Van Til: the
Theologian
By: John M. Frame
In 1961,
Cornelius Van Til reviewed a book by R. H. Bremmer called Herman Bavinck als
Dogmaticus (Herman Bavinck the Theologian).l Having run across
this review in a recent perusal of the Van Til corpus, I asked myself whether
someday there might be a book called Cornelius Van Til als Dogmaticus.
Perhaps
one's first instinct would be to say no. Van Til, after all, is an apologist,
not a dogmatician. He did indeed teach courses in systematic theology for many
years, but those courses (if some of his former students are to be believed)
were essentially apologetics courses in disguise. Where Van '
If, however,
from the above considerations we conclude that Van Til's theology is
uninteresting and/or unimportant, we will merely expose ourselves as shallow
thinkers and cut ourselves off from one whose contribution to theology is of
virtually Copernican dimensions. If Van Til had done nothing more than to
introduce some of the best insights of the Dutch theologians to the American
public, even then his work would have been of substantial importance. But when
one considers the uniqueness of his apologetic position and then further
considers the implications of that apologetic for theology, one searches for
superlatives to describe the significance of Van Til's overall approach.
Van Til's
apologetics may well be described as a group of original applications of some
familiar Reformed doctrines. In Van Til's view, apologetics and theology
(particularly systematic theology) are very closely
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1. C. Van Til, "Bavinck the Theologian, A Review Article,"
3
4
related:
"... defense and positive statement go hand in hand."2
There can be no adequate positive statement without defense against error, and
vice versa. In fact, "Systematic Theology is more closely related to
apologetics than are any of the other disciplines. In it we have the system of
truth that we are to defend."3 Thus Van Til begins the
exposition of his apologetic with an outline of Reformed systematic theology. 4
It is clear from the outset that one of Van Til's basic concerns is to present
an apologetic which is true to Scripture and Reformed doctrine. His major
complaints against competing apologetic methods are theological complaints,
that is, that they compromise the incomprehensibility of God, total depravity,
the clarity of natural revelation, God's comprehensive control over creation,
and so on. His appeal to the non-Christian contains much exposition of Reformed
doctrine, in order that the unbeliever might know what sort of God is
being argued for.5 Thus, Gordon R. Lewis6 and John W.
Montgomery 7 charge that Van Til confuses apologetics with
systematic theology. This criticism is mistaken, for it suggests that Van Til
would merely proclaim doctrine to a non-Christian without evidence or argument.
Even though "defense and positive statement go hand in hand," Van Til
is quite capable of distinguishing between them, and he is self-consciously
concerned to supplement the one with the other.8 Yet the
Lewis-Montgomery criticism shows a real insight into the structure of Van Til's
thought, for in one sense it is indeed difficult to distinguish apologetics
from systematic theology in Van Til's position. Though Van Til does clearly
distinguish "positive statement" from "defense," and though
in general he aligns the first with theology and the second with apologetics,
he does insist that, because each is indispensable to the other, theology must
have an apologetic thrust, and apologetics must expound theology. The
difference between the two in practice, then, becomes a difference in
emphasis rather than of subject matter.
This
practical identification of the two disciplines makes Van Til's apologetics
highly responsive to the demands of Reformed doctrine. But
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2. Van Til, Apologetics (Syllabus, 1959), 3.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 4ff; cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1955), 23ff.
5. Note, for example, the treatment of creation, providence, prophecy, and
miracle in Van Til's pamphlet, Why I Believe in God (
6. In E. Geehan, ed.,
7. In ibid., 391f.
8. Van Til, Apologetics, 3f.; Why I Believe in God, 16. The idea
that Van Til's apologetic substitutes proclamation for argument is frequently
denied in Van Til's writings, but is nevertheless one of the most prevalent
misunderstandings of his position.
5
the converse
is also true: the traditional doctrines take on, in many cases, a very new
appearance when put to Van Til's apologetic use. Unoriginal as his doctrinal
formulations may be, his use of those formulations -- his application
of them--is often quite remarkable. The sovereignty of God becomes an
epistemological, as well as a religious and metaphysical principle. The Trinity
becomes the answer to the philosophical problem of the one and the many. Common
grace becomes the key to a Christian philosophy of history.9 These
new applications of familiar doctrines inevitably increase our understanding of
the doctrines themselves, for we come thereby to a new appreciation of what
these doctrines demand of us. Sometimes these new understandings are of quite a
radical sort -- radical enough to require new formulations, or at least
supplementary formulations, of the doctrines themselves. Van Til, as we have
observed, rarely provides such revised formulations, though he does at some
significant points, as we shall see. But there is much in Van Til that will
require future orthodox Reformed dogmaticians to rethink much of the
traditional language and thus to go beyond Van Til himself. Not that the
traditional language is wrong (generally speaking); it is just that through
reading Van Til we often become painfully aware of how much more needs to be
said.
Thus, Van
Til's theology, conventional and traditional as it may seem at first glance, is
just as significant in its own way as is his apologetics. If Van Til has given
a new epistemological self-consciousness to apologetics, then he has done the
same for theology and all other types of Christian thought. If (as may well be
said) Van Til has done for Christian thought what Kant accomplished for non-Christian
thought, giving it a revolutionary awareness of the uniqueness and
comprehensiveness of its distinctive principles, then as with Kant the
"Copernican" radicalism of his contribution must be appreciated in
all areas of human thought and life.
This paper
attempts to set forth the contributions of Van Til to theology, both the
"explicit" and the "implicit" ones. As suggested above, the
importance of Van Til's contribution does not always lie on the surface. At
times the logic of his position requires us to go beyond his explicit
teachings, to say more than he himself says. I intend to suggest some areas
where such is the case and also to suggest clarifications and corrections in
Van Til's formulations where the genius of his own thought demands them.10
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9. For references and further discussion on these matters, see below.
10. Here let me say a word on behalf of the need for constructive critical
analysis of Van Til. Van Til, like any human thinker, is fallible. Those
who love and honor him can pay him no higher service than to help him see his
own weaknesses and thereby to increase the effectiveness of his future efforts.
We must therefore be
6
Where shall
we begin? In this sort of paper, one is often torn between focusing upon a
thinker's basic concerns and focusing on his distinctive teachings.
The two are not always the same. Van Til's concern is to be faithful to the
biblical gospel: the sovereignty of God, the authority of Scripture, the
reality of Christ's redemptive work in history, etc. But these concerns are
also the concerns of many others -- Augustine, Calvin, Kuyper, Warfield, many
more. If we portray Van Til as, say, a "theologian of divine
sovereignty," then how do we distinguish him from Calvin? Is it that Van
Til is more concerned for divine sovereignty than was Calvin? Doubtful.
Is it that Van Til does more justice to divine sovereignty than does
Calvin? Well, perhaps. But if so, how does he do it? What we want to know is
not so much what Van Til's concerns are, for these are obvious to anyone who
reads Van Til, and are in any case the common property of the whole Christian
church. We want to know, rather, how Van Til is able uniquely to implement
these concerns in certain areas of controversy. What is it that is distinctive
to Van Til? What does he do that Calvin, say, does not? Therefore, this paper
will focus, not on Van Til's "basic concerns," but on his
"distinctive teachings." The reader should be warned, however, that
such a focus may distort the
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greatly saddened by the fact that there has been almost no quality critical
work done on Van Til's writings from sources sympathetic to his position. (a)
Most critical work on Van Til has come from sources deeply unsympathetic
to him--from "debunkers." Note in this connection James Daane, A
Theology of Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), the contributions of
Montgomery and Pinnock in Jerusalem and Athens, and many more. (b) Most sympathetic
responses to Van Til have been utterly uncritical and generally non-analytical.
They simply laud Van Til's positions and castigate his opponents without any
serious wrestling with the issues Van Til raises. Such writers mean to do him
tribute, yet meek acquiescence is hardly an adequate response, certainly no
compliment, to a thinker who means to challenge us at the most profound
intellectual and spiritual level. As an example of this tendency, note D.
Vickers' review of Jerusalem and Athens, in Westminster Theological
Journal XXXIV, 2 (May, 1972), 174-179. (c) A third group, the cosmonomic
idea thinkers, has taken a middle ground, mingling appreciation of Van Til with
criticism. Yet their critique of Van Til rests on a rather bizarre
misinterpretation of his teaching--a misinterpretation resulting from their
attempt to squeeze Van Til's thought into the rigid categories of their
philosophical scheme. Cf. the contributions of Dooyeweerd and Knudsen in Jerusalem
and Athens. (d) The best material on Van Til comes from the
7
shape of Van
Til's system in a certain way. It may seem from this treatment that Van Til's
thought is preoccupied with abstractions -- unity and diversity, paradox and
logic, analogy, epistemology, etc. Such, however, would be a false impression.
These "abstract" concerns are fairly high on the list of Van Tillian
"distinctives," but fairly low on a list of his "basic
concerns." Van Til pursues such philosophical questions only in order to
be faithful in his witness to Jesus Christ. Far from being
"preoccupied" with such abstractions, Van Til brings them up with
reluctance, and only as a means of showing the implications of the gospel of
God's saving grace.
As I have
hinted in the above caveat, I find Van Til's major distinctiveness in the area
of theological introduction or "meta-theology" -- the theology of
theology, the study of theological method and structure. This area is sometimes
called "theological prolegomena," a term which designates those
things which must be "said before" theology may be done. Sometimes
"prolegomena" is conceived of as not properly belonging to a
theological system. Louis Berkhof and others fail to include the doctrine of
Scripture in their major dogmatic works, relegating that doctrine to
supplementary or "introductory" volumes, since they feel, apparently,
that the doctrine of Scripture belongs to "prolegomena" and not to
theology. Whatever may be said on behalf of this procedure, a "Van Tillian
theologian" will wish to guard strongly against any implication that
"prolegomena" is some kind of autonomous rational activity which precedes
the believer's submission of his mind to God's Word. "Prolegomena"
must be just as subject to Scripture as any area of theology -- especially so,
since prolegomena so greatly influences every phase of theological
thinking. All our thoughts, "introductory" and otherwise, must
be captive to the obedience of Christ (II Cor. 10:5). Thus I insist that in one
sense, perhaps the most important sense, "prolegomena" is a properly
theological discipline.
