9
DISPENSATIONALIST
EXPOSITIONS OF LITERALNESS

We are now ready to look at some dispensationalist statements on the principles of "literal" interpretation.

28. Ryrie's description of literalness

One of the fuller discussions of literal interpretation is set forth by Charles C. Ryrie (1965, 86-87). The most important paragraph in Ryrie's discussion is a long one. So, for convenience, we will analyze it a few sentences at a time. After some introductory remarks, Ryrie begins as follows (1965, 86):

Dispensationalists claim that their principle of hermeneutics is that of literal interpretation. This means interpretation which gives to every word the same meaning it would have in normal usage, whether employed in writing, speaking or thinking.

Ryrie undoubtedly sees himself as heading toward a definition of grammatical-historical interpretation. Yet the above two sentences by themselves might very easily be construed as advocating first-thought interpretation, in the sense defined in section 26. That is, it might be construed as saying that each word is to be given the most prominent meaning that it has in the dictionary (first-thought meaning), regardless of context. Ryrie needs a much more complicated and qualified statement if he is to describe the decisive influence of historical context, discourse context, and sentence context on the question of which senses of a word (often, out of a whole range of senses found in a dictionary) are activated in a single given context.

But let us not be too hard on Ryrie until we hear the continuation.

This is sometimes called the principle of grammatical-historical interpretation since the meaning of each word is determined by grammatical and historical considerations.

This seems to be a good qualification. Yet Ryrie is still focusing on the meaning of words. This is not enough. His statements might still be presupposing an inadequate view of how sentence meaning and discourse meaning arise. The meaning of a sentence is not simply a mechanical sum of the meanings of its constituent words. There is grammar and paragraph context and historical context telling the reader how the words fit together, how they mutually qualify and modify one another in a complex interaction resulting in a communication of statements, commands, speaker attitudes, tone, allusions, and so on.

Ryrie continues:

The principle might also be called normal interpretation since the literal meaning of words is the normal approach to their understanding in all languages.

Here Ryrie unfortunately gives the appearance of talking about first-thought interpretation. Is he saying that we should assign to each word in a passage the "literal" meaning, that is, the meaning that would first be thought of when the word is produced in isolation? At the very least Ryrie has still not got beyond words, into sentences and communicative acts. In charity, we must suppose that, despite the apparent tendency of this sentence, Ryrie is not really advocating first-thought interpretation. Perhaps he wanted to say something like the following.

Words appearing in a dictionary often have several possible meanings, and have a potential to be used metaphorically. However, when a given word appears in a certain passage, in a certain total context, one almost automatically assigns to it a meaning agreeing with the context. This "almost automatic" assignment (from the standpoint of a native speaker) is what I mean by "literal meaning." Since this is also the normal way of proceeding, it can be called one aspect of normal interpretation.

Unfortunately, Ryrie has not gone to any great care in defining some special sense to his phrase "the literal meaning of word." Hence it sounds like what he means is first-thought meaning.

Let us look at the next sentence to see whether we get clarification.

It might also be designated plain interpretation so that no one receives the mistaken notion that the literal principle rules out figures of speech.

The mention of figures of speech is a useful qualification. Now the question will be whether, without "ruling out" figures of speech, Ryrie is nevertheless setting up a bias for flat interpretation (not to mention "plain interpretation" in my sense). Flat interpretation recognizes "obvious" figures of speech, but nothing beyond the obvious. The word "plain" might easily connote a refusal to go beyond a most obvious level. Or it might suggest that what is "plain" to us as moderns is sufficient. In that case, it would be similar to "plain interpretation" in my sense (section 27). It would say that (possibly because the differences between our times and biblical times are rather minimal) it is sufficient for us to interpret the biblical against the background of our own knowledge and culture. In view of what Ryrie has already said previously about "grammatical and historical considerations," I think that he does not want to talk about "plain interpretation" in my sense. In that case, it would have been better if Ryrie had introduced more qualifications or explanation.

Let us go on still further, to see whether Ryrie says anything to eliminate the option of flat interpretation or reinforces that option.

Symbols, figures of speech and types are all interpreted plainly in this method and they are in no way contrary to literal interpretation. After all, the very existence of any meaning for a figure of speech depends on the reality of the literal meaning of the terms involved. Figures often make the meaning plainer, but it is the literal, normal, or plain meaning that they convey to the reader.

