7
THE LAST TRUMPET

Before discussing the crucial question of the principle of "literal" interpretation, it is well for us to look at a particular example which will illustrate a few of the problems. The example I have in mind is 1 Cor 15:51-53. This is one of two texts that are most fruitful for a discussion of dispensationalism, precisely because it brings some of the hermeneutical principles to the surface.

Now I do not think that this passage is by any means decisive in a discussion of dispensationalism. Rather, it is a passage to be used as a kind of "opening move." It is a kind of ice-breaker to help establish positive relationships of communication.

22. 1 Cor 15:51-53 as a problem to pretribulationalism

1 Cor 15:51-53 presents a problem to the doctrine of pretribulational rapture, because it speaks of "the last trumpet." Now classic dispensationalist theory interprets 1 Cor 15:51-53 as referring to the rapture. Seven years after the rapture another trumpet is sounded at the visible second coming of Christ, in connection with the gathering of elect Jews (Matt 24:31). Hence, apparently, the trumpet sound described in 1 Cor 15:52 is not really the last. If, on the other hand, the rapture of 1 Cor 15:51-53 and the visible second coming of Matt 24:31 are essentially simultaneous (contrary to classic dispensationalist theory), the two trumpets are presumably also the same, and there is no difficulty.

Thus there is an obvious difficulty in reconciling the two texts (1 Cor 15:51-53 and Matt 24:31) with dispensationalist theory. Now, there is a standard dispensationalist answer to this difficulty. In fact, this answer is fairly "obvious" within the dispensationalist system. The readers who are familiar enough with the general principles of the system may be able to figure it out for themselves. My concern is not with whether there is an answer, but with the hermeneutical question: how is the answer obtained?

One must in effect keep raising hermeneutical questions. What are the principles by which we undertake to understand 1 Cor 15:51-53 and to reconcile it with Matt 24:31? When classic dispensationalists talk about those principles, they tell us that we must interpret "literally" or "plainly." Now what is a "literal" interpretation of 1 Cor 15:51-53? To be "literal" could mean simply to take fully into account all the grammatical, contextual, and historical clues throwing light on this passage. That is sometimes demanding. But it would be sound. On the other hand, to be "literal" could imply that we are to stick to what is most "plain" or "obvious." If we agreed with this principle, we would argue as follows:

Well, the "plain" meaning of 1 Cor 15:52 seems to be that this is the last trumpet. There are no more trumpets after that. You have told us to be literal, we can't make it out as saying anything else if we are "literal." Now when we turn to Matt 24:31, and it speaks of a trumpet, we am bound to believe that Matthew's trumpet is either the same one or an earlier one. After all, the one in 1 Cor 15:52 is the "last" trumpet (literally the last). Matthew 24:30 already speaks of the visible Second Coming. Hence it appears that the visible Second Coming is simultaneous with the transformation of believers' bodies in the "rapture." Because you have told us to be "literal" in interpreting 1 Cor 15:51-53, we can't believe in the seven-year distinction between rapture and second coming.

There might be several suggestions for avoiding this conclusion. First, one could suggest that though there is only one trumpet, there are several blasts from the trumpet. But this will not work, because 1 Cor 15:52 mentions the trumpet sound. It clearly means to imply that this is the last sounding of a trumpet of God, not merely that there is a single fixed trumpet that is used for blasts relating to a long series of "last" events.

Next, one could suggest that the trumpet sound is perhaps seven years long. But this will not work because of the stress in 1 Cor 15:52 on the quickness of the operation. The raising of the dead sequentially follows the sounding of the trumpet, rather than taking place during some very long sounding of the trumpet. Or at least this seems to be the "plainest" way to take the text.

Or one could suggest that Matt 24:31 is not about the visible second coming of Christ, but about the rapture. But a "literal" interpretation of Matt 24:30 would certainly lead us to think that we are dealing with the visible second coming.

Of course, the above argument arose from trying to be "literal" in a wooden sense. But even if we are trying just to understand 1 Corinthians 15 and Matthew 24 by sound, grammatical-historical exegesis, these texts are most easily reconciled by viewing the rapture and the second coming as simultaneous.

23. The standard dispensationalist answer

Now let us take up explicitly the standard answer, as given by J. Dwight Pentecost (1958, 189-191).

The word last may signify that which concludes a program, but is not necessarily the last that will ever exist. Inasmuch as the program for the church differs from that for Israel, each may be terminated by the blowing of a trumpet, properly called the last trumpet, without making the two last trumpets identical and synonymous [sic; a later edition corrects this to "synchronous"] as to time.

. . . (3) The trumpet for the church is singular. No trumpets have preceded it so that it can not be said to be the last of a series. The trumpet that closes the tribulation period is clearly the last of a series of seven.... (7) The trumpet in 1 Thessalonians is distinctly for the church. Since God is dealing with Israel in particular, and the Gentiles in general, in the tribulation, this seventh trumpet, which falls in the period of the tribulation, could not have reference to the church without losing the distinctions between the church and Israel.

Pentecost has much else to say, though much of it is only relevant against the theory of midtribulationist rapture or in the context of particular specialized views concerning the seventh trumpet in Rev 11:15.

Pentecost is certainly right on one point: in some contexts "last" should not be understood in an absolute sense. But how do we decide when the word "last" is to be understood in a qualified way? What hermeneutical principle do we use? What does it mean to interpret "last" "literally"? Well, sometimes "last" is accompanied by a qualifying genitive: "On the last and greatest day of the feast ..." (John 7:37). "Last" may receive a qualification obvious from the context: "last" in Matt 20:8 must mean last of those hired. But 1 Cor 15:51-53 has no such obvious qualification. On the contrary, the passage as a whole is about events which the first-century Jewish environment associated with the end of the whole world. The perspective is cosmic, not some limited series of events.