Yet
prolegomena, or theological introduction,11 deals with many matters
which are more often associated with philosophy than with theology: questions
of epistemology, of logic, of analogy, and so on. Distinctive to Van Til's
thought in this area is a generalized reflection upon the relation of unity
to diversity in the theological organism. In my view, Van Til is the first
orthodox Christian thinker to have studied this question in a distinctively
theological way. This is what I take to be Van Til's most distinctive
contribution to theology. Only a man with his philosophical background
could have attacked such a problem, but only a man with
----------
11. I prefer
the second designation for reasons discussed in the previous paragraph. So does
Van Til, although, so far as I know, he has never explicitly stated the
argument I have presented.
8
his
profoundly biblical commitment could have adopted his distinctive approach.
In the rest
of this paper, I shall discuss Van Til's concept of the Christian "system
of truth." The analysis will focus on the various sorts of
"unities" and "diversities" to be found among the various
Christian doctrines. In particular, I shall ask in what ways the various
doctrines are "interdependent"-- in what ways they "require one
another" -- and, on the other hand, in what sense these doctrines are
"paradoxically" related. In the course of the discussion, I concern myself
not merely with these methodological questions. I will explore many of Van
Til's specific doctrinal teachings, some in passing, others at length.
Is there a
"system" of Christian truth? Surely that is an important
"introductory" consideration to theology, especially systematic
theology! It has been a controversial question: Kierkegaard and Earth have
condemned the very idea of a doctrinal "system" as an affront to God,
as a human attempt to master and manipulate God's revelation. On the other
hand, E. J. Carnell set forth something called "systematic
consistency" as the final test of religious truth.12 What does
Van Til say? Typically, his answer carries with it a demand for further
analysis: it all depends on what you mean by "system." In one sense, yes,
there is such a system; in another sense, no. Thus, at times Van Til appears
unequivocally to endorse the idea of "system," while at other times
he seems to attack it.
I. Pro-System
Van Til's
endorsement of "system" begins with the consideration that God
himself is "exhaustively comprehensible to himself."13
God's self-knowledge is in no way defective; it is in perfect order. And to say
this is to say, in one sense, that God's knowledge is "systematic":
"... there must be in God an absolute system of knowledge."14
This knowledge includes knowledge not only of God himself but also of His
works. Since God has planned and controls all things, "All created reality
therefore actually displays this plan. It is, in consequence, inherently
rational."l3 God, therefore, has a "systematic"
knowledge of himself and of the world, since He knows His own plan exhaustively
and since the world perfectly conforms to that plan.
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12. E. J. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 56ff.
13. Van Til, "Nature and Scripture," in
14. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 61. Cf. "God is absolute
rationality. He was and is the only self-contained whole, the system of
absolute truth," An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Syllabus,
1961), 10.
9
Because of
this absolute divine system of truth, true knowledge is available to
men. God has created the world and us, adapting each to the other according
to His rational plan. "We see then that our knowledge of the universe must
be true since we are creatures of God who has made both us and the
universe."l4 God's rationality vindicates human knowledge:
"We say that if there is to be any true knowledge at all there must be in
God an absolute system of knowledge."14 This human knowledge is
not "exhaustive" or "comprehensive"; only God has that sort
of knowledge. But it is, or is capable of being, genuinely true. 15
Even more: with regard to "the existence of God and the truth of Christian
theism," there is "absolutely certain proof,"16 Not
only do we have true knowledge of God, but certain knowledge as
well. God is clearly revealed, so that His existence and the truth of
His word is not just "possible" or "probable," but certain.
17 There is a cogent "theistic proof."18
This
knowledge of God available to man is "systematic" in two related
senses. In the first place, it is "systematic" in the sense of being internally
coherent:
But I do, of course, confess that what Scripture teaches
may properly be spoken of as a system of truth. God identifies the Scriptures
as his Word. And he himself, as he tells us, exists as an internally
self-coherent being. His revelation of himself to man cannot be anything but
internally coherent. When therefore the Bible teaches that God controls by his
plan, whatever comes to pass, it does not also teach that God does not control
whatever comes to pass. If such were the case, God's promises and threats would
be meaningless. 19
There is no
"real contradiction" in God's revelation. It cannot be the case that
"the same ultimate will of God wills, and yet wills not, the salvation of
sinners."20 There can be no "contradiction between the
secret and revealed wills of God."21 Note also:
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15. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 24, 164; The Defense of
the Faith, 60; "Nature and Scripture," 277.
16. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 120; Apologetics, 64.
17. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 114f.; Apologetics, 13;
"Nature and Scripture," 278f.
18. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 102ff., 196; The Defense
of the Faith, 196; A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Nutley, N. J.: Presbyterian
and Reformed, 1969), 292; Common Grace and the Gospel (Nutley, N. J.:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972), 179ff., 190ff. In this note I have indulged
in a bit of referential overkill, because this point is often missed. Van Til
is not simply opposed to the theistic proofs as students often imagine. On the
contrary, he gives them strong endorsement. But he insists that they be
formulated in a distinctively Christian way, rejecting any "proof' based
on a non-Christian epistemology.
19. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 205. Cf. A Christian Theory of
Knowledge, 38f.
20. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 76.
21. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 251.
10
God can reveal only that which is consistent with his
nature as a self-identified being. The law of identity in human logic must be
seen to be resting upon the character of God and therefore upon the
authoritative revelation of God. But to say that God is both omnipotent and not
omnipotent, because conditioned by the ultimate determinations of his creatures,
is to remove the very foundation of the law of identity. This is irrationalism.
It allows the legitimacy of the non-Christian principle of individuation,
namely chance. 22
Related to
this internal coherence of God's revelation is a slightly different sense in
which the revelation may be said to be "systematic": there are relations
of dependence among biblical doctrines. Some may be said to be
"fundamental" to others. Some, in fact, are "fundamental"
to the whole system.
Naturally, in the system of theology and in apologetics
the doctrine of God is of fundamental importance. In apologetics it
must always be the final if not the first point of attack. In theology the
main questions deal with the existence and the nature of God. 23
Fundamental
to everything orthodox is the presupposition of the antecedent self-existence
of God and of his infallible revelation of himself to man in the Bible. 24
First and
foremost among the attributes, we therefore mention the independence or
self-existence of God. . . . 25
Another
"central" doctrine is the historical fall of Adam: only if we take
the fall as historical can a sound theology be maintained. 26
"Temporal creation" is another doctrine with which "Christianity
stands or falls."27 Furthermore, predestination, as Warfield
says, is the "central doctrine of the Reformation." 28 And
the Trinity is the "heart of Christianity." 29
More
specifcally, there are doctrines which Van Til sets forth as necessitating
other doctrines:
...the Christian-theistic conception of an absolute God
and an absolute Christ and an absolute Scripture go hand in hand. We cannot
accept one without accepting the others. 30
Self-contained
God implies self-attesting revelation. 31 The doctrine of
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22. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 202, cf. 38f.
23. Van Til, Apologetics, 4 (emphasis his). Cf. A Christian Theory of
Knowledge , 12, The Defense of the Faith, 59.
24. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 1.
25. Ibid., 206.
26. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29.
27. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 229.
28. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1959),76.
29. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 28.
30. Van Til, Christian-Theistic Ethics (n.p.: den Dulk Foundation,
1971), 28.
31. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 203; cf. An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 62, "Introduction," to B. B. Warfield, The
Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1948), 36f., A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 70.
11
analogical
knowledge is a "corollary" from the doctrine of the Trinity. 32
Man's knowledge is true "because," not in spite of, the fact that it
is "analogical." 32 Man's being and action are genuinely
his own "because Of)) (again, not "in spite of") "the more
ultimate being and activity on the part of the will of God." 33
The personality of God (and hence the ultimately personal character
of man's environment) becomes the key to avoiding determinist and
indeterminist conceptions 34 -- a somewhat surprising idea at first
glance, but worked out cogently by Van Til. For one thing, denial of the
self-sufficient holiness of God entails denial also of temporal creation and
historical Fall. 35 For another, "God is free not in spite of
but because of the necessity of his nature." 36 therefore,
"deny the doctrine of creation and you have denied the Christian concept
of God." 37 The creation of man in God's image is at the same
time a "pre- supposition of revelation" and a "corollary from
the notion of an absolutely self-conscious God." 38
Van Til's
stress on the interdependence of biblical doctrines can be seen from the
following examples of his reasoning. The providential involvement of God in all
created things and events, His all-foreordaining direction of the world (so
characteristic of Reformed theology), requires a distinctively Reformed view of
Scripture. 39 To deny biblical authority is to assert one's autonomy
or independence of God's control. 40 The differences between
Calvinism and Arminianism require a difference in apologetic method.41
Christian ethics presupposes double predestination.42 To deny the
historicity of the fall is to deny the directness of revelation in history.43
Modernism, Barthianism,44 and Arminianism, because of their distinctive
teachings, cannot do justice to the biblical
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32. Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (n.p.: den Dulk
Foundation 1969), 48; cf. 97.
33. Van Til, Apologetics, 11.
34. Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 67f.; Christian-Theistic
Ethics, 35, 48. Note also the account of the centrality of God's absolute
personality in The Defense of the Faith, 29, 59.
35. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 244.
36. lbid., 177.
37. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 231.
38. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 63.
39. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture (den Dulk Foundation, 1967), 37;
The Defense of the Faith, 202; The Sovereignty of Grace (Nutley,
N. J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 63.
40. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 139.
41. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 35.
42. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 118f..
43. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 47.
44. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism; The New Modernism.