Does this help? Well, for me at least, it doesn't help. I can't say that I know from this whether Ryrie is talking about what I call grammatical-historical interpretation or what I call flat interpretation. The word "literal" occurs here in three successive sentences. In the first we might hope that it is equivalent in meaning to "grammatical-historical." In the second sentence it means first-thought meaning (literal as the opposite of figurative). In the third, it might very well suggest flat interpretation. This seems to me to confirm my impression that part of the value of the word "literal" is that it can slide between several different senses.

Moreover, the above description does not help us become aware of the possibilities involved with "open-ended" texts. Some texts may make clear their central aspects of meaning, but there may be mysteries about just how far certain allusions or suggested meanings are to be considered. "Flat interpretation" fails precisely here. It underestimates the possibilities for ambiguities and possible-but-not-perfectly-obvious allusions used for positive effects.

There is still a possible rejoinder to this. The proponents of flat interpretation might argue as follows:

We grant that authors may produce "open-ended" texts. And we grant that it is improper to interpret such texts "flatly." But we think that the Bible is not an "open-ended" a text. God, in writing the Bible, intended to communicate truth rather than conceal it. Hence we expect that he will not use ambiguity or not-so-clear allusion. He will not exploit poetic possibilities in open-ended metaphors (where we are not sure how far a metaphorical comparison extends).

This is a responsible position, but it is a position that needs to be argued rather than simply assumed. It is easy to assume it without argument if we are not careful in stating hermeneutical principles. Moreover, I for one simply do not think that the position is true. Jesus' parables (see Mark 4:11-13) and types in the OT appear to me to be the simplest counterexamples.

Ryrie, of course, mentions types explicitly in the material that I quoted. But what does he intend to do with them? In particular, does he think that the the significance of an OT type may go beyond what can be seen in the original OT context? Some, perhaps most, interpreters with an orthodox view of biblical inspiration would say yes. The argument would be as follows. God knows the end from the beginning. Therefore, as the divine author of the Bible, he can establish a relation between the type and its antitypical fulfillment. Since the fulfillment comes only later, the type becomes richer than what is available by ordinary means in OT times. In other words, the divine intention for a type may, in certain cases, be richer than what one can obtain by grammatical-historical interpretation. Such richness, properly conceived, will not violate grammatical-historical meaning, or go contrary to it. It will arise from the added significance to the type when it is compared to the fulfillment.

If this is true, it means that grammatical-historical interpretation is not all that there is to the interpretation of types. Grammatical-historical interpretation is only one moment in the total act of interpretation. Hence it may be that Ryrie is not talking only about grammatical-historical interpretation. By mentioning types, he may be thinking of principles which are richer than grammatical-historical interpretation. On other hand, by not clearly excluding flat interpretation, he may be introducing a bias in favor of something less rich than grammatical-historical interpretation (because it will not take into account the allusions and figures that are not obvious). All in all, there is still considerable leeway in Ryrie's delineation of what he means by "literal" interpretation.

Ryrie continues using a quote from E.R. Craven.

"The literalist (so called) is not one who denies that figurative language, that symbols, are used in prophecy, nor does he deny that great spiritual truths are set forth therein; his position is, simply, that the prophecies are to be normally interpreted (i.e., according to the received laws of language) as any other utterances are interpreted--that which is manifestly figurative being so regarded."

This quote is basically good. But Ryrie (or Craven, who is quoted) unfortunately does not tell us what to do when something is not "manifestly figurative." That is, suppose something is not obviously, plainly, undeniably figurative, but nevertheless may be figurative. What do we do? Herein lies a good deal of the potential difference between flat or plain interpretation and grammatical-historical interpretation. Flat interpretation acknowledges only obvious figures; grammatical-historical interpretation seeks to acknowledge all figures and allusions. If Ryrie desired to talk about grammatical-historical interpretation, he might better have begun his sentence with the phrase "the grammatical-historical interpreter" rather than "the literalist."

29. Other statements on literalness

By contrast to this, Tan (1974, 29-30) defines grammatical-historical interpretation much more clearly in the first two of the following paragraphs:

To "interpret" means to explain the original sense of a speaker or writer. To interpret "literally" means to explain the original sense of the speaker or writer according to the normal, customary, and proper usages of words and language. Literal interpretation of the Bible simply means to explain the original sense of the Bible according to the normal and customary usages of its language.

