Penultimate Thoughts
on Theonomy
After some twenty years of studying,
discussing and debating theonomy, I would like
to summarize the points I think most important. I would like to believe
that these will be my final "thoughts," but I have learned never
to regard any of my analyses as final. Hence I call these
"penultimate."
Theonomy
can be defined simply as adherence to God's law, which would make all
Christians, especially Reformed Christians, into theonomists.
Here I define the term more narrowly as a school of thought within
Reformed theology which prefers literal, specific, and detailed
applications of Mosaic civil laws to modern civil government. The word
"prefers" gives us some leeway. At points, the theonomists, like the rest of us, apply the law only
in general and non-literal ways. But they tend more than the rest of us to
prefer the specific and the literal.
Clearly theonomy
so defined is not a clear-cut hermeneutic which prescribes the answer to
every exegetical question. Theonomists differ
much among themselves as to how the civil laws are to be applied. As I
have argued elsewhere, the difference between theonomists
and more conventional Reformed thinkers is not sharp but fuzzy. Rather, theonomy as defined above is an emphasis, a tendency.
Whether the theonomist
tendency or the more conventional Reformed tendency is correct will
depend, in my opinion, not upon general theological principles, but on the
exegesis of specific passages. If, on investigation, the best exegesis
finds that these texts warrant highly specific, literal and
detailed applications, then we will have to say that the theonomists were right. If that exegesis more commonly
points the other way, we will have to say that the theonomists
were wrong.
I cannot here present exegeses of
all the relevant passages; but perhaps the following comments will be
found helpful.
1. Historically, Reformed thought
has shown elements of both relatively theonomic
and relatively non-theonomic emphases. I do not
believe that either approach may claim unequivocally to be "the
Reformed position." Of course, Reformed people are not antinomian. They believe that Christians are governed by
God's law, and that includes the Old Testament. But Reformed
exegetes including Calvin have varied greatly as to how literally
and specifically they apply the details of the Mosaic legislation
to their own situations.
2. Kline's
rejection of theonomy presupposes some
ideas which are themselves controversial and in my opinion dubious:
(a) the sharp distinction between life-norms and faith-norms, (b)
the derivation from the Noachic Covenant of a
religiously neutral state, (c) his view of the New Testament as the sole
canon of the Christian church. We should not, therefore, assume that Kline any more than theonomy
represents unambiguously the Reformed tradition.
3. Other critics of theonomy tend to be very vague in their arguments or
even reveal a certain antipathy toward the Mosaic laws themselves (e.g.
the horror displayed at the very idea of making homosexuality a capital
crime).
4. Both Bahnsen
and Kline make broad, bold
programmatic statements which they modify considerably in their
detailed discussions. This happens to such an extent that in my
opinion their bold programmatic statements do not really or
fairly represent the views they are presenting. In actual fact, they
are much closer together than their rhetoric would suggest. See
my essay in the WTS volume Theonomy: a Reformed Critique.
5. In the application of Scripture,
there is never unity without diversity or diversity without unity. Every
law of Scripture must be applied to situations. Since every situation
is different, every application is somewhat different. On the
other hand, since all Scripture is God's word, all applications
have one thing in common: they are applications of the word of
God, applications of a fundamental unity. Rhetoric, therefore,
which denies unity or diversity is misleading. Contrary to theonomic rhetoric, there is always "change" from one application to the next of
the same law. Contrary to anti-theonomic
rhetoric, all of God's word must be brought to bear upon all of human
life (Matt. 4:4).
6. "Change" in this
connection applies both to redemptive-historical change (e.g. OT to NT)
and to cultural change (e.g. we no longer fence our roofs because we no
longer use the roof as living space). Assessing the relevance of
all these forms of change is not always easy. Should believers
wear tassels on their garments? Is that ruled out by redemptive-historical
change? Is it ruled out because the tassel has no symbolic value in the
present-day world? How about head-covering for women in worship? We should
not assume that for each of these questions there is one obvious and easy
answer, such that those who come to opposite conclusions are insincere
or heretical. As I argued in another essay, God has ordained,
and therefore takes account of, our epistemological limitations.
7. There is some confusion in theonomy between present and future application of the
law. Often when Bahnsen is pressed as to the
difficulty of enforcing theonomy in today's world,
he argues that the Mosaic laws should not be enforced today. They presuppose, he argues, a people who understand and
believe the law and who are committed to be God's people. But this
idea turns theonomy from a practical present
program to a future ideal. Yet the rhetoric of theonomists
is often calculated to arouse immediate action. I suspect that few of us
would disagree with theonomy if it were simply
presented as a future ideal. Sure: if the postmilennial
hope is realized and the world-society with its institutions becomes
largely Christian, then most of us would find very attractive the prospect
of living under something like the Mosaic civil law. Now I agree that
there are elements of the Mosaic law which would be enforceable and
helpful in contemporary society: e.g. double restitution for theft
without prison sentences. But the question of what is or is not to
be implemented now is a difficult question, and it is made all
the more difficult by the present/future distinction. We need
not only to determine how literally the law is to be applied in
the ideal situation; we must also determine how it is to be
applied in the non-ideal situation of today.