12
doctrine of
grace.45 Secondary causes in the universe have genuine significance
"not in spite of, but just because of the fact that they act in accord
with the one ultimate Cause or plan of God." 46 To
summarize and generalize :
A truly Protestant method of reasoning involves a stress
upon the fact that the meaning of every aspect or part of Christian theism
depends upon Christian theism as a unit ... the whole claim of Christian theism
is in question in any debate about any fact.47
The starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one
another. 48
No other
American theological writer gives his readers such a profound sense of the unity
of Christian truth. Again and again we learn that to affirm one doctrine is to
affirm another and to affirm the whole; to deny one doctrine is to deny another
and to deny the whole. All doctrines are interdependent; the parts depend on
the whole; the whole depends on the parts. In this emphasis, Van Til has given
Reformed theology much to think about. Any one of the relationships listed
above might be made the subject of a theological treatise. Why is it that the
self-contained nature of God implies that His revelation be self-attesting? A
theologian could spend a great number of pages arguing that point. Van Til
himself rarely argues for any of these relationships at any great length. To
him they are virtually self-evident. Yet fuller explorations of these matters
could bring much edification to the church. How is it, for example, that denial
of creation involves denial of God? An answer to that question could help us
see the importance of creation in a new way.
Further, the
formula "not in spite of, but because of," which recurs so often in
Van Til's thought, places a substantial challenge before theologians as they
deal with apparent contradictions in biblical teaching. Have we too often been
content merely to point out the consistency of biblical doctrines when
the Bible itself would have us do more? Have we been content merely to show
that human responsibility is compatible with divine foreordination, rather than
showing that human responsibility depends upon divine foreordination and
is inconceivable without it? If we are going to do the latter, some hard
thinking may be necessary. We will certainly have to go beyond the elliptical,
highly summarized arguments of Van Til's own writings. Yet the rewards will be
great.
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45. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 239; The
Theology of James Daane, 122.
46. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 207; cf. 267ff., Common Grace
and the Gospel, 73, cf. 65ff. As should be evident by now, the formula
"not in spite of, but because of' is one of the leitmotifs of Van
Til's thought.
47. Van Til, Apologetics, 73.
48. lbid.,62.
13
Van Til's
approach here also has another interesting ramification. Today there is much
concern in theology as to the "central focus" of the Christian
revelation. Many theologies have arisen attempting to persuade us of the
"centrality" of something or other in the Christian faith: theologies
of the Word, of "crisis," of personal encounter, of divine acts, of
history, of hope, of self-understanding, of celebration, of covenant law, of
doxology, and so on. Van Til's emphasis reminds us, however, that there are
many "central" doctrines of the faith, not just one single one.
And further, any scheme which would dismiss any teaching of Scripture as
unimportant or false must be rejected. In Christianity, the
"central" doctrines do not become central by cancelling out other
scriptural teachings; rather, they undergird and support and necessitate those
other doctrines. Though Van Til himself does not say this, his thought
suggests the desirability of an orthodox Christian "perspectival"
approach to theology: each major doctrine provides a "perspective"
in terms of which the whole of Christianity can be viewed. The atonement,
for example, presupposes certain attributes of God, a certain doctrine of sin,
a definite conception of redemptive history; and it in turn generates a further
history of redemptive application. The seventh commandment, to use another
example, provides a "perspective" upon all sin; for idolatry
is a form of adultery in Scripture, and idolatry is the essence of sin in
general. Thus, all sin is adultery of a sort; and all sin is theft (theft of
what is due to God); and all sin is false witness (exchanging the truth of God
for a lie). Each of the ten commandments presents a characterization which
applies to all sin and which therefore defines all righteousness. Thus,
in Christianity, each major doctrine 49 provides a certain
"perspective" upon the whole of Christian truth. Each one can be
"central." The use of various centers at various times can
enrich our understanding of Scripture.
II. Anti-System
Thus far, I
have been intentionally vague as to the precise logical relations among
Christian doctrines. Van Til's language is not the precise language of a modern
logician. One doctrine can "require" or "necessitate"
another in various ways. To say that one doctrine is true "because"
of another is to speak with some ambiguity: even Aristotle recognized four
senses of "because." And even when Van Til uses more technical
logical terms like "corollary" and "entail," it is not
clear that he is using them in their technical senses.
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49. Even for
Van Til, I assume, not all doctrines are "major." "Abraham lived
in
14
One might
conclude from what was said above that Van Til regards Christianity as a
deductive system in which each doctrine, taken by itself, logically
implies all the others. Van Til, however, explicitly denies this notion.
There is no "master concept" from which the whole of Christian
doctrine may be logically deduced.50 But then in what sense is the
self-contained character of God "central" to Christianity? In what
sense does this doctrine "require" a certain doctrine of Scripture,
of Christ, etc.?
Even more
perplexing is Van Til's attitude toward the logical consistency of Christian
doctrines. We have seen earlier that Van Til affirms the "internal
coherence" of the Christian system and attacks positions which introduce
contradictions into that system. The natural assumption is that this coherence
is a logical coherence. Doesn't he say that "The rules of formal logic
must be followed in all our attempts at systematic exposition of God's
revelation, whether general or special"?51 And yet at the same
time Van Til teaches that the Christian system is full of "apparent
contradictions":
Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are
bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our
knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical.52
... while we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace
with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory. 53
All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.54
Let us look
at some specific examples. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Van Til
denies that the paradox of the three and one can be resolved by the formula
"one in essence and three in person." Rather, "We do assert that
God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person."55 Van Til's
doctrine, then, can be expressed "One person, three persons" -- an
apparent contradiction. This is a very bold theological move. Theologians are
generally most reluctant to express the paradoxicality of this doctrine so
blatantly. Why does Van Til insist on making things so difficult? In the
context, he says he adopts this formula to "avoid the specter of brute
fact." (Brute fact, in Van Til's terminology, is uninterpreted being. )
The argument here is somewhat elliptical, but if we fill in some missing
premises, it seems to go like this: If we deny that God is one person,
----------
50. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 205; cf. 227, A Christian
Theory of Knowledge, 38.
51. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 28. On p. 143 he refers
approvingly to Kuyper's view that "all men have to think according to the
rules of logic according to which alone the human mind can function." Cf.
also references in notes 19-22, above.
52. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 61.
53. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 9.
54. Ibid., 142.
55. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 229.
15
then the
unity among Father, Son, and Holy Spirit becomes an impersonal unity.
The diversities among the three in that case would not be functions of personal
planning and interpretation; rather these diversities would "just
happen" to exist. Such a view would in effect place an impersonal
"chance" or impersonal "fate" behind and above the persons
of the Godhead. Somehow, then, the three persons must function in such intimate
interdependence that it may be truly said that the three are one person.56
Bold as it may seem, this view not only conforms to the metaphysical teachings
implicit in Scripture but also to the simple language by which Scripture refers
to God. Scripture, after all, does refer to God as one person. It
distinguishes among Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; yet very often it speaks of
God as a person without mentioning those distinctions. It is true, as the
traditional formulae suggest, that God is one in one respect, three in another
respect. Such language is necessary to guard against the possibility of a
"real contradiction," a chaos, in the Godhead. Yet Scripture does not
clearly specify the "respect" in which God is three as over against
the "respect" in which God is one. In other words, Scripture leaves
us with an "apparent contradiction" here. God is one, and God is three.
And Van Til's view gives us an important warning not to go beyond Scripture in
this matter.
Van Til
treats the relation between God's nature and His attributes in the same way as
he treats the trinitarian question: "... the unity and the diversity in
God are equally basic and mutually dependent upon one another."57
God is one and God is many -- that, it seems, is the best we can do. The
apparent contradiction might be resolved if we could specify in what respects,
precisely, God is one and many, but to do so would be to go beyond Scripture
and to raise again "the specter of brute fact." Cosmic impersonalism
would again be a threat.
The
necessity and freedom of God's will are also paradoxically related according to
Van Til. If God's will is directed by His intelligence, then His free acts
(creating the world, for example) become necessary: God had to create. If, on
the other hand, God's free acts are truly free, then it would seem that they
must be unconnected with His intelligence and therefore random: God just
happened to create. Neither alternative is
----------
56. The term "person" has a rather different meaning in its modern
use from any meaning attached to it (Greek: hypostasis) at the time of
the Nicene creedal formulation. Van Til's use is more like the modern than like
the ancient. Still, it is important to ask about God's "personality"
in the modern sense. Scripture does describe God as what we would call a
"person'-one who thinks, plans, loves, creates, judges, speaks, etc. It is
important, then, to ask as Van Til does how "personality" in this
sense is related to the doctrine of the Trinity. And I believe that Van Til's
conclusion is not different from the one we would have to draw with regard to
the ancient usage of hypostasis.
57. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 26; cf. An Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 229.
16
biblical;
nevertheless, Scripture requires us to affirm the intelligence and
freedom of God's acts. Van Til does suggest that we need to distinguish between
two kinds of necessity--the necessity of God's nature and that necessity by
which His free acts come about. But, he adds, "this is as far as our
finite minds can reach."58 There is no definitive and final
solution for finite thought. Again, the apparent contradiction could be
resolved if we could specify the precise differences between the two
"necessities," but God has not revealed those differences.
Van Til's
paradigm case of the concept of "apparent contradiction" is what he
calls the "full-bucket difficulty." God is self-sufficient; He
needs nothing outside himself; He cannot become greater than He is, in
knowledge, love, power, glory, for a greater than God is inconceivable.
Nevertheless, He creates a world for His own glory -- to obtain more
glory, to enter into significant knowledge; love- and power-relationships which
He would not have entered otherwise. In other words, on the one hand, God's
knowledge, love, power, and glory preclude addition; on the other hand
they demand addition." The course of history is somehow significant
and important for God, even though that whole course is completely known to God
before it begins."60 Secondary causes are significant and
important (again, for God!-God is the determiner of significance), even though
God's primary causality controls all that comes to pass. 61 Again,
if we could determine more precisely what sort of significance world
history has for God, then the "contradiction" would drop away.
Evidently, there is one sense in which secondary causes are
"significant" and another sense in which they are not. Yet God
has not chosen to give us information by which these difficulties might be
resolved.
