Review
Benjamin Wirt Farley: The
Reviewed by John M. Frame.
Originally published in Westminster
Theological Journal 51:2 (Fall, 1989), 397-400. Used by permission.
Divine providence is, I think, one
of the more neglected doctrines in today's theologies, and I am pleased to
find in this book evidence of some concentrated thought on the subject.
There are, however, many weaknesses in it, so many that its chief value may
be to stimulate others to develop better treatments of the subject.
The book tries to cover many bases:
biblical teaching, Greek philosophical concepts, the history of Christian
doctrine, the impact of modern science, modern theological discussions
of "acts of God," the "challenge of process theology."
Obviously, a book of this size cannot deal in depth with so many topics.
The book is like a great big theological dictionary
article, presenting the basic facts plus some very concise personal observations,
usually summarizing "common wisdom" on the various issues. Those
who have need for such a summarized treatment should buy the book.
However, those who, like me, pick up books with such titles hoping to find
some new insights into difficult problems (such as, in this case, evil,
freedom and predestination) will be disappointed.
Farley has three degrees from Union
Theological Seminary of Richmond, Virginia (including doctoral work under
John Leith) and now teaches Bible, Religion, and
Philosophy at
Farley's own views also raise
questions here about the meaning for him of "Reformed." He
affirms the reformation sola Scriptura,
but his formulation of it is disappointing: He says that it forbids
principles which "might actually repudiate, contradict, or compromise
the central motifs of the Bible" (p. 17). Only the central motifs?
And I shall discuss later the question of Farley's view of divine
sovereignty; that too raises some questions about his actual relation to
the Reformed tradition.
The book begins with some basic
distinctions. Farley argues first that providence is "a doctrine of
faith" rather than "a postulate of reason." He notes here
some interesting biblical connections between providence and faith, but he
never quite explains what view he is opposing. Is he simply affirming sola Scriptura as above? Is he saying that
providence is not part of general revelation? Then what of Acts 14:17,
17:24-28, etc.? Is he saying that we repress this truth apart from
faith? But is that not the case with all of God's truth? Is he opposing philosophical
attempts to prove divine providence? What kind of philosophical attempts?
Christian? Non-Christian? All? In any case, much more must be said about
Christian epistemology.
Then he argues that providence is
importantly related to the doctrine of election. His dependence on Barth and Brunner here is a bit disconcerting, and the
precise relationship of the two doctrines somewhat eludes his
descriptions. Evidently he doesn't want "to subsume, as completely as
Barth does, the preservation of human life under
the rubric of salvation or election" (p. 36). But this question is
not a question of degree ("as completely as"), but a question of
precisely what relation is in view. Also, Farley seems to feel that this emphasis
gives us more of a "christological
accent" (p. 25) and makes our formulations "less authoritarian,
speculative, and deductive" than the "older Reformed dogmatics" (Ibid.). This point seems to me
neither clear nor obvious, especially in view of the fact that it suggests
supralapsarianism, a view which is
often portrayed as the very source of much "authoritarian,
speculative, and deductive" thinking in the post-reformation period.
He then argues in a fairly
traditional way, though again in dialogue with Barth,
that providence is not "continuous creation" (pp. 27ff) and
expounds the basic Reformed view in terms of preservation, cooperation
("concurrence") and government (pp. 31-46). Nothing new here; as
a summary it is fine.
Similarly for the historical survey
which occupies the next six chapters and the bulk of the book. Through
here he intersperses some analysis with the descriptive material, but
one will not find here, e.g., any notable contributions
to interpretative controversies about Plato or Aquinas. Farley's evaluations
are very sketchy. He seems to feel that he must say something positive and
something negative about everybody; so for example he tells us that
Plato's god has "high moral and rational attributes" (p. 58),
but "yet" he is forced to admit that this god is only "a
myth which functions in a metaphorical way to attest to the phenomenon of
the power and possibility of an ideal Good" (Ibid.). In my view, it
would have been less misleading to weight the criticism in a more strongly
negative direction. What good are God's moral and rational attributes
if, in the final analysis, he is only a myth? Well, I may be
carping here. The real problem is that Farley's analyses are so
sketchy that he is never able todevelop an
argument yielding fresh insight. When I read such books I am tempted to
carp.