8. Much of the rhetoric of theonomy is based on the assumed need for certainty on
specifics. I have often heard Bahnsen ask
candidates for licensure/ordination how they
would argue against, say, bestiality, without referring to OT case
law. We need the case laws, the argument goes, because the other
parts of Scripture are not sufficiently specific. Another example: theonomists typically deny the appeal to "natural
light" (an appeal commonly made by Calvin and his successors) because
the natural light is not sufficiently specific in its directives.
The argument suggests that we need divine direction that is
perfectly specific, that leaves no room for human reflection; else we
will be obeying ourselves rather than God.
But in my view, that is not the
nature of Christian ethics. In Christian ethics, there is always a "situational perspective." There is always a
situation to which the law must be applied. And Scripture does not always
specify that situation in detail. There is, therefore, always a role for
human reason: to take the word of God and apply it to the situation. No
command of Scripture is perfectly specific; all Scripture commands
are general to some extent. Scripture does not tell me what key
to press on my computer as I write this article. But it does tell me in
general what I ought to say. Scripture does not anywhere specifically
forbid abortion; we determine that abortion is wrong by applying the
eighth commandment and the language of Scripture concerning the unborn.
Scripture does not speak of nuclear war, of the use of artificial
life-support, etc.
Thus we should not be frustrated
that we do not have, say, a Scripturally-dictated
maximum figure limiting government taxation. We will never escape the need
to apply general principles to specific situations. If we wish to call
that an appeal to "natural law" or "conscience," we
certainly may (though I have written elsewhere some criticisms of the
natural law theory of ethics).
9. After some reflection, I have
come to the conclusion that theonomy (like Dooyeweerdianism in the 1960s) is a good case study of
how theological ideas should not be
introduced. Forgive the personal reference, but consider this: In my Doctrine of the Knowledge of God I
introduce a "multi-perspectival"
approach to theology. Now imagine how I might have written the book in a
very different way: I might have said that multi-perspectivalism
was the clear teaching of Scripture and the Reformers, but that since the
Reformation down to the present the church has been dominated by
wicked mono-perspectivalists who have
impoverished and disempowered the church by
their stupid and wilful heresy. With the
right rhetoric, I might have sent my students forth to start all
sorts of battles in churches, denominations, Christian schools
and other organizations between "monoperspectivalists"
and "multiperspectivalists."
Eventually I might have become the founder of a denomination called the "Multiperspectivalist Presbyterian
Church" (MPC, of course). And perhaps in time I might have been
interviewed by Bill Moyers.
I could have made a case for such a
polemical and partisan approach. In fact, I believe that Scripture is multi-perspectival
and that most good theology (like that of the Reformers) is also multi-perspectival. I also believe that the church has
been impoverished by certain narrower approaches which absolutize
certain "emphases," "orders," over against others
and which overgeneralize and misapply Scriptural
principles by ignoring perspectives other than their own. Such theology
creates rifts in the church. That is denominationalism,
in essence; see my Evangelical
Reunion.
But I did not present my case that
way; for I hate ecclesiastical factionalism (I Cor.
1-3) as much as I love multi-perspectivalism.
And I believe that the best way to communicate multi-perspectivalism
is gently, leading Christians to see that this is what they already
believe in their heart of hearts, rather than creating adversary
relationships with my readers before they even understand what I am
saying.
The sharp polemics of the theonomic movement (and, to be sure, of its critics in
return) have been in my view quite unnecessary and indeed
counter-productive to its own purposes. People have a hard time seeing the
important truths that theonomy communicates; it
is hard to learn from someone who is always accusing you of something.
Reformed people have always had a high regard for God's law. They are not,
on the whole, antinomians and should not be
stigmatized as such. Theonomy's approach should
not be to attack them for "latent antinomianism,"
but to ask probing questions, to gently guide those readers into more
thoughtful and accurate applications of God's Word.
Am I condemning here the accusatory language used by the Reformers and Scripture itself? Doubtless there is a place for harsh language. Jesus was harsh with the Pharisees, but not with the woman of Samaria, although he certainly did convict her of sin. In general I think the Reformers were justified in their polemics, but I confess I have often wondered how much more persuasive they might have been if they had more regularly observed the adage that "you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar."