Review
The Nature and
Extent of Biblical Authority
Christian Reformed
Church, Report 44
by John M.
Frame
[Supplement to “Modern Views of Revelation and Scripture”
This document is the report of a
study committee to the Synod of 1972. It was in response to a request from
the Reformed Ecumenical Synod which, in turn, was prompted by a request
for joint discussion by the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland. The GKN
later produced as the result of its study, the document God With Us. The RES (and the CRC also)
had made earlier declarations about the authority of Scripture, but the
GKN questioned whether these documents were adequate to deal with
the issues of today. In particular, they failed to discuss the "connection
between the content and purpose of Scripture as the saving revelation of
God in Jesus Christ and the
consequent and deducible authority of Scripture" (emphasis theirs)
(16).
To accept the GKN's
formulation of the problem at this point, of course, is to prejudice
significantly the sort of answer one will arrive at. We have seen this
"content/authority" issue in Berkouwer
and GWU, and we have seen how it can lead us into danger. Certainly, in
some senses, authority is derivable from content:
1. Most of us come to know Jesus
first, the authority of Scripture second. We are attracted to Scripture
because it tells us of Christ.
2. And, indeed, the authority of
Scripture is, in the final analysis, the authority of Scripture's content
(what else?). It is the authority of the gospel of Jesus Christ.
3. It is not just any book which
could be the inspired Word of God; only a book with truly divine content could have such a nature.
4. The specific nature of God's
authoritative will, what he wants us to believe and to do, is a function
of the content of Scripture. We find it through applicatory
exegesis.
Therein lies the plausibility of the
GKN's formulation. But without further
elucidation it can lead us into error. One might mistakenly accept ideas
such as the following:
1. That our belief in Scripture is
not based on Scripture's self-attestation, but upon our autonomous
value judgment concerning the significance of Scripture's message.
2. That some parts of Scripture are
somewhat irrelevant to the central message and therefore can be treated as
merely human words.
The fact is that "content"
and "authority" are not related to one another in some simple
causal way. The content of Scripture is, usually, the means by which human
beings come to recognize the
authority of Scripture. But the content is not the efficient cause of
scriptural authority; it is not what makes Scripture the Word of God. What
makes Scripture the Word of God is simply the fact that God has spoken it.
Furthermore, Scripture makes plain that all of it (II Tim. 3:16, II Pet.
1:20f) is God's Word, not just those parts which modern scholars deem to
best reflect the "message." The fact is that God gave us his
message within a rather large context of history, poetry,
prophecy, gospel, epistle, apocalyptic. None of this is dispensible. In the largest sense, all of it is his
message. All of it is his Word.
Now I wish that the CRC statement
(henceforth NEBA) had analyzed the GKN formulation forthrightly as I have
tried to do above. On p. 16, indeed, NEBA does reject the possibility of
a "canon within the canon" or "kernel and husk." It
affirms that the whole Bible is the inspired Word of God. Yet it also
affirms the need "to make some distinctions in interpreting the
concrete expressions of Scripture's authority." The example they give
is the "traditional distinction between historical and
normative authority," a distinction I approve of, but which I doubt
is relevant to the GKN type of thinking. Anyhow, they go on to
say that form and content are not to be separated "in a dualistic fashion" (emphasis
theirs). I note the hand of committee chairman Gordon Spykman
here; he often talks about "dualisms," drawing as he does upon Dooyeweerd. But what is
a dualistic separation as
opposed to some other kind of separation? I find this rather confusing.
Are we allowed to separate the two, if only we don't do
The statement goes on to proscribe
separations (now it appears to be all separations, not just dualistic
ones!) between "formal and material aspects of Scripture,"
between "Jesus Christ as the content of Scripture" and "the
garment of Scripture in which he comes to us." NEBA rejects the idea
that "certain aspects" (?) can be "removed or isolated
from" scriptural authority. Scripture is a "single, unified,
authoritative Word of God," an "integrated whole."