. . . It is proper for a word to have various meanings and senses. However, when a word is used in a given situation, it should normally possess but one intended sense or meaning. This is the regular law of linguistic exchange among sensible people.

. . . To "understand" a speaker or writer, one must assume that the speaker or writer is using words normally and without multiple meanings. This is what the literal method of interpretation assumes of God in Scriptural revelation. It believes the Bible to be revelation, not riddle.

Tan has nevertheless biased things seriously towards a flat interpretation by a few turns of phrase. In what Tan says about words, the same tendency towards the idea of first-thought meaning may still be at work. In the second paragraph, Tan might better have said that in any one occurrence of a word in a piece of text, the word will have only one intended sense unless the context activates more than one sense. We have seen in the analysis of Isa 27:2-4 that some contexts can activate more than one meaning simultaneously. The word "battle," for instance, in Isa 27:4 evokes both the idea of a battle against personal enemies that the Lord might undertake on behalf of Israel (this is the main point), and a metaphorical battle which a gardener might have against briers and thorns. The full impact of the passage depends on the possibility of both of these. Again, "thorns" and "briers" are used in the extended figure involving the vineyard to stand for personal enemies. But they have the power also to evoke a memory of Eden, with its absence of (literal) thorns and briers. Hence the total impact of the words "thorns" and "briers" depends on the simultaneous presence of a metaphorical and a literal connection.

In fact, most metaphors depend for their success on such a simultaneous presence of two (or more) planes of meaning (cf., for example, Max Black 1962, 25-47). Hence Tan's third paragraph, if left as it stands, virtually eliminates the possibility of metaphors. Tan presumably did not intend this result. But he fell into a very one-sided statement.

Tan can be even more explicit than he is above.

Normal human communication demands the fundamental principle that what is being spoken or written be predominantly nonfigurative. A. B. Davidson is happily correct when he says: "This I consider the first [!] principle in prophetic interpretation--to read the prophet literally--to assume [!] that the literal meaning is his meaning--that he is moving among realities, not symbols, among concrete things like people, not among abstractions like our Church, world, etc." (Tan 1974, 132.)

Tan says that communication is "predominantly nonfigurative." Of course, there must be nonfigurative uses of words, against the background of which figurative uses arise. Moreover, the language learner typically acquires a sense for the meaning of words by observing the use of words in various contexts. In this sense, nonfigurative uses of a given word will "predominate." But what does this "predominance" of nonfigurative language amount to? It is a predominance within the total number of utterances ever heard by the average user of the language. This sort of predominance is quite compatible with the possibility that even very long discourses might be wholly figurative. For instance, Jesus' parables and John Bunyan's allegories are figurative all the way through.

30. Some global factors in interpretation

Moreover, Tan's statement does not seem to take into account the possibility that a whole story may be globally figurative, without there being any one word or words which are uniquely figurative. Some of the parables of Jesus approach this kind of story. For example, the Parable of the Lost Sheep in Luke 15:4-6, taken simply as a story in itself, contains little figurative language. Few of its individual words are used in an obviously figurative way. But in its context in Luke, it is obvious that the story as a whole functions as an extended metaphor relating two planes of meaning. That is, it relates the "husbandry" plane, concerning a shepherd and his sheep, to the "salvation" plane, concerning leaders of God's people and the people.

Now, how do we know whether biblical prophecy is like a plodding history writer, or like John Bunyan, or like parables, or like something else? Whether or not biblical prophecy is predominantly or exclusively figurative or nonfigurative ought not to be something "assumed," on the basis of a supposed "fundamental principle" of communication. It ought to be determined by looking at prophecy both in its verbal content and its historical context (grammatical-historical interpretation). To make pronouncements beforehand as Tan and Davidson do is to bias the question immediately in the direction of flat interpretation or plain interpretation or both.

Davidson's statement has still another problem, this time relating to the Israel/church distinction. His statement contrasts "reality" with "symbol," "concrete things" with "abstractions." "People" are reckoned as concrete things whereas "our Church" and "world" are reckoned as abstractions. As if our Church were not one kind of "people"! It looks very much as if the fundamental distinction between heaven and earth is at work here. The Church is reckoned as heavenly, and so as somehow not real, not "concrete," whereas other peoples are earthly and hence concrete. Where is such a question-begging contrast coming from? Literalness is almost being made to function as a code-word for the classic dispensationalist doctrine which construes the distinction between Israel and the church as a distinction between earth and heaven.