Does God's
plan "include" evil? Yes and no. God brings evil to pass, but He is
not therefore to be blamed for it. God foreordains sin, but man is not forced
to sin. God ordains the damnation of the reprobates, but that gives them no
excuse."62 Apparent contradictions again. But we should note
that here, as in the previous cases, Van Til also approves a non-contradictory
formulation:
Thus all Reformed Confessions and all Reformed always
reject the eodem modo idea. It is abhorrent to any true believer to make
God the author of sin, to say that God is as much interested in the
----------
58. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 2492., cf. 176ff.
Note also the reference in note 36 above, where Van Til says that God's will is
free because it is necessary. Van Til can state that two concepts are
"apparently contradictory" while at the same time making the one
logically dependent upon the other.
59. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 10; The Defense of the
Faith, 61f.
60. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 28.
61. Ibid., 73ff., 141f.; The Defense of the Faith, 207tf., 245,
267ff., 269ff.
62. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 248; "Nature
and Scripture," 271; Christian-Theistic Ethics, 36, 139.
17
death of the sinner as in the blessedness of the saved.
God's decree is not in the same manner back of reprobation as of
election. The counsel of God is primarily concerned with the
establishment of God's kingdom through Christ. There must be no equal ultimacy
of election and reprobation that forgets this fact. 63
God does not
ordain damnation (or, by implication, any other evil) in the same way as
He ordains good. Somehow the word "ordain" does not designate quite
the same sort of divine act in the two cases. Somehow God's plan does not both
"include" evil and "exclude" it in the same respect. Yet
divine revelation does not tell us precisely in what respect God's plan
includes evil and in what respect it excludes it. Thus, a paradox remains for
us, though by faith we are confident that there is no paradox for God, Faith is
basic to the salvation of our knowledge as well as the salvation of our souls.
In other
doctrinal areas also, Van Til formulates his positions in strikingly
paradoxical ways. The traditional distinction between the image of God in the
"wider" sense (man's personality, moral agency) and the image in the
"narrower" sense (knowledge of God, righteousness, holiness) Van Til
accepts as only "relatively satisfactory." 64 If pressed,
he argues, this distinction would imply that man's personality as created by
God has no ethical character-historically a Roman Catholic position rejected by
the Reformation. 65 Is it possible, he asks, for the image in the
"narrower" sense to be wholly lost in the Fall while the image in the
"wider" sense is left entirely intact? Though Van Til does not spell
out an alternative view in any precise way, he seems to move in the direction
of saying: The image is lost (in some sense) and also remains (in some sense).
Since the precise senses are not specified, we are left with a paradoxical
formulation. Yet to call such a formulation "contradictory" would be
to ignore the fact that specification of the senses is possible in principle,
and God is surely capable of specifying them.
Note also:
(1) Van Til's view of mankind existing and yet not existing in Adam as its
representative;66 (2) his view that apart from common grace, sin
would and would not have destroyed the creative work of God; 67 (3)
his view that the unregenerate man is both able and unable to know the truth; 68
(4) his view that the significance of human actions is both guaranteed by, and
rendered logically problematic by, the all-controlling
----------
63. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 90.
64. Van Tit, Christian-Theistic Ethics, 46; cf. The Defense of the
Faith, 29.
65. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 202ff.
66. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 249ff.
67. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 199f.
68. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 26, 112f.
18
plan of God;69
(5) his view of Chalcedon as an acceptance of and formulation of apparently
contradictory biblical teaching.70 In all of these matters, Van Til
appears to deny that any fully satisfactory non-paradoxical formulation is
possible. Still, in each of these cases (as in the ones discussed more fully in
the preceding paragraphs), the "apparent contradiction" appears to
arise from our ignorance concerning the precise senses of certain key
terms." So construing the problem, it is not difficult for us to assume
that the paradoxes are resolvable for one who has more complete or exhaustive
knowledge of the truth. Surely we must assume that they are resolvable in God's
own thought, and thus not "really" contradictory.
Yet for us
men, with the revelation now available to us (which in Van Til's view is
sufficient and will not be increased before the return of Christ), the
necessity of formulating doctrines in "apparently contradictory" ways
certainly increases the difficulty of developing a "system of
doctrine," especially a system such as Van Til himself advocates, wherein
all doctrines are profoundly interdependent, wherein one doctrine is frequently
said to "require" another. How may it be shown that one doctrine
"requires" another, when our paradoxical formulations fail even to
show how the two are compatible? His stress on apparent contradiction, though
it does not render Christianity irrational or illogical, does seem at least to
make very difficult if not impossible the task of the systematic theologian.
Does this emphasis amount to an anti-system polemic which in effect contradicts
his pro-system theme?
III. The Analogical System
Van Til
reconciles his pro-system statements with his view of "apparent
contradiction" by means of his doctrine of analogical reasoning. Only one
kind of "system" is possible if we are to be true to God's
revelation: an "analogical" system. 72 What does Van Til
mean by "analogical system" and "analogical reasoning"?
On first
hearing these phrases, we might suppose that Van Til here is advocating a
doctrine about Christian religious language--that such language is
"analogical," figurative, as opposed to being "literal."
The term "analogical" is often used this way in theological and
philosophical litera-
----------
69. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 64f.; cf. references in note
46 above. By "logically problematic" I mean that for Van Til the
relation of human responsibility to God's plan must invariably be formulated in
an "apparently contradictory" fashion.
70. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 205.
71. Van Til does not himself suggest that the paradoxes turn on such
ambiguities; yet all his examples of "apparent contradiction" may be
analyzed in such a way.
72. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture, 123; A Christian Theory of
Knowledge, 38;
19
ture,
especially when contrasted with "univocal," as it is in Van Til. It
is evident, however, that Van Til's concept of analogy is a doctrine about
human reasoning (even human life!) in general, not about religious language in
particular. He rarely if ever discusses the religious language question, and he
never discusses it in contexts where the concept of "analogy" is prominent.
There are two passages in his writings where analogous reasoning is said to
legitimize certain "anthropomorphic" expressions. 73
However, in view of Van Til's usual accounts of "analogy" (see
below), I would hold that in those two passages, the term "anthropomorphic"
means "from a human perspective" in a broad sense, and not the more
narrow formulation, "utilizing figures comparing God to man." Van Til
may well hold (though he never says so) that since revelation presents God to
us "from a human perspective," it often presents God in figurative
terms. Yet he has never taught that all language about God is
figurative, and there is nothing in his thought that demands such a conclusion.
Rather than
such a doctrine about language, Van Til's view of analogy is essentially this:
analogous reasoning is reasoning which presupposes as its ultimate basis the
reality of the biblical God and the authority of His revelation. We shall
analyze this concept under three headings: analogy and God, analogy and
revelation, analogy and logic.
A. Analogy
and God
The necessity of reasoning analogically is always implied
in the theistic conception of God. If God is to be thought of at all as
necessary for man's interpretation of the facts or objects of knowledge, he
must be thought of as being determinative of the objects of knowledge. In other
words, he must then be thought of as the only ultimate interpreter, and man
must be thought of as a finite reinterpreter. Since, then, the absolute
self-consciousness of God is the final interpreter of all facts, man's
knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge. Since all the finite facts exist by
virtue of the interpretation of God, man's interpretation of the finite facts
is ultimately dependent upon God's interpretation of the facts. Man cannot,
except to his own hurt, look at the facts without looking at God's
interpretation of the facts. Man's knowledge of the facts is then a
reinterpretation of God's interpretation. It is this that is meant by saying
that man's knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge.74
Analogical
reasoning begins with the assumption that God is both the ultimate source
of all facts and the ultimate interpreter of all facts. Man, therefore,
can be "creative" and "interpretative" only in a secondary
way. He may create and interpret only that which has already been
created
----------
73. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 73; A Christian Theory of
Knowledge , 37.
74. Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 203f.
20
and
interpreted by God. Man does not ultimately determine the nature and meaning of
the world; rather, he is born into a world which God has already structured,
and he must, willingly or not, live with that God-ordained structure.
Therefore,
"God's knowledge is archetypal and ours ectypal." 75 God's
thought is "creatively constructive" while ours is "receptively
reconstructive." 76 God "interprets absolutely" while
man is the "re-interpreter of God's interpretation." 77
This
distinction is both a fact and a norm. It is a fact, because human
thought in the nature of the case can be nothing else than
"reinterpretation." It may be a faithful or faithless
reinterpretation; it may be a true or false reinterpretation; it may be
admittedly reinterpretative or allegedly autonomous; but it cannot help but be
reinterpretation, for that is what God made it to be. The distinction is also a
norm: if our thinking is to be sound and true and right, then it ought
to acknowledge its character as reinterpretation; it ought to take its
actual status as reinterpretation into account; it ought to presuppose that
status in all its work. Thus, the fact of our created status entails our
obligation to "think as creatures," 78 to think in a way
appropriate to our creaturely status. Analogical reasoning, then, for Van Til,
is human thought which is not only reinterpretative (as all human thought must
be), but which acknowledges its character as reinterpretation and seeks to
think in a way appropriate to creatures.
Analogical
reasoning, then, is not only dependent upon God, but self-consciously
dependent. God is not only its creator and sustainer, but also its
"ultimate reference point of predication." 79 Analogical
reasoning recognizes God as the final authority, the ultimate criterion of
truth and falsehood, right and wrong, possibility and impossibility. Our
interpretation must be submissive to the authoritative interpretation of God. 80
This view
implies both a continuity and a discontinuity between God's thoughts and those
of human analogical reasoning. There is continuity because the very
nature of analogical reasoning is to agree with God, to conform to God's own
thought. But there is also discontinuity, for human thought, even
analogical human thought, can never be divine. Human thought can never be the
ultimate interpretation, the ultimate reference point. Analogical thought,
again by its very nature, confesses its creatureli-
----------
75. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 203. The
terminology is from Kuyper's Encyclopedia.
76. Ibid., 126.
77. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 64.
78. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 205.
79. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 101.
80. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture, 15.
