or many other) cases does divine causation eliminate human
responsibility. In fact, these texts often mention human responsibility in the
same context. (6) Scripture also contradicts libertarianism by teaching that
human decisions are governed by the heart (Luke 6:45), and by teaching that the
human heart itself is under God’s control (Ps. 33:15, Prov.
21:1). (7) In Scripture, the basis of human responsibility is not libertarian
freedom, but (a) God’s sovereign right to evaluate the conduct of his creatures
(Rom. 9:19-21), and (b) the knowledge (Luke 12:47-48, Rom. 1:18-32) and
resources (Matt. 25:14-29) God has given to each person. (b) shows that in
Scripture there is an important relation between responsibility and ability,
but the abilities in view here do not include the absolute ability to choose
opposite courses of action.
These considerations lead to the
conclusion that the Bible teaches theistic determinism, one that is “soft” in
James’s sense. Scripture renounces chance in the first and third senses above,
but not in the second. And it teaches that human beings sometimes have moral
freedom, usually have compatibilist freedom, never
have libertarian freedom. Scripture may imply that we have freedom from natural
causation as well. Certainly it doesn’t deny that, but I don’t know of any
passage that clearly affirms it.
Bibliography
J. M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, NJ, 2002).
_______, No Other God (Phillipsburg, NJ, 2001).
J. Edwards, Freedom of the Will (New Haven, CT, 1973).
W. James, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” in Essays in Pragmatism (New York, 1955), 37-64, and in many other editions of James’s works.