Perhaps some will think that I am being too hard on Ryrie, Tan, and Davidson. Are they really begging the important questions? Are they really slanting the case in favor of flat interpretation? Or are they just being imprecise? Well, maybe they are just imprecise. But the particular way in which they are being imprecise does not help to delineate the issues separating dispensationalist from nondispensationalist hermeneutics. Rather, it confuses them. And this happens in the very context where they are trying to set forth the distinctiveness of dispensationalist approach to hermeneutics over against other approaches!

We may illustrate the problem in still another way. Let us ask ourselves whether Ryrie or Tan's statements help us to know when and how to find a typological meaning when we are working with a particular OT historical or legal text. Ryrie explicitly allows that there are types. Tan would presumably do so too, though his statement denying multiple meanings for words would seem to exclude it. But both men are so general that they do not tell us about the crucial role of context (both immediate and more distant) in determining whether there is a symbolic or allusive meaning, and in determining how far the allusions belonging to such meaning extend. This leaves us with the question of whether it is legitimate to apply typological techniques to prophecy as well as history. Scofield said no. But Ryrie and Tan do not immediately distinguish history and prophecy. Hence it would seem that, in principle, they allow typological techniques in both history and prophecy or else in neither.

Now over against this, Tan's quote (1974, 132) from A. B. Davidson, with its pointed exclusion of the church, apparently forbids the use of typological techniques with prophecy. Perhaps Tan is operating with a general principle that is vague enough so that it can be interpreted at one point (historical texts) as allowing a good deal of allusiveness, yet interpreted at another point (prophecy) as minimizing any such possible allusiveness. In that case, his general principle would be ambiguous between grammatical-historical interpretation, flat interpretation, plain interpretation, and perhaps still other types of interpretation.

One final quotation may illustrate the problem. Feinberg (1980, 46) criticizes M. J. Wyngaarden, a writer he describes as believing "that even in Old Testament times those Old Testament Scriptures [many passages appealed to by Wyngaarden] had to be understood as embodying latent and incipient spiritualization." In rejecting this Feinberg (1980, 46) says:

How those portions were understood in Old Testament times, one need not be informed; it is a matter of common knowledge and open to the careful investigation of all. They were taken only and solely as literal.

What does Feinberg mean by "literal" here? He along with other dispensationalists assures us that he does freely recognize that there is figurative language in the Bible. So "literal" cannot mean "having no figures of speech." In spite of Feinberg's strong language, "only and solely as literal," he does not mean "no figures." Hence, "literal" does not mean first-thought interpretation. Does it connote simply "grammatical-historical interpretation"? In this context, evidently not, because then Feinberg's statements would come close to being a triviality. Both Feinberg and Wyngaarden agree that grammatical-historical interpretation is important. The point at issue with Wyngaarden is whether grammatical-historical interpretation does or does not include some "spiritualization." Wyngaarden claims that it does. Feinberg claims that it does not. Feinberg distinguishes his position from Wyngaarden using the word "literal." Hence "literal" here corresponds very closely to what I have described as flat interpretation. If I understand him correctly, Feinberg uses the word "literal" precisely in order to assert that grammatical-historical interpretation, in the particular case of OT writings, coincides in its results with what I have called "flat interpretation." The original audience was supposed to understand the writings in a flat manner, and hence grammatical-historical interpretation reproduces this flatness.

Now, let us suppose that we have understood Feinberg correctly. His claim is exceedingly important. It may be close to the heart of the hermeneutical disputes. But Feinberg does not defend his view. He says merely that his view is "a matter of common knowledge." Unfortunately, it is not "common" to me. I would like the matter to be discussed at some length, not just assumed. Hence I will take up the question in chapters 10 and 11.

In the meantime, what is "literal" interpretation? It is a confusing term, capable of being used to beg many of the questions at stake in the interpretation of the Bible. We had best not use the phrase, but rather speak of grammatical-historical interpretation. The word "literal" could still be retained in discussing the meaning of particular words or particular sentences. In that case it would be the opposite of figurative. It would do roughly the same job as my phrase "first-thought" meaning.