Farley attempts to deal with all
major thinkers only through Schleiermacher. His
treatment of the impact of science ends with
We should not, however, exaggerate
the importance of the problems I have noted above. Most of these problems
derive from the format of the book, in which Farley is forced to deal
with many things in a very short space. Since the length of a book
is often determined by the publisher rather than the author,
the format problem may not be entirely of Farley's making. And in
any case, the over-conciseness does not prevent the book from being
a useful survey of basic facts for those who need to have them.
I do have, however, a more serious
criticism, a substantive one which goes beyond format problems. That
is the author's confusion on that most basic issue, the
sovereignty of God.
Farley is a Calvin scholar and has
edited and translated Calvin's Sermons
on the Ten Commandments and Treatises Against the Anabaptists and
the Libertines. He notes in the preface to The Providence of God that in working through the second
Calvin volume, especially chapters 13-16 of the Treatise Against the Libertines, he "was struck by
the clarity and simplicity of Calvin's argument against
the Libertines' pantheistic and deterministic interpretation
of nature and history" (p. 11). These chapters "proved Calvin's theology
to be far less deterministic than I had previously thought it to be"
((Ibid.). More specifically, he says, Calvin rejected "the notion
that God is the unqualified cause of all causes" (p. 154; cf. 219,
235). Farley then resolved, in writing The
Providence of God, to keep in view "Calvin's own approach as a
sort of guiding norm" (Ibid.).
In the present volume, then, Farley
seeks to develop a Reformed position which is not
"deterministic" in the way that he thinks, e.g., Zwingli's
position was (pp. 143-150). He makes a distinction between
"hard" and "soft" determinism. So far as I can tell,
he never defines "hard" determinism, though he associates it
with fatalism, the idea that "regardless of what we do, the outcome
will be the same" (p. 69, quoting Adolf Grunbaum). "Soft" determinism means that
"Rules for managing individuals and nations can be based only on
causal laws which tell us that if such and such is done, it is likely that the outcome will be thus and
so" (Ibid., again quoting Grunbaum). Not
having access to Grunbaum's article I won't
try to explain Grunbaum's meaning here. Farley,
however, takes this principle to mean that "events are rightly the
results of antecedent causes, but not necessarily the results
of unalterable, predetermined causae" (Ibid.. I confess I don't understand this
very well. He seems to be saying in the first clause that all (?) events
are caused; but in the second clause he says that these causes are not
unalterable, nor are they themselves predetermined. If they are not
predetermined, then evidently they are uncaused. But that would mean that
not all events are caused, contrary to the impression left by
the first clause.
At any rate, it is fairly clear to
me (not entirely) that Farley is here opening a door to "free
will" in the sense of philosophical libertarianism and theological Arminianism. See especially pp. 75, 78f, 91, 149, 166.
His "soft determinism" seems not to be determinism at all in any
conventional philosophical sense. It is, rather, an indeterminism. It
is possible that I have misunderstood him here. It certainly
would have improved communication if Farley had offered some
comparison between his view of freedom and that of Calvin's opponent Pighius, or between his and that of Arminius
who brought grief to later Calvinists. But Farley seems almost
intentionally vague in this area.
Another confusing thing is that
Farley leaves out a very significant alternative. That is the view that
although all events including human decisions are foreordained (by God in
the theological context), free human choices are still
important because (a) they are not coerced and (b) they are
necessary means to the preordained end. That is, incidentally, the
view which is usually called "soft determinism" by philosophers. William James had it in mind
when he first developed the hard/soft distinction in his "The Dilemma
of Determinism." Paul Edwards, in "Hard and Soft
Determinism" associates this view also with Hume, Mill and Schlick. I would say too that this is the position of
the Westminster Confession of Faith IX, 1 and of Calvinists generally.
Including Calvin. Farley's book did
stimulate me to study closely Calvin's Treatise
Against the Libertines, 13-16
(in Farley's edition!), and I certainly did not find what he thinks is
there. On Farley's own account, Calvin is here criticizing a pantheistic determinism. His opponents
were maintaining that no distinction can be drawn between God's acts and
ours and that therefore "it is not lawful to condemn anything"
(p. 255). Calvin replies by emphasizing that God does no sin and that men
are responsible before him. But to support those points he does
not resort to any kind of libertarianism. On the contrary, he
begins by saying "we do not deny that whatever comes to pass does so
by the will of God" (p. 242).
So: buy the book to get a concise
factual history of the concept of providence, but not to seek new or deep
insight. Above all, try to ignore what he says about determinism and
freedom, which in my opinion will only produce confusion.