This is one problem that rather
pervades NEBA. Terms like "separate," "isolate,"
"dualism," "apart from," "in relationship to,"
"in terms of," "holding together," "division,"
"divorce," "atomism,"
"cutting loose," "dichotomy" are thrown around
rather recklessly, as if they had some obvious meaning. In fact,
this language is very vague, and without explanation it is
quite unsuitable for theological purposes, common though it is
in theological literature. It is not at all clear what is
meant, e.g., by "separating form and content." There are many
different relations between form and content which might be described
by some people (usually not all) as "separations." It is far
more interesting and important to describe precisely what kind
of relation we are talking about (as, e.g., I have tried to
do above), rather than to talk vaguely about "separations,"
etc. These terms, used by themselves, are usually
counter-productive. They paint various images in the mind of the reader so
that some readers think they understand the issues when they really
don't. Many (like Spykman, evidently) think that
these terms give them an extraordinarily "deep" insight that
more precise terms would not give. I consider that feeling of depth quite
illusory.
I have described this problem
elsewhere (in DKG and in my Studies
in Modern Theology)as "anti-abstractionism" ("abstract" being a common
synonym for "separate," "isolate," "divide,"
though, to be fair, I was unable to find it used in NEBA). This sort of
language is one source of the plausibility and apparent "depth" of Barth's theology and that of Berkouwer especially,
and to a lesser extent of many others. But when this language is analyzed,
it proves highly vague. I am disappointed to note such a heavy reliance on this sort of vague
rhetoric in a document of the CRC.
Interestingly, however, after its
preliminary analysis, NEBA determines not to focus any longer on the GKN's content/authority distinction, but rather to
explore a different, though related problem, the problem of relating
divine to human aspects of Scripture (16f). Or, to put it differently,
"Is the authority of Scripture in any way influenced or qualified by
its historical character?" (17) In my view, this latter sentence
is, like the aforementioned anti-abstractionism, a very vague way
to formulate the problem. Obviously the historical character of Scripture
does have some influence on the
nature of its authority. The true question is, what influence? In other words, and here I continue my
critique of anti-abstractionism, it is not enough to say that history and
authority are related; we must also show what that relation is.
The question of divine/human aspects
of Scripture was posed at the Synod of Apeldoorn
of the GKN in 1961, which was the fountainhead of the discussions in the
RES and CRC which led to NEBA. Another "subsidiary" (17) concern
at Apeldoorn was "the desire to avoid an atomistic approach to the concept of inspiration and
authority (i.e. one that views each word or verse as being inspired and
authoritative in and by itself)" (17). Cutting through the
anti-abstractionist rhetoric, I take this to be a plea to interpret
Scripture in its proper contexts, especially the context of the saving
message of Christ. This concern is a proper one, but can also, if abused,
lead to the two errors mentioned earlier in connection with
the content/authority issue.
NEBA then moves on to the main body
of its discussion. First it surveys the confessions' teaching on biblical
authority. I have no serious debate with them here, though I think
the sentence "We can never adequately define but only acknowledge
and confess God's authority" smacks of Dutch irrationalism.
How do we acknowledge and confess something that we cannot define at
all? What is meant by definition here?
On 20 begins a discussion of what
NEBA said it would not be focusing on, namely the relation between content
and authority. If one ignores some anti-abstractionist vagueness,
the discussion is pretty good. It emphasizes that Scripture's authority
is divine, its extent pervasive, that it is plenary and verbal. It brings "content" into the discussion only
by saying that "When the entire Scripture speaks with divine
authority, this divine authority is understood concretely and specifically
only when one takes account of what God said, how he spoke, to whom he
spoke, etc." In other words, all of Scripture is authoritative, but
the only way to discover what specifically God is saying authoritatively
is by looking at the content, that is, through contextual exegesis. That
is a fairly obvious point, but one which ought to motivate us
toward serious study of Scripture. P. 22, then, excludes the
positions of Roman Catholicism, liberalism, Barth,
Bultmann, Ebeling, Fuchs. That is good; certainly
In section C (22), NEBA makes the
point that an understanding of Scripture's purpose is necessary for
good exegesis. True and important. On 24 they speak of
progressive revelation and the fact that "not all the words or
commandments of Scripture apply to us in the same manner in which they
were applied to those to whom they were first spoken" though all
those words remain divinely authoritative. Quite right. Then
they affirm that the human purposes of the authors are important
for understanding and applying the texts. Again, I have no
problem. (I would not endorse the distinction on p. 26, taken from Krister Stendahl, between "what it meant originally" and "what it continues to
mean." There are dangers there. Meaning is potential use, and all the
potential uses are in the words as originally given, though not all uses
are appropriate to every situation.)
