
Levels of Ethical Evaluation
by John M. Frame
Note: I am writing these brief
papers to supplement my lecture outline in the course Doctrine of the
Christian Life. In the upper left corner of each essay is an
indication (page number and outline location) as to where in the outline this
particular essay "fits."
It is also important that we
understand the different ways by which God in Scripture evaluates our
actions. Reformed people tend to think of ethics exclusively as the
application of moral commands,
perhaps because of the traditional Reformed emphasis on the decalogue. I agree that the decalogue
is central. But I think we need to be aware of all the ways in
which Scripture holds us responsible. I would enumerate these
as follows:
1. Command: This is of course the most obvious, and it is very
important. Contrary to the antinomian spirit of
our age and of many Christians today, we must insist on the
binding character of God's law. More on this under the
"normative perspective."
2. Prohibition: This is simply a negative command. It tells us
what not to do. Our catechisms
describe sins of commission (doing what God forbids) and of omission
(failing to do what God commands). Both these categories are important.
Many Scriptural commands are negative in form (notably
commandments 1-3 and 6-10 of the decalogue),
although as we shall see the overall thrust of biblical ethics is
positive, and even the negative commands have positive implications.
Divine commands and prohibitions
define what is sinful, or at least what we may regard as sinful for
purposes of mutual exhortation and church discipline. Fundamentalists and
others have often been charged with "legalism" in the sense of
going beyond Scriptural commands to define what is sinful. I do
think the matter is more complicated than that, as we shall see
below, and in our later discussion of the adiaphora. Many questions of this sort are questions, not about what is
absolutely commanded or forbidden, but about what is better or best
as opposed to merely being good. There are also questions about the application of biblical commands which
cannot be answered from the text alone, as we shall see under the situational perspective.
3. Permission: Sometimes Scripture gives
explicit "permissions," as in I Cor.
7, where Paul "permits" (but does not command) marriage in
certain cases, or when Moses "permitted" divorce in the Old
Testament even though God did not actually approve of it (Matt. 19:8).
Other times, permissions in Scripture are inexplicit.
It is important for us to be aware of the differences between commands and
permissions. Later we shall see that in some Reformed thought the rule for
everyday life is "whatever Scripture does not prohibit is
permitted," while in matters of faith and worship, "whatever is
not commanded is prohibited." I take issue with this traditional
account of things. For now, let us simply be aware of the
distinctive meaning of "permission." Permission tells us what we may do.
4. Approval: Approval is stronger than "permission" but
less strong than "command," as a means of impelling us to behave
a certain way. (In Medical Ethics I
call this level of evaluation "praise.") In one sense, all
permitted and commanded acts are approved by God. We may never declare an
act to be sinful when God has commanded or permitted it; in
that sense, God approves of all acts which he commands or
permits, disapproves of all acts he forbids. Still,
Scripture distinguishes among human acts between good and better,
and between bad and worse. Among acts which are good, some are
given special divine approval. For example, the heroism of
David's three mighty men, when to fulfill a passing wish of
their commander they fought to bring him a drink of water from the enemy-held
well at Bethlehem, is definitely approved by God (II Sam. 23:13-17). But
would they have sinned if they had not done this? I don't think so.
Consider also the poor widow who put "everything" into the
temple treasury (Mark 12:44). Would
she have sinned had she put in only one mite instead of two?
Roman Catholic theology describes
such acts as "supererogation," that is, beyond the requirements
of God's law. In one sense this is true: these are good acts, approved by
God, which are not strictly commanded. However, this way of putting it is
very misleading. Note: (1) The goodness of these acts is defined by Scripture; so in one sense it
is not "beyond" the law at all. (2) Even after such moral
heroism, we must confess to God that we are unworthy servants. Our motives
are impure; there is sin even in our heroism. This is far from the Roman
idea that we can do more than
God requires. (3) The deeper meaning of the law is to be found in the
righteousness of Christ. The standard for Christians is nothing less than
his self-sacrificing love, the ultimate in "moral heroism"
(Matt. 20:26ff, John 13:34f, Phil. 2:1-11, I Pet. 2:21, I John 3:16, many
other passages). When God "permits" something less than this
ultimate, he does it "because of our hardness of heart" (cf.
Matt. 19:8). (4) The Roman Catholic idea that by doing morally heroic
things I may accumulate merit which may be somehow transferred to
others is anti-scriptural and confuses the very Gospel of grace.
5. Disapproval: This of course is the opposite of approval.
Although God disapproves of all acts which he prohibits, there are also
some acts which he permits which he nevertheless disapproves. An example is divorce in the
Old Testament period, which Moses permitted because of the
people's hardness of heart, but which God did not actually approve
(Matt. 19:8-12; cf. Mal. 2:16).
It is important in the Christian
life to be concerned, not only with what is commanded/permitted/forbidden,
but also what is approved/disapproved. Preoccupation with the
former group of categories can lead to a mentality that asks "How
much can I get away with?" Thus some Reformed Christians,
preoccupied with the doctrine of Christian liberty (and reacting
against fundamentalist "legalism"), have sought to be as much
like worldly people as they could be, while remaining (barely)
within the sphere of divine permission. But a biblical ethic is
never merely an account of "how much we can get away with."
The Christian life is always a striving for the perfection of
Christ (realizing that we will not attain perfection in this
life) (Phil. 3:7-16). We must always ask, not only, "is
this permitted?" but also "is this the best choice?"
I admit there are some residual unclarities in this account, but I think we have
carried these distinctions about as far as Scripture warrants and no
farther. This formulation does not explain everything we might want to
know, but we may here be brushing up against "the secret things"
which God has kept to himself. We should not, for example, tie ourselves
up in knots worrying how these distinctions will be handled in the
final judgment. One might be tempted to ask: When the hearts of
men will be revealed, what about those who divorced their wives
in the Old Testament period for reasons rejected by Jesus? Will
God excuse them, because he had "permitted" such divorces, or
will he chasten them because he hates divorce? Perhaps the
"permissions" have more to do with church discipline on earth
than with the final judgment. But one might ask: if God permits something,
how can he later hold it against us? The answer, I think, is that
the final judgment is a judgment of the heart, and the standard will be God's omniscient knowledge of the heart. No one
will argue the fairness of God's evaluations on that day.
Detailed questions of legal interpretation, under those conditions,
will seem quite irrelevant. Further, all of this will be somewhat moot for
those who trust in Christ for salvation. For believers know that their
individual sins, though great, are overshadowed by the greater sin of all
of us in Adam, and our righteous deeds are literally nothing compared with
the righteousness of Christ by which alone we are justified. For although
the secrets, even of believers, will be manifest on that last day, our
acquittal is based not on our works but on the righteousness of Christ.
p. 4; I, B, 11
7-28-93