21
ness, its
non-divinity. The slogan "thinking God's thoughts after him" 81
reflects both the continuity and the discontinuity: we think God's thoughts
(continuity) after Him (discontinuity).
Thus, just
as it is important for us to agree with God, so it is equally important
to distinguish our thoughts from His. God reveals himself to us, not exhaustively,
but "according to man's ability to receive his revelation." 82
We do not know God the same way He knows himself. Without such discontinuity,
the continuities mentioned earlier would be meaningless, for if we cannot
clearly distinguish between our thoughts and God's, how can we regard the
latter as authoritative for the former? Van Til, therefore, even acknowledges a
sense in which man himself is a kind of "starting-point" for thought:
he is a "proximate" starting-point, while God is the "ultimate"
starting-point. 83 God is our final authority; but for that very
reason we must be content to think as human beings.
So far, Van
Til's position is generally straightforward, and it is hard to see how it could
offend any Bible-believing Christian. However, Van Til's view of the continuity
and discontinuity between human and divine thought (sketched above)
precipitated within Bible-believing Christian circles one of the most heated
controversies in Van Til's controversial career--the debate over the "incomprehensibility
of God," otherwise known as the "Clark case." 84 In
that controversy, the argument focused on Van Til's statement that there is no
"identity of content between what God has in his mind and what man has in
his mind." 85 As I understand it, this statement is merely
another way of asserting the "discontinuity" between divine and human
thought which we have discussed above. It sets forth the same
discontinuity we have already noted, and not some further discontinuity in
addition to that one. To deny "identity of content" between God's
thought and man's is, for Van Til, simply to assert the Creator-creature
distinction in the area of thought. God's concept of a rose, let us say, is
different "in content" from man's, because God's concept is the original
and ours is derivative; His is self-justifying, while ours must be justified by
reference to His. So far as I can see, this is all Van Til means to say
in denying "identity of content."
I would
argue, however (with the benefit of hindsight), that in making
----------
81. Van Til uses this slogan: cf. A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 16,
"Nature and Scripture," 271.
82. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 37.
83. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 203; cf. The
Doctrine of Scripture, 14. Cf. also the opening section of Calvin's Institutes.
84. The protagonists in the controversy were Van Til and Gordon H. Clark, a
well-known Christian apologist and philosopher. I shall not discuss
85. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 165; cf. 171ff. Cf.
also Van Til, "Introduction" in B. B. Warfield, The Inspiration
and Authority of the Bible, 33.
22
such a
statement Van Til was somewhat unwise in his choice of terminology.
"Content" is an exceedingly ambiguous term when applied to thought.
The "content" of my thought may mean (1) my mental images, (2) my
beliefs, (3) the things I am thinking of, (4) the epistemological processes by
which knowledge is acquired (including the roles of sense-experience,
intuition, reason, etc.), (5) the meaning of my language, conceived in
abstraction from the linguistic forms used to state that meaning, (6) anything
at all to which the physical metaphor "contained in the mind" may
conceivably apply. In senses (2) and (3), there seems to be no reason to assert
any necessary "difference in content" between divine and human
thought. Surely God and man may have the same beliefs and may think about the
same things. As for (1) and (4), Scripture tells us very little about the
processes of divine thought--how He knows what He knows, whether He has mental
images or not, if so what they are like, etc. Doubtless there are continuities
and discontinuities in these areas, but the whole question borders on the
speculative. As for (5), surely there is an identity of meaning between
God's words and ours at least on those occasions when God uses human language.
Van Til himself, I think, has sense (6) in mind when he denies "identity
of content" between divine and human thought. And with that meaning Van
Til's assertion is obviously true. There is "in" God's mind what can
never be "in" any man's mind, namely, ultimate authority and creative
power. Man can never know fully what it is like to think with such self-validating
autonomy. Epistemological lordship attaches to every thought God has,
and to no thought any man ever has. Thus there is, with regard to any
item of knowledge, always something "in" God's mind different from
anything "in" man's. Yet the preposition "in" here is
rather metaphorical, as is the term "content" in sense (6); it is
further a rather vague metaphor, one which does not specify with any precision
the sort of discontinuity Van Til wishes to assert. Still further, it
tends to obscure the continuities upon which Van Til himself has placed
such emphasis -- that we must have the same opinions God has, that we
must think about the same matters that God speaks of in His revelation,
that we must attach the same meanings to God's words that He does, that
our thinking must have the same "reference point" God's thinking has
(namely, divine authority).86 To assert without further definition a
difference in "content" between divine and human thought obscures the
senses in which divine and human thought ought to have the same content. 87
----------
86. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 165 -- above the
previously cited passage.
87. I might point out another terminological problem which may also have
hindered communication during the "
23
Whatever we
may think about the "content" terminology, however, we cannot deny
the basic points Van Til is making here about analogical reasoning: (1) our
thought must CONFORM to God's, His thought being the ultimate standard
of truth; and (2) we must not confuse our thought with God's, for ours
is not ultimate, not self-validating.
B. Analogy
and Revelation
If analogous
reasoning means bringing our creaturely thoughts into accord with (but not into
identity with) God's divine thoughts, how is this to be done? Certainly not by
direct inspection of the divine thought-processes, as if I could distinguish an
apple from a tomato by comparing them with duplicates in God's mind.88
That sort of Platonism is far from Van Til's position. Van Til rather affirms
with all Reformed thought that we can have no knowledge of God unless He
voluntarily reveals himself. Our only access to God's mind is through
His voluntary self-revelation--His word. Thus, Van Til is able to define
analogical reasoning as reasoning which is fully subject to God's authoritative
word.89 This revelation is not exhaustive, and therefore analogical
reasoning may not attain to exhaustive knowledge.90
Van Til's
doctrine of revelation is for the most part standard, familiar, Reformed
theology. General revelation in his view is revelation given by God to
all men through nature and through human constitution, declaring the reality
and nature of God, and revealing enough of God's will for man as to leave
sinners without excuse (Ps. 19:lff.; Rom. 1-2). Special revelation
consists in the words spoken by God to and through prophets, apostles, the
incarnate Christ, and the written Scripture, not only once again to display His
nature and utter His commands, but particularly to set forth His provision for
the forgiveness of sin in the work of Christ.
What is
unusual about Van Til's teaching in this area, however, is (a) his emphasis on
the correlativity between general and special reve-
----------
bility of God." The term "incomprehensibility" generally denotes
a relation between human knowledge and the being of God, not a relation
between human knowledge and divine knowledge. To say that God is
incomprehensible is generally to say that we lack exhaustive knowledge of God's
being, of what he is (and does). In the
88. Cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 300f.
89. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 206; An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 256-60; Jerusalem and Athens, 126; cf.
"Introduction," 49.
90. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 16.
24
lation and
(b) the delicate balance he strikes between this correlativity and the primacy
of Scripture.
(1) The
Correlativity of General and Special Revelation: Van Til likes to emphasize
that general and special revelation are related to one another in
"organic, supplemental fashion."91 By this he means, first,
that neither has ever existed apart from the other. Even before the Fall, from
the first moment of man's existence, he was confronted both with God's
spoken word (Gen. 1:28f.; 2:16f.) and with God's revelation in creation.
Second, neither was ever intended to function apart from the other.
Fact-revelation and word-revelation "require each other."92
The fact always "needed to be explained by God himself,"93
and the word always explains facts about God, man, nature, and
redemptive history. Either without the other would be unintelligible, would
communicate nothing. Adam needed to hear a word of God to know his duty with
respect to the trees of the garden, but this verbal command presupposes Adam's
knowledge of the "situation": "The supernatural could not be
recognized for what it was unless the natural were also recognized for what it
was."94 Third, both general revelation and special
revelation are "necessary, authoritative, clear and sufficient."
Those four adjectives apply to general revelation in view of its distinctive
purpose. To render sinners without excuse and to provide the factual
referent for special revelation, general revelation is necessary, speaks
with authority, speaks clearly, and contains sufficient content to accomplish
its work.95
This sort of
emphasis is unusual in American theology, though it has precedents in the Dutch
literature. I find it refreshing and exciting; its implications for theological
work are innumerable. For one thing, it means that we need not be embarrassed
about using extra-scriptural information to interpret Scripture. If
indeed the creation were somehow autonomous, then we might fear that the use of
such data might to some extent hide the full truth of God's revelation. But
creation is not independent of God.96 God controls it and speaks
through all of it. And He has chosen to reveal himself, not by nature or
Scripture alone, but always by the two together in organic union. Thus, we can
use such data fearlessly and thankfully.
----------
91. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture, 65.
92. Van Til, "Introduction," 32.
93. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 133.
94. Van Til, Apologetics, 30.
95. Van Til, "Nature and Scripture," 269ff.; Apologetics,
30ff.
96. Notice that Van Til's doctrine of Scripture is distinctively Calvinistic.
It presupposes an uncompromising view of God's sovereignty. Van Til is fond of
speaking about the "isolation of the Reformed view of Scripture" (cf.
The Doctrine of Scripture, 37). The division between Calvinism and
Arminianism is not only over soteriology and providence, but it cuts across the
whole range of Christian doctrine, in Van Til's view.
25
For another
thing, Van Til's emphasis frees us to see a very important principle: Scripture
is seen for what it is only when it is properly related to the world
into which it has come. God never intended otherwise. This means not only that
Scripture must be interpreted in the light of its original cultural
environment, but also that it must be applied to our own lives and
culture -- to the environment in which it now speaks. We do not know what
Scripture says until we know how it relates to our world. The question of
interpretation and the question of application are the same. To ask what
Scripture says, or what it means, is always to ask a question about
application. A question about the meaning of Scripture always arises out of a
personal problem -- an inability to relate the words of Scripture to our lives,
to our language, our thought-forms, our culture, our fears and hopes.
