Chapter 9
The Punishments and Penalties of the Law,
Prefiguring the Destruction of Sin and Guilt through Christ

Some of the laws of Moses describe punishments that fall on those who disobey. How do we understand these punishments? This area is a particularly sensitive one, because of modern aversion to punishments of any kind. Some people are tempted to say that these parts of the Old Testament contain inferior ideas deriving from Israel's imperfect understanding rather than from God. But such a response greatly misunderstands the character of Mosaic law. Israel was indeed an imperfect nation, but the laws in Exodus through Deuteronomy are God's words to Israel, not Israel's response to God. Jesus confirms the absolute authority of these words when he says, "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished" (Matt. 5:17-18). Hence we must see the punishments of the law as part of the positive communication deriving from God himself.

The righteousness of God's punishments

The punishments are easy to accept once we deal with the perversions and misunderstandings in our own hearts. Modern culture is averse to punishment because it does not understand God nor does it understand the seriousness of sin. We need to reject many ideas of modern culture in order to accept God's word. God is infinitely holy and good. Sin is rebellion against him, an infinitely serious violation of his majesty and a despising of his goodness. The righteous punishment for sin, according to the standard of God's own righteousness, is eternal death. If we can see the true seriousness of our sin, we will no longer object to God's supposed severity but marvel at his mercy.

We can approach the same issue from another angle. God loved Jesus Christ his own Son supremely. And yet by God's own plan Jesus was condemned to death (Acts 2:23; 4:25-28). God hated sin so much that even Jesus had to suffer when sin was laid on him. Here we see the true awfulness of sin. Moreover, if there had been another way to save the world, God surely would have spared his own Son from a horrible death in order to do it. The awesome character of Jesus' death therefore shows how righteous God is. Sin must be punished. God's righteousness requires it. There is no other way. Punishment, then, is built deeply into the order of the universe; in fact, it is an aspect of God's own order, of his way of dealing with sin. We do not like to hear about punishment because it reminds us of the seriousness of sin. But we must hear about it if we are to wake up to the true horror of our sinfulness and flee to the remedy, that is, flee to Christ. Thus punishment in this life can have a positive side. It can make us wake up to our need. C. S. Lewis has said that "God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pains."1 Pain is a warning that our lives are amiss. Come to Christ before it is too late!

Thus we never have a right to complain that God's punishments are too severe. Within this life, punishments are less than we deserve apart from Christ. Moreover, when we are God's children, we can have confidence that he is disciplining us for our good (Heb. 12:5-13). "No discipline seems pleasant at the time, but painful. Later on, however, it produces a harvest of righteousness and peace for those who have been trained by it" (Heb. 12:11). Discipline also has a role on a human plane, when parents discipline their children. Of course, a good parent takes care to set a good example and spends much time giving positive instruction and guidance to children, like the father in Prov. 4:1. But good parents will not shirk their duty to punish children when the children go astray. Such punishment, if given consistently and in love, gives the children a most concrete warning of the long-range consequences of evil behavior. "Do not withhold discipline from a child; if you punish him with the rod, he will not die. Punish him with the rod and save his soul from death" (Prov. 23:13-14). "He who spares the rod hates his son, but he who loves him is careful to discipline him" (Prov. 13:24).

God's punishments in the Old Testament always foreshadow God's final judgment. They warn us that judgment is impending and symbolize on an earthly plane the character of the judgment. Thus, as we have seen, the substitutionary punishments that take place in animal sacrifices foreshadow the punishment and destruction that is due for sin, and the complete consecration to God that is required of true worshipers. This punishment and destruction fell on Christ on the cross, where he became our substitute. Christ's utter consecration to God is vindicated in his resurrection. We who trust in Christ share the benefits of his work. We are freed from punishment and destruction and are consecrated to God through Christ's sacrifice (Heb. 10:10, 14). Those who do not believe in Christ and are not united to him must suffer punishment and destruction in their own person in hell. In a similar way we should understand all the punishments in Israel's history as warnings and foreshadowings.