In the end, Pentecost really has only one hermeneutical argument for not understanding "last" in an unqualified way. His argument is that it is last for the church, not for Israel. But where does 1 Corinthians say or hint that the "lastness" is to be understood as confined to the concerns of the church? Dispensationalists agree that 1 Cor 15:20-28 is a passage whose scope includes the whole millennial period, up to the consummation. And 15:45-57 is obviously picking up on many of the topics of 15:20-28. Dispensationalists have told us to be "literal." Doesn't this mean not reading in things that have no warrant in the text?

So what does "literal" interpretation of 1 Cor 15:51-53 mean? This is the question that ought to be asked patiently and repeatedly as dispensationalists wrestle with the explanation and interpretation of 1 Cor 15:52. Ultimately for J. Dwight Pentecost "literalness" appears to mean reading 1 Cor 15:51-53 with the Israel/church distinction already in mind. It means coming to the passage asking whether this passage is speaking of Israel's destiny or the church's. But that would mean that the word "literal" is so loaded with the connotations of the dispensationalist distinctives that it is worthless for the purpose of positive and fair dialog.

Now admittedly, all interpreters with a high view of the Bible's doctrinal unity will believe that we are to strive to understand one passage of the Bible in a way that harmonizes with other passages. Any one passage will be read, not only in terms of its immediate literary and historical context, but in terms of the context of the whole of the rest of the Bible. Moreover, interpreters will have already formed certain conclusions about the over-all form of the teaching of the rest of the Bible. They will hold a host of doctrinal convictions. Those convictions which they hold on the basis of clear teaching of several texts, they will be reluctant to abandon just because one new text appears to present difficulties. Hence, what dispensationalists are doing with 1 Cor 15:51-53 is not so very different from what nondispensationalists do. Both read texts under the influence of prior judgements and convictions. But it must be recognized that this process makes it more difficult for people to abandon error.

By itself, then, this brief analysis of 1 Cor 15:51-53 does not show that dispensationalists are wrong. But it is useful in order to help us become more aware of the way in which the dispensationalist system impinges on the interpretation of a given passage. The system does affect interpretation. It is useful also because similar effects occur at various points within any competing system of interpretation. No one escapes all the problems.

But the problems are more acute within classic dispensationalism, which maintains a sharp two-peoples-of-God distinction. Classic dispensationalism, whether right or wrong, is almost impossible to refute by an appeal to texts. The aid of the dispensationalist system almost automatically provides a way out of otherwise problematic texts. The word "literal" can conceal these difficulties, because it is not clear how much that word allows. Does "literalism" permit the importation of the distinction between Israel and the church, at any point where the system gets in difficulty? If "literalism" does permit this importation, it begs the most important interpretive questions which are at stake with nondispensationalists.

What do dispensationalists themselves say about how a system can be refuted? Charles Feinberg's (1980, 39) description of testing premillennialism goes as follows:

First, when certain difficulties are affirmed of a doctrine which claims to be biblical, one is only required to show that a solution of the alleged problem is possible. When certain passages are referred to that are said to contradict the premillennial doctrine, all that is necessary is to demonstrate that according to the rules of exegesis, a harmonization is possible.

To begin with, postmillennialism and amillennialism as well as modified dispensationalism and nondispensationalist versions of premillennialism could, I believe, hold their own on the same basis as Feinberg suggests. All that they have to demonstrate is that "harmonization is possible" within their own system. Surely all firm premillennialists, postmillennialists, and amillennialists claim that much. Feinberg's criteria are really too weak to arbitrate between different millennial positions.

But the problem is worse yet, because Feinberg is still vague about what "the rules of exegesis" are. Do those rules include the right to invoke the Israel/church distinction, when dealing with a passage like 1 Cor 15:51-53? If they do, we are involved in a circular argument. The circle goes like this. Premillennial dispensationalism demonstrates the validity of an Israel/church distinction. This distinction is incorporated into a hermeneutical rule. And that rule is used to build up and harmonize the dispensationalist system.

Feinberg's continuation, one page later in his book (1980, 40), is not reassuring:

Every prophecy is part of a wonderful scheme of revelation; for the true significance of any prophecy, the whole prophetic scheme must be kept in mind and the interrelationship between the parts in the plan as well.

Feinberg seems to be saying that the entire dispensationalist system ought to be kept in mind as one is interpreting any one prophecy. It sounds as if the essentials of dispensationalism have been incorporated into the rules of exegesis. Perhaps not. Perhaps Feinberg is working with a distinction between exegesis in a narrow sense (the first quotation above) and the appreciation of the "significance" of a prophecy in a broad sense (the second quotation above). But exegesis in a narrow sense would certainly not do with 1 Cor 15:51-53 what dispensationalists do with it. We are left, then, with a big problem. What is "literal" interpretation, and what we will allow to be taken into account in the interpretation of any one text? Moreover, how do we avoid an unfruitful circularity in dialog? Feinberg is not the only one who could fall into circularity. One can imagine classic dispensationalist, modified dispensationalist, amillennialist, and postmillennialist alike going round and round, showing that it is "possible" to harmonize texts with their system. They will each establish their case all the more effectively if, as is often the case, the "rules of exegesis" are understood with a slightly different slant within the various systems. The appeal to "literalism" is often seen as part of the avoidance of subjectivity in interpretation. But one does not really escape the possibility of subjectivity by simply waving "literalism" as a banner. One must examine what one means by that word, and try to specify what it does and does not imply. Otherwise one only hides from intellectual challenges and from insight into one's assumptions and limitations.

I am not saying that all dispensationalists are hiding. But the ones who are not might well take into account that others are.