This
principle, in turn, helps us attain greater clarity on the question of what
theology is all about. Theology is simply the application of Scripture to
all areas of human life. On this matter, Reformed writers have often been
unhelpful. They have talked about theology as a study of God or Scripture, as
an ordering of biblical data, as a process of theory construction from the
facts of the Bible, etc. But they have not seriously asked the question,
"Why do we need theology if Scripture is sufficient?" Often they have
talked as if theology is necessary for us to obtain the truth about God,
forgetting for the moment that God has already told us the truth about
himself in Scripture. Sometimes they have suggested that the scriptural account
of the truth is somehow defective--in form if not in content--and that theology
is needed to remedy that defect, to put the Scripture into proper form,
perhaps. Such options are not open to a follower of Van Til. Scripture is
not lacking in truth, order, rationality. It is not a brute fact which
stands only as data for human interpretation. It is
interpretation-divine interpretation. We need theology not because of any
defect in Scripture, but because of defects in us, because of our
inability to relate the clear revelation of Scripture to our own lives.
We need theology--not to restructure or improve upon Scripture, but to apply
Scripture to our lives.97
If theology
is "application," then theology necessarily must make use of general
as well as special revelation. To know how Scripture applies, we must
know something about ourselves and our world. If we are to know how Scripture
applies to abortions and ecology and energy crises and nuclear war, we must
have at our disposal more than the text of
----------
97. Van Til himself has not defined theology as "application" as we
have in this paragraph. His own definitions of theology are of a more
traditional sort. But this is one of those areas where we must go beyond Van
Til in order to be fully true to his distinctive insights. The concept of
theology as "application" has a firm basis in the thought of Van Til,
though it is not found among his explicit doctrines.
26
Scripture;
we must have information about all these matters as well. But if Van Til is
right, we may use such information without embarrassment.
(2) The
Primacy of Scripture: But what has happened to the sufficiency of Scripture
in all of this? If theology may and must use general revelation "without
embarrassment," and if general revelation is needed for us to understand
(= apply) Scripture, then in what sense does Scripture have primacy? If our
knowledge of Scripture is dependent to some extent upon OUT "natural
knowledge," can we have any more confidence in Scripture than we can have
in our natural knowledge? Does Scripture itself, on this view, merely become another
form of general revelation?
We have
already observed that for Van Til nature and Scripture are related in
"organic, supplemental fashion."91 Scripture is
unintelligible without those facts which it interprets, but the facts also are
unintelligible apart from God's spoken and written interpretation of them.
Even before the Fall, therefore, there is a sense in which God's spoken words
had a "priority" over His revelation in nature. Man was to accept
God's spoken words as ultimately authoritative interpretation, as that
interpretation by which all other interpretation must be judged. Eve sinned in
accepting the serpent's words (and eventually her own) as having this ultimate
authority. It was not that God's spoken words were more true or more
authoritative than His revelation in nature. Rather, God's spoken words were
more authoritative than any human (or Satanic) interpretation of natural
revelation. Thus, Adam and Eve were under obligation to make God's spoken
words the "starting point" of their thought, to accept them as the
criterion for all sound interpretation of God's world.
After the
Fall, the spoken and written words of God take on an even more crucial role,
since man's normal activity of interpreting the universe has been distorted by
sin. 98 After the Fall, it becomes even more important to point to
these spoken and written words as the only ultimately authoritative sentences
known to man. Therefore, "the revelation in Scripture must be made our
starting-point. It is only in the light of the Protestant doctrine of Scripture
that one can obtain also Protestant doctrine of the revelation of God in
nature." 99 "But since the entrance of sin it is necessary
to begin even the study of the works of God through the Word of God." 100
The point is
that natural revelation must indeed be used in the interpretation (=
application) of Scripture, but once that interpretation is ascer-
----------
98. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 163f.;
"Introduction," 33; An Introduction to Systematic Theology,
110f.
99. Van Til, Apologetics, 27.
100. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture, 120; cf. "Nature and
Scripture," 265; Christian-Theistic Ethics, 133, 139f.
27
tained, it
must take precedence over hypotheses derived from any other source.
"Theology as application" presupposes a finished, complete,
authoritative Scripture (see above discussion). Theology is the application of Scripture
and Scripture alone.101 Even when we use extra-scriptural
information (as we must) to understand Scripture, we must hold loosely
to this information--loosely enough to allow Scripture to call it in question.
It is only when our methods of Scripture interpretation are themselves purified
by Scripture that real progress can be made in theology.
In Van Til's
view, the primacy of Scripture is comprehensive -- it covers all areas
of life. He clearly rejects the view that the Bible contains only "truths
of faith" or "religious teaching" as over against, say, teaching
about the physical universe.102 The philosopher, too, is
"directly subject to the Bible...." 103 Directly or
indirectly, there is no matter about which the Bible is silent. 104
It has been
asked that if Scripture has such primacy for Van Til, why is his method not
more "exegetical"? G. C. Berkouwer has chastened Van Til on this
score, and Van Til himself has admitted guilt in this regard.105 Van
Til rarely exegetes specific biblical passages; his terminology is often
abstract and philosophical. There is some truth in this criticism, but there is
also much to be said in favor of Van Til's approach. First, many critics
are unaware of the extent to which Van Til's mind is steeped in the content of
Scripture. His sermons and class lectures are full of biblical references,
allusions, illustrations. For some reason, this emphasis has not been prominent
in his published works; yet his published works grow out of this
Bible-saturated mentality. Second, many critics are unaware of the fact
that Van Tit's favorite professor at
----------
101. Nothing could be further from Van Til's view than the idea that
nature-study reveals divine commandments beyond Scripture and equal to
Scripture in authority. Van Til's sola scriptura stands in sharp
contrast to the views of Dooyeweerd and his followers. See my article, "
102. Van Til, "Bavinck the Theologian," 10; Apologetics, 2; The
Defense of the Faith, 24; cf. The Doctrine of Scripture, 89ff.
Compare this with the assertion of Dooyeweerd that Scripture is a "book of
faith" and therefore may not speak, e.g., of the chronology of creation:
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N. J.: Craig
Press, 1968), 149ff.
103. Van Til, Apologetics, 37. Cf. the discussion in Jerusalem and
Athens, 81, in which Dooyeweerd takes issue with Van Til's position on this
point.
104. Van Til, Apologetics, 2, The Defense of the Faith, 24.
105. Van Til, Jerusalem and Athens, 203f.; cf. Toward a Reformed
Apologetics (no publication data), 27.
28
is
unmistakable to anyone who reflects on the matter.106 Third,
Van Til has had the advantage of teaching at an institution where there has
been a remarkable unity of mind among the faculty. Unlike some theologians, Van
Til has felt that he could trust his colleagues in the exegetical
disciplines and build upon their exegetical work. Van Til's trust in his
colleagues has given him the freedom to concentrate his work in areas most
suited to his own gifts, which are more philosophical than philological. Thus
in reply to Berkouwer's criticism, he simply refers to the exegetical work of
John Murray as expressing his own view. Finally, we must rethink, in my
view, our common concept of what "exegesis" is. If, as we have argued
earlier, interpretation and application of Scripture are the same thing,
then we ought to conclude that "exegesis" is a broader discipline
than it is often conceived to be. Is Van Til not doing "exegesis"
when he translates the biblical concepts into philosophical language?107
What is the difference, really, between translating biblical concepts into
philosophic terms and translating Greek words into English? The two activities
require different sorts of skills, but is it really fair to describe the one activity
as "exegetical" and to deny such a description to the other? Is Van
Til not doing "exegesis" when he applies biblical teachings to
problems of philosophy and apologetics? What is the difference, really, between
applications of that sort and applications to problems of achieving syntactical
equivalence? Perhaps when all is said and done it will be seen that Van Til's
work is indeed "exegetical" in a very significant sense. This is not
to reject the need or importance of those grammatical and historical studies
which are commonly called "exegesis." These considerations do
suggest, however, that the whole work of exegesis cannot be done by any
one man, by any one method, by any one set of gifts.
C. Analogy
and Logic
But I seem
to have forgotten the problem which led me to consider Van Til's concept of
"analogical reasoning" in the first place. How do we reconcile Van
Til's emphasis on "system" with his zest for "paradox"? How
is it that the doctrines of Christianity are both dependent on one
another and somehow in tension with one another? Our earlier discussion
of analogical reasoning is not irrelevant to this point. We have learned that
analogical reasoning is the first kind of "thinking God's thoughts after
him"--a type of thinking which seeks conformity to God's thoughts
while
----------
106. Note particularly the emphasis on "taking history seriously" in
Common Grace and the Gospel (passim), the discussion of the kingdom of
God in Christianá Theistic Ethics, the frequent references to the
"Adamic consciousness," etc., as in An Introduction to Systematic
Theology, 25ff., and the discussion of modern trends in terms of God's
covenants with Adam, Noah, Abraham, etc., in The Great Debate Today
(Nutley, N. J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971).
107. Cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 40n.
29
simultaneously
acknowledging its own creatureliness. We have learned that analogical
reasoning, therefore is reasoning which is subject to God's revelation in
general and which tests all ideas by the criterion of Scripture. As such, this
reasoning attains truth, but not all the truth. It is true as far as it goes,
but not exhaustive. It is true insofar as it actually conforms to God's mind,
but the amount of truth obtainable is limited by (a) the creaturely
status of the reasoner, and (b) the sovereign decision of God concerning what
is to be revealed and what kept secret.
Insofar as
we attain truth, we attain a sense of the interconnectedness of the
creation. God's plan is a wise one. He has not planned any one thing in
creation without taking everything else into account. All elements of His plan
"dovetail" with one another. Scripture often reflects upon these
interconnections: faith establishes the law (Rom. 3:31); the glorification of
the elect necessitated the sufferings of Christ (Heb. 2:10); true faith always
issues in good works (James 2:18); to control the tongue is to control the
whole body (James 3:2); to disobey one point of the law is to be guilty of all
(James 2:10). A truly biblical theology will reflect upon these
interconnections, for they are part of God's truth.
Since,
however, our knowledge is limited both by our created status and by
God's sovereign limitation of revelation, we can expect to find paradox also in
Scripture. If we do not know all the truth, then we do not know all the
interconnections between the truths. And paradox, as we have earlier
presented it, is simply the result of our ignorance about interconnections.