The punishments of God are never arbitrary, but fit his own holy character. Sin always involves an attempt to play God, to usurp God's authority, and to be one's own standard of right and wrong like Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden. In sin we engage in an attempt virtually to destroy God's authority and claim on us--to destroy God if we could. The fit punishment for such rebellion is a replica of the crime. "As you have done, it will be done to you" (Obad. 15). Since we have attempted to destroy God, we are ourselves destroyed by God in hell. Or else Christ as our representative bears the destruction for us on the cross. (Lest readers misunderstand, let me say that in biblical contexts destruction of human beings never implies literal nonexistence or annihilation, but frustration and rendering powerless.) The smaller judgments of God within history, whether in the form of illness, suffering, or physical death, all confront us with smaller forms of destruction and powerlessness; they thereby anticipate the great judgment.

The fit payment for sin is both punishment and destruction, as two aspects of one whole. Fit punishment includes powerlessness, and hence the destruction of our powers. Conversely, fit destruction includes destruction of our longings for fulfillment. Hence it involves pain and frustration, that is, punishment. Within this life such payment can serve to awake us to our danger and our guilt, if we are repentant. For those who are unrepentant, it serves as the first foretaste of greater punishment at the last judgment.

Another way of understanding the appropriateness of punishment is to see it as an implication of love. God the Father loves the Son. Just as any human father will want to defend his son against enemies, God the Father reacts against any dishonor to Christ and will punish it.

One final analogy may help to drive home the point. A wise human father will not only endeavor to warn a young son but spank him for disobedience if he gets too near a busy street. Similarly the son will be punished for trying to play with the father's power tools. The father gives his son an immediate pain signal to warn him, because the son is not yet able to calculate the more distant consequences of toying with danger. Similarly, in our relationship to God certain areas are off limits, because God is using his power tools. The entire tabernacle is off limits for Israel, except under certain carefully specified conditions that protect the priests from the danger. Moreover, even the tabernacle itself is only a shadow of the real areas of power.

God's holiness and righteousness are in fact the real power tools. God because of his righteousness undertakes to cleanse the world from evil. And he will do so through the power of Christ's death and resurrection. But we must keep out of God's workshop. We must stop playing God. We must submit to his way of doing things. Punishment on earth is God's signpost warning us of approaching danger. Presumptuous people are like madmen dancing nonchalantly into the business end of a sawmill.

The analogy with the sawmill is imperfect, because we are guilty and not merely ignorant. We ourselves are part of the refuse from which God must cleanse the world. But we must not be embarrassed or embittered by punishment. God's goodness does not contradict his punishments. Rather, the coming together of goodness and punishment points to a deep mystery, the unfathomable wisdom by which God righteously saves wicked people. For God to create the world shows infinite power and wisdom. For God to destroy wickedness and injustice shows infinite power and wisdom. For God to destroy wickedness while rescuing wicked people shows infinity squared, namely the infinity of the punishment and goodness and justice that are united together in crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Here God's power tools are harnessed for our good.

One of the most general principles of God's justice is the principle of similar measure. "As you have done, it will be done to you, your deeds will return upon your own head" (Obad. 15). Jer. 50:29, Hab. 2:8, Joel 3:4, 7, and other passages articulate the same principle in varying forms. The famous law of punishment, "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (Exod. 21:24), embodies the same principle in a specific juridical context. It was never intended as an excuse for personal vengeance but as a directive to judges making decisions regarding penalties in cases of injury (Exod. 21:22-25). The death penalty for murder comes in the same form, "Whoever sheds man's blood, By man his blood shall be shed" (Gen. 9:6). Gen. 9:6 is an exceedingly significant passage because it is spoken to Noah immediately after the flood. The character of Noah as representative of all his descendants and the otherwise universal context of the passage (Gen. 9:7, 11-19) show that here we are dealing with a principle of truly universal scope, and not merely with something specially tailored to Israel as a holy nation. The same principle comes up in New Testament teaching. "For in the way you judge, you will be judged; and by your standard of measure, it shall be measured to you" (Matt. 7:2). "Pay her back even as she has paid, and give back to her double according to her deeds; in the cup which she has mixed, mix twice as much for her. To the degree that she glorified herself and lived sensuously, to the same degree give her torment and mourning" (Rev. 18:6-7). "They poured out the blood of saints and prophets, and Thou hast given them blood to drink. They deserve it" (Rev. 16:6).