On p. 27 begins NEBA's
evaluation of "Current Methods of Interpreting Scripture," topic
IV, and probably the topic of greatest interest to the church. I shall
review it following their outline.
A. Biblical Interpretation and
Scientific Findings (27ff)
NEBA recognizes the danger here to
the principle of Scriptura ipsius interpres ("Scripture is its
own interpreter"). It points out that this principle was mostly
used against allegorical and spiritualistic forms of
interpretation, and in favor of the alternative, namely grammatico-historical interpretation. But the latter
requires some knowledge of language, archaeology, etc. The operative
principle is that "these findings may not dictate an interpretation
of Scripture contrary to its own intent; but certainly these findings may,
and in fact, must, be used to help to understand the intended
meaning of Scripture" (28f).
What of new scientific theories?
NEBA points out that Calvin did not oppose Copernicanism.
Science may not dictate the interpretation of the Bible, as in liberal
teaching concerning miracle (30). Without naming the culprits, NEBA also
criticizes some (presumably this gets closer to home than
nineteenth century liberalism) who may assert "that science makes
it impossible to believe any longer that there was historically an
original man and woman who were the ancestors of the human race"
(30). In this case, "the principle that Scripture is its own
interpreter is no longer being maintained" (30). "However,
scientific discovery does compel us to ask whether a traditional
interpretation reflects the intent of the Bible, or whether it is a
reading of the Bible in the light of out-dated scientific
conceptions" (29). "Although scientific evidence may become the occasion for a reexamination of a
traditional interpretation, any reinterpretation must be based on
principles germane to and garnered from Scripture
These formulations are pretty good;
I wouldn't actually disagree with any. I do wish, however, they had said
something about the enormous extent to which science (much more in our
day than in Calvin's) has bought into dogmatically
anti-Christian presuppositions, making it necessary for us to engage in
some radical critique before using any of its conclusions.
The principle of antithesis is
entirely missing from NEBA. There is no suggestion that we are fighting a
spiritual battle in the area of science. Rather, NEBA seems to assume that
science and Christian thought are simply looking at the world from
different perspectives, which hinders communication somewhat even
though the two disciplines are basically headed in the same direction.
B. The Use of the Historical Method
NEBA disavows the old liberal form
of what is sometimes called the "historical-critical" or merely
"historical"
[1]
method which operated
explicitly on non-Christian presuppositions-- closed universe, etc. (30).
Still, they affirm the need to make use of the discipline of history in
order to understand, say, the synoptic problem. Illustrations:
1. The Historicity of the Gospels
NEBA makes the point common among
evangelicals that the gospel writers did not adhere to modern criteria of "notarial precision" in writing their
books. But then NEBA says this point is "no longer considered
adequate" (32). Why not? Because, NEBA says, it doesn't answer all
the questions as to how the writers report events, etc. That doesn't seem
to me to indicate any inadequacy in the point about notarial
precision, only a desire to supplement it with further analysis.
NEBA goes on to say that many
differences in the synoptic gospels may be traced to differences, not in
the incidents reported, but in the purposes of the individual writers.
This is not, they insist, to "divide" event from report, but
only to "distinguish." (In my estimation, this and other
language in the last paragraph of 33 is anti-abstractionist gobbledigook.) It is not, they say, ground for
speaking of the "unreliability" of Scripture (34). For the
writers were simply doing what all historians do, mixing fact and
interpretation.
I agree with the broad point. Were I
writing NEBA, however, I would have included a warning about how this
principle can be abused.