In many doctrinal areas, we do not know fully how various elements of
God's plan are related to one another. We do not know precisely how they
"dovetail," how they take account of one another. We know that
they do dovetail, for we know that God's plan is wise and exhaustive,
and usually we know how they fit together to some degree, but the gaps in our
knowledge often demand that we rest content with a paradoxical formulation.
God is good,
yet He foreordains evil deeds. We know that these truths are compatible, for Scripture
teaches both and God does not deny himself. We know, further, that the denial
of any one may lead to the denial of the other, and in that sense the two
truths are "interdependent." God can foreordain evil only if He is
himself good, for in Scripture "evil" is "evil" only by
contrast with the goodness of God. God is truly good only if the evil in the
world is foreordained by Him, for only if evil is fully controlled by God can
we be confident that there is a good purpose in it, and only if there is a good
purpose in it can we trust the overall good purpose of God. Scripture, then,
teaches us that these two truths are interdependent; they "require"
each other. Yet at the same time there is paradox here. Indeed, in this case we
know not only that there is interdependence, but we also know, to some
extent, how there is interdependence. But we
30
do not have
the full. knowledge of the "how." There is still something
strange about this, something we cannot quite reconcile. How can a good
God foreordain evil? Thus, we are in a strange state of affairs: we have two
propositions ("God is good" and "God foreordains evil")
which we can show to be logically interdependent in one sense; yet we cannot
show them to be logically compatible except by an appeal to faith!
Strange indeed; yet this is where we must stand if we are to do justice both to
the truth of God's revelation and to the limitations of our creaturely
knowledge, if we are to "reason analogically." This balance of
interdependence and paradox is in the interest of thinking in submission to
Scripture. Scripture must be followed both in its assertions of interdependence
and in its refusal to reconcile all doctrines to our satisfaction.
But to what
extent, then, may we use logic in the derivation of "good and
necessary consequences" from Scripture? Are we to deduce doctrines from
one another only when Scripture itself does that explicitly? Or may we go
beyond what Scripture teaches explicitly to unfold its implicit message?
Surely Van Til thinks we can. But to what extent? How?
Van Til's
general teaching on logic is along the following lines: 108 The validity
of the laws of logic derives from the character of God. 109 God
is not subject to some source of (logical or other) possibility more ultimate
than himself. 110 Rather, He himself alone determines ultimately
what is possible.111 It is God, therefore, who both vindicates
and limits the competence of human logic. First, He vindicates it. His
revelation contains no logical contradiction--no "real"
contradiction. There are apparent contradictions in Scripture, but only
apparent ones.112 Apparent to whom? They appear ultimately
irreconcilable to unbelievers because unbelievers have a false view of the
foundation of logic. 113 But the "ap-
----------
108. Van Til's idealist philosophical training creates some problems in assessing
his view of logic. It is not always clear when he is using the term
"logic" to mean formal logic and when he is using it (as in
idealism) to refer to the methodology of thought in general. In my
discussion, formal logic is in view throughout, and I have tried to set forth
Van Til's views on that narrow subject. I may not always have been successful,
but rather often the distinction is not important, since Van Til's views on
formal logic often parallel closely his views of intellectual methodology in general.
109. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 202; An Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 11, 37, 256; The Doctrine of Scripture, 72, Common
Grace and the Gospel, 28.
110. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 202; An Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 11.
111. Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture, 131.
112. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 61f.; A Christian Theory of
Knowledge, 38.
113. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 28; The Defense of the
Faith, 253; An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 171, 230. Van
Til grants that unbeliever and believer may observe the same laws of formal
logic: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 37, 254; The Defense
of the Faith, 296ff.; Common Grace and the Gospel, 27. The
difference is that believer and unbeliever disagree on the
31
parent
contradictions" also are apparent to all men, believers and un-believers
alike, because of their finitude.114 Still, from God's point of
view, there is no contradiction; and thus the believer knows that whatever may
seem to be the case, God's revelation is fully consistent with itself. Logic
applied to God's revelation, therefore, will not lead us astray, if it is used
rightly. Logic itself, properly used, will discover no real contradiction in
Scripture.
Second,
"proper use" involves certain limitations in the process of
logical reasoning. We cannot reason any way we want to. We must reason in full
awareness of the fact that God is the foundation of logic. 115 Logic
itself does not determine what is possible or probable; only God does that. 117
Logic does not give to man exhaustive knowledge only God has that."' Thus,
we cannot assume that all biblical doctnnes can be shown to be fully
consistent in terms of our present understanding.118 Van Til says,
therefore, that the "system" of Christian theology is not a
"deductive" system, and that we must not use "deductive"
exegesis.119 What does Van Til mean by "deductive" here?
He does not actually define the term anywhere, perhaps assuming (I think
wrongly) that it needs no explanation. Judging from his overall position,
however, I would say that in opposing "deductivism" he means to say
(1) that theology ought not to make deductions from one or several doctrines,
the conclusions of which contradict other scriptural teachings; 120
(2) that theology ought not to assume that it can demonstrate the formal
logical consistency of all its doctrines (see above discussion); and (3) that
there-
----------
basis of logic and that they hold different "premises" about ultimate
origins and authority. Cf. Apologetics, 50; A Survey of Christian
Epistemology, 213f.
114. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 228. Van Til leaves open (as he
must, to avoid speculation) the question of how God resolves these
apparent contradictions, whether by a better-than-human logic, by fuller
knowledge of the facts, or by somehow transcending the whole logic/fact
problematic.
115. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 11; Common
Grace and the Gospel, 28. Van Til criticizes Hedge, not for using logical reasoning
to evaluate Scripture, but rather for failing adequately to distinguish
Christian from non-Christian ways of doing so: An Introduction to Systematic
Theology, 31ff.; Apologetics, 47tf.
116. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 256;
117. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 37f.; The Defense of
the Faith, 228.
118. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 169ff.; Common
Grace and the Gospel, 10. In the latter passage he suggests that the
contradiction appears only at "first sight." Elsewhere, he seems to
argue that it is irresolvable by any created intellect.
119. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 38; The Defense of the
Faith, 204f., 227; The Doctrine of Scripture, 123; An
Introduction to Systematic Theology, 257; Common Grace and the Gospel,
202.
120. Above references (previous note). Also cf. Van Til, An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 256;
32
fore the characteristic
method of theology is not deduction (as in
For all of
this it must be admitted that there remains some unclarity in Van '
Further: to
say that God is both omnipotent and not omnipotent is indeed to say something
"apparently contradictory." It may be "really
contradictory." But, of course, if "omnipotent" and "not
omnipotent" employ different senses of "omnipotent," then this
apparent contradiction is biblically resolvable. Yet Van Til's argument
suggests that in this case (though not in others) we know that
the contradiction is a real one (not merely "apparent"), and
therefore we must reject it. But how do we know that this
contradiction is "real" while others are only "apparent"? How
----------
121. Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 7.
122. Ibid., 201. Van Til sometimes uses the phrase "circular
reasoning," but "spiral reasoning" is far closer to the concept
he seeks to convey.123. Ibid., 7.
124. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 202.
125. Ibid., 38. Cf. references above, notes 19-22.
33
do we know
that one contradiction is irresolvable while another is resolvable, when we
cannot ourselves resolve either one?
Van Til does
explain why we must sometimes be satisfied with apparently contradictory
formulations. He does not explain why in some cases we must rest content
with such paradox while in other cases (as in the Pieper example) we
must press for an explicit logical consistency. I suspect, however, that if Van
Til were to address this problem, he would do it somewhat as follows: Since we
believe that there is no "real" contradiction in Scripture, our
exegesis should strive to achieve, as much as is humanly possible, a logically
consistent interpretation of biblical teaching. Yet this goal is not the
primary goal. The primary goal of exegesis is not logical consistency but
faithfulness to the text. And sometimes in trying to formulate one doctrine
with logical consistency, we may find ourselves compromising another doctrine
of Scripture. When that happens, something is wrong. We must not simply push
our logic relentlessly to the point where we ignore or deny a genuine biblical
teaching. Rather, we must rethink our whole procedure--our exegesis, our
reasoning, the extra-biblical knowledge we bring to bear on the matter, etc. If
no explicit logical consistency can be obtained without conflict with other
biblical teaching, then we must remain satisfied with paradox. In the
omnipotence example, explicit logical consistency is possible without any
compromise of biblical teaching. Scripture teaches that God is omnipotent. It
does not teach the opposite. Logically consistent affirmation of God's
omnipotence does not put us in conict with any other biblical teaching.
Therefore we affirm it and insist upon logical consistency. In the example of
God's sovereignty and human responsibility, the case is somewhat different.
Here there is (in Van Til's mind) an "apparent contradiction." Yet to
remove that contradiction would be to compromise either God's sovereignty or
man's responsibility. That may not be done, since both doctrines are clearly
taught in Scripture. The general principle: we may (and ought to) use logical
deduction freely except where such deduction puts us in conflict with the
explicit teachings of Scripture.
But if this
is the proper analysis of Van Til's position, what are we to make of his
statement that "All teaching of Scripture is apparently
contradictory"? 126 This statement is rather strange since, as
we have seen above, Van Til sometimes refuses to accept "apparently
contradictory" formulations of scriptural teaching. The omnipotence of
God, for Van Til, is not (it would seem) an "apparently
contradictory" doctrine. It is wrong, in his estimation, to say
that God both is and is not omnipotent. Furthermore, as we have seen earlier,
Van Til does approve other formulations which are not in any sense
"apparently contradictory." When he
----------
126. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 142.
34
says, then,
that "all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory," we are
tempted to think that here (as elsewhere; see above, note 108) Van Til has
something other than formal logic in mind. Indeed, the paragraph which explains
this statement makes no mention of formal contradiction or even of formal logic
in general. It simply presents the sovereignty and authority of God over our
thought. Is "apparent contradiction" here just a metaphor for the
general subordination of man's thought to God's?
A metaphor,
perhaps, but not "just" a metaphor. At this point it is important for
us to note Van Til's view of Christian doctrines as "limiting"
"supplementative" concepts. This principle is the connecting link, in
a sense, between Van Til's general view of analogical reasoning and his
specific view of formal logic. In saying that theological concepts are
"limiting concepts," Van Til is drawing out an implication of
man's creaturely status. Since man is finite, none of his concepts exhausts
the "essence of the thing it seeks to express." 127 Our
concept of a tree may be accurate as far as it goes, but it can never exhaustively
describe the tree. The same holds true for our concepts of God, sin, salvation,
etc. Even the concepts of Scripture, presented as they are in human language
and adapted therefore to human understanding, do not exhaustively
describe the realities to which they refer. Scripture tells us what we need to
know, but it does not tell us everything. Our concepts, therefore, are
"approximations" to the truth in a certain sense. 128
Caution is needed here. Van Til is not saying, for example, that the doctrine
of justification by faith is only "approximately true" in the sense
of being partly false. Rather, this and other biblical doctrines are completely
and dependably true, yet they do not tell us everything God knows about the
matters in question. The fact that all doctrines are "non-exhaustive"
in this sense implies that various doctrines should be seen as
"supplementary" to one another. 129 Scripture clearly
----------
127. Ibid., 201. Cf. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology,
256. The term "limiting concept" comes from the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. Kant argued that the "noumenal world," the world as it
really is, could not be known by man, but that the idea of a noumenal
world could be entertained and used for a certain purpose: "The concept of
a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is
to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative
employment." Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), 272. In Kant's thought, a "limiting
concept" has no positive content. For Kant, "God" is a limiting
concept, and this means, not that God actually exists, but only that the term
"God" may properly be used in describing the limitedness of our
experience. To say that "God exists," for Kant, means only that our
experience is limited as if by God. Van Til, however, uses the term very
differently. In his thought, limiting concepts do have positive
significance. God really does exist, though our concept of God is a
"limiting concept." To say that the concept of God is a
"limiting concept" in Van Til's thought is merely to say that our
knowledge of who God is, though true, is non-exhaustive.
128. Ibid., 11.
129. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 255ff.
35
teaches that
God is sovereign, but it does not tell us in complete (exhaustive) detail how
His sovereignty operates. The theological concept "divine
sovereignty" does not suffice to comprehend and exhaust all of God's
actual relations to the world. Thus, we ought not to derive our view of human
responsibility exclusively from our concept of divine sovereignty, while
ignoring what Scripture explicitly says about human responsibility. We should
rather allow the two concepts to supplement one another: the biblical teaching
on human responsibility will deepen our understanding of divine sovereignty,
and vice versa. If putting the two together produces an "apparent
contradiction," then so be it. But even the recognition of logical tension
helps the believer to see the deeper logical unity of the two doctrines. For
the sovereignty of God cannot be seen for what it is -- that is, in its full
paradoxicality!-except in its relationship to human responsibility. It is in
this sort of way that Van Til can describe the two doctrines as "requiring
one another" while at the same time insisting that their relationship is
"apparently contradictory."
But remember
that all teachings of Scripture are "limiting concepts." All
concepts of Scripture are "mutually supplementative" in the above
sense. The doctrine of justification by faith also supplements, and is
supplemented by, the doctrine of divine sovereignty. The doctrine of divine
sovereignty tells us what sort of God is justifying us. Thus, the doctrine of
justification by faith incorporates the paradox of divine sovereignty. The
doctrine of justification by faith--when fully explained in its relations to the
rest of scriptural truth--is just as paradoxical as divine sovereignty. Even
the omnipotence of God, then, shares with other doctrines a paradoxical
element. That paradoxical element is not properly (scripturally) formulated by
the phrase "God is and is not omnipotent." We reject, on scriptural
authority, that paradox. Yet there is another sort of paradox which
applies to the divine omnipotence. The omnipotence of God is
"limited" in a sense. God cannot do "everything" if that
"everything" includes things contrary to His nature or contrary to
His promises, or contrary to His eternal purpose. God's "omnipotence"
will not rob man of his responsibility, nor will it eliminate the significance
of human action as a secondary cause.
"Apparent
contradiction," then, results from the "limiting" nature of
biblical concepts. And since these "limiting concepts" are
"supplementative," the paradoxes which attach to one attach to all,
while at the same time each concept is seen to "require" all the
rest. This does not mean that every paradox is to be accepted simply
because it is a paradox. The paradoxes must be exegetically formulated. Nor
does it mean that every doctrine must always be stated in paradoxical
terminology. Yet the paradoxes found in Scripture must be fearlessly stated in
any complete theological work, and the relations of these paradoxes to each
biblical doctrine
36
must be
traced. There is a sense, then, in which "all teaching of Scripture is
apparently contradictory": (a) all teachings of Scripture are "limiting
concepts"; (b) limiting concepts generate apparent contradictions; (c)
since limiting concepts are supplementative, an apparent contradiction in one
doctrine generates apparent contradictions in all doctrines.
Does this
doctrine render Scripture unintelligible? If all doctrines are apparently
contradictory, do they have any meaning at all? It is not enough to reply that
the contradictions are "apparent" though not "real." An
"apparent contradiction," before it is resolved, poses the same
problems of intelligibility as a "real contradiction," it would seem.
Or does it? Let us go back to our earlier remarks about "theology as
application." If interpretation and application are the same, then the
question of intelligibility becomes the question of whether a consistent
pattern of application is possible. A sentence may be intelligible, even
though it does not conform to logical canons, if it unambiguously dictates a
particular response on the part of the reader or hearer. In a sense, logical
laws themselves are secondary to "intelligibility" in this broad
sense. Logic aims (fallibly) to describe the conditions under which such
application is possible. But as many contemporary logicians have observed, no
present logical system describes all such conditions of intelligibility.
Logic has made only small steps in this task, describing the conditions of
intelligibility for a few key terms like "all," "if-then,"
"some," "none," etc. It has succeeded in analyzing these key
terms only in certain narrowly defined contexts of their occurrence. Now, since
scriptural doctrines are not "really" contradictory, they are
intelligible, but their intelligibility is not demonstrable by the limited
canons of current human logic. For example, according to Van Til, man has (in one
sense) and has not (in another) lost the image of God as a result of the Fall.
Since the senses are not clearly specifiable, we have apparent contradiction,
but since God knows what the senses are, there is no real contradiction. Is
this doctrine intelligible? Yes, for as taught in Scripture it has a clear
application. We are to treat men as made in the image of God, even though they
are fallen (Gen. 9:6; James 3:9). We have no right to despise our fellow men on
the ground that they have lost the image of God. Though the supposed right to
despise our fellow men might seem to follow from part of the doctrine taken in
isolation, it is a conclusion uniformly-consistently!-rejected by Scripture.
The "loss" of the image does have a legitimate application,
but not an application contrary to that of the "continuance" of the
image. The "loss" of the image motivates us to recognize our own need
for renewal, the need to "put on the new man" (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10).
There is no inconsistency, then, in the overall application of these two
apparently contra- dictory principles. There is no contradiction between loving
fallen human beings and recognizing our own need of renewal.
37
We should
now be able to see the peculiar structure of Van Til's "analogical
system." All doctrines are interdependent, in that none can be
adequately understood except in the light of the others. All doctrines are
"apparently contradictory," in that none exhausts the fullness of
the truth, and their non-exhaustive character limits our ability to
demonstrate formal logical consistency. Yet all doctrines are true as far as
they go, are not "really" contradictory, and are intelligible in
that even though they may be unassimilable to the forms of our logic,
nevertheless provide clear guidance for God's people. This account of the
nature of the Christian "system" is a theological accomplishment of
immense magnitude. 130
Epilogue
In my view,
Van Til's concept of a "theological system" is his most important
contribution to theology, as well as the most difficult one for most of us to
understand. I trust that what I have written has clarified this concept, at
least for some. I have also mentioned quite a number of Van Til's distinctive
formulations of specific doctrines, each of which is important in its own
right. 1 have discussed (in the context of our broader concern) Van Til's view
of general and special revelation, his concept of the "incomprehensibility
of God," and his many interesting formulations of the various kinds of
"interdependence" and "paradox" found at many doctrinal
loci. In these discussions, I have provided an outline of Van Til's distinctive
theological positions, as well as an account of his general view of the nature
and method of theology.
There is
much more that could be said, however. Van Til's concept of "common
grace" as "earlier" grace is highly significant and merits much
close analysis. l31 His non-intellectualistic view of man's nature, l32
his view of sin as "ethical," l33 his view of the
Chalcedon Christology as a function of the Creator-creature distinction, l34
his immensely fertile account of the goal, motive, and standard of ethics: 135
all of these and others deserve close examination, analysis, proclamation.
Further, a really complete account of Van Til's theology could not ignore his
critiques of non-Reformed thought -- critiques both interesting in themselves
and useful in
----------
130. See if the above account does justice to the difficult passage in The
Defense of the Faith, 231f., where Van Til argues that temporal creation is
"implied in" but not a "logical derivative from" the
doctrine of God. I think myself that Van Til's concept of
"implication" here is a sort of "logical
derivation"; yet it is different enough from other types of derivation,
perhaps, to merit a different name in Van Til's estimation.
131. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel.
132. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 32.133. Ibid.,
24f., 253ff., elsewhere.
134. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 32ff.
135. Van Til, Christian-Theistic Ethics.
38
helping us
better to formulate the doctrines in question. Van Til's critique of Barth's
universalism, for instance, is instructive not only in warning us against
Earth, but also in showing us the ways in which alien philosophical motifs may
lead to compromise in the doctrine of definite atonement. Hopefully, other
studies will be produced dealing with these matters in detail. The present
study, having already exceeded the editor's length requirement, is nearly at an
end. I do feel, however, that this paper demonstrates something of the immense
significance of Van Til's work for the theologian, and something of the
difficulty involved in understanding and appropriating it. If I am right, then
I have furnished herein the best and only justification for further research
into this extremely important thinker. Surely one day there will have to be a Cornelius
Van Til als Dogmaticus!