2. The Historical Jesus
NEBA is critical of both old and new
"quests." The latter reduces our knowledge of Jesus to five or
six basic facts, because it dismisses much gospel material as biased by
the faith of its authors. NEBA considers this restriction
wrong, illegitimately dictating "the limits of historical
possibility" (35). The new questers claim
that much of the gospels represents post-Resurrection thinking. Jesus
could not have claimed Messiahship or deity
before the Resurrection. Thus much of this is the creation of the early
church, fabrication rather than history. NEBA rejects this extreme aproach, while maintaining a legitimate role for form
criticism (37f). They conclude that "any view that allows the actual
creation of events for the sake of the message calls into question the
reliability of the gospels" (38). I agree with their treatment on the
whole.
3. The Resurrection of Jesus Christ
NEBA says that "no one
associated with the new theology in the Reformed community denies the
factuality of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The question under
discussion is only what the historian can say concerning the fact of the Resurrection
as recorded in the gospels" (38).
There is first the assertion that
the historian "as historian" can say nothing about the
Resurrection as such, for he cannot speak about anything unique (38). NEBA
disavows this concept of history. Certainly, they say, the Christian historian at least should
be able to include the Resurrection on the list of historical events, even
if it is in some way a matter of faith (39). And what basis do these
people have for saying that the Resurrection even took place? Clearly they
are not basing their thinking on Scripture, and the authority
of Scripture has been compromised. I agree with NEBA.
C. The First Chapters of Genesis
NEBA affirms the historicity of Gen.
1-11, while recognizing there the presence of selectivity, reflection of
the later time of Moses, figurative and symbolical language.
It insists that those who claim that various things are figurative must
argue their case "by means of careful exegesis and sound biblical
exposition. No one may make such claims simply because he thinks that
modern science has made it impossible to understand Scripture in the
traditional Reformed way" (42). Still, we should be open to hear the
scriptural rationale for new interpretations (43). Well said.
The Reformed Confessions insist that
creation and historical fall are events at the beginning of human
history (43). However, they allow some flexibility on details. They
do not contain any official position on the length of the creation days,
in NEBA's view. NEBA does not criticize theistic
evolution as such, but it exhorts those who study it to avoid
the temptation to let science dictate biblical interpretation
(44f). Those who deal with that matter should "do so with a clear
and unambiguous adherence to Scripture as the authoritative Word
of God, and in agreement with our Reformed Confessions which
are subordinate to that Word" (45). True, but I wish they had
said something very specific against theistic evolution.
Genesis 3, they say, is not a mere
"teaching model." People who say it is either make science
dictate interpretation, or else they misconstrue "rabbinic"
tendencies in Paul, who affirms the Genesis 3 account in Romans 5. Romans
5 does not include any rabbinic-type stories,
only Genesis 3 itself, which the rabbis clearly considered historical.
Good point, good argument.
On 46 is a brief excursus saying
that the Christocentric character of Scripture
does nothing to undermine its historicity. Christ himself is related to
creation and history, and the basic gospel does not eliminate the
legitimacy of asking other sorts of questions. I like to see the Berkouwer type of rhetoric ("you avoid the
serious questions") used against the Berkouwer-type message-monism.
NEBA concludes with pastoral advice
offered to the church at large. There is a bit too much heart-searching
about this for my taste; the actual advice is not very controversial.
There is a certain amount of anti-abstractionist blather ("divorce"
on 53, several phrases on the bottom of 58). The rather technical
terms "event-character" and "revelational
meaning" are used on 55 without nearly enough explanation. But for
the most part, the pastoral advice and its explanations merely restate the
positions of the preceding report.
I wish myself that NEBA had been more specific, addressing theologians by name and critically analyzing their proposals. The "Dutch family" atmosphere in the CRC seems to prevent any such mutual criticism, however. Failing that, the overall position is good, though at times it is stated too vaguely and the anti-abstractionism should be replaced by some serious analysis. I would have written it very differently, and I would have given the GKN a clearer answer on the content/authority issue. But I don't disagree with the most of the positions actually taken by NEBA.