Penal authority given to human beings

The principle of similar measure applies both to judgments by God, such as the judgment on Babylon in Rev. 18:6-7, and to judgments by human authorities, such as the penalties of "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" in Exod. 21:24. But we must be careful in making the transition from God to human authorities. God's authority is original and absolute, while all human authority is derivative and limited. God's judgments are always perfectly holy and righteous, while human judgments are tainted by sin. God's judgments are based on perfect, exhaustive knowledge of the facts of the case, while human judgments must be based on partial, imperfect knowledge. Human governmental authority is subject to great abuse, as when it was used to try to force Daniel and his friends into idolatry.

Nevertheless, even with all these reservations, the Bible definitely teaches that the authority of human state governments and the authority of human parents is a limited but legitimate authority given by God (cf. Rom. 13:1-7; Eph. 6:1-3). We must resist the modern temptation to rebel against all authority whatsoever. Such modern rebellion is rooted ultimately in rejection of God's authority (Rom. 13:2). It overlooks the fact that God sets up kings and deposes them (Dan. 2:21). Since it regards differences in status and authority as pure chance, it is naturally contemptuous of the claims based on such differences.

In the Mosaic law God gives to human beings--to Israel in particular--authority to execute penalties for certain crimes. In fact, the human authority to punish is attested even earlier, in Gen. 9:6. God might have kept all prerogatives to punish for himself, but he does not do so. In the case of murder, the awesome responsibility of executing the death penalty is assigned to finite, sinful human beings ("by man"). Undeniably there is a risk here. Human beings with the best intentions may make a grievous mistake because their knowledge is finite. And frequently their intentions are corrupt. But by assigning this task to human beings, God confirms one aspect of their dominion as image bearers of God.

Human government at its best is indeed a blessing from God. Most obviously, government can protect the innocent from criminals (Rom. 13:3-5; 1 Pet. 2:14). But the punishments of human government, since they reflect nothing less than divine authority (Rom. 13:1-2), are also a little reminder of the coming final judgment of God. Human authorities as image bearers of God ought to reflect in some measure divine justice as they carry out their duties.

We can learn something about principles of God's justice as we reflect on the specific penalties of Old Testament law. Such laws derive from God, so we know that the penalties are always just. But when human beings are given responsibility to execute penalties, the penalties involved are only a finite image of God's own penalties and justice. There is always a decisive difference in the nature and scope of their authority. As Jesus says, "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the one who can destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28). Once we recognize the decisive distinction, we can also see similarity. Justice on a human level is a shadow of that great act of justice and mercy where Jesus Christ bore the just penalty for our sin. Hence all the Old Testament penalties point forward to the justice of God at work in the sacrifice of Christ.

Simple examples of just recompense on earth: murder and theft

We can see clearly how things work in the case of the death penalty for murder in Gen 9:6. Let us suppose that person A has deliberately killed person B. The same penalty is in return executed on person A: the executioner, by God's authority, deliberately kills person A. Such a penalty corresponds to the nature of the crime. "As you have done, it will be done to you" holds true. The punishment is a kind of replication of the crime, except that it returns the crime back on the criminal. Thus this punishment, operative as it is on the level of human government, reflects the divine principles of replication and imitation that we have already seen.

How do we understand the principle of just recompense in the case of theft? According to Mosaic law thieves are required to pay back something to the owner from whom they have stolen. The amount paid varies with the situation: sometimes double, sometimes four times, sometimes five times (Exod. 22:1, 4, 7). The situation is more complex here, because we must try to understand whether there is some reason for the various quantities of repayment. The easiest starting point is with the related statutes concerned with reparations for accidental damage and for borrowed things (Exod. 21:28-36; 22:10-15). The person who is responsible for accidental damage or who has borrowed something is required to make good what the owner has lost. A singlefold restitution takes place in order to match the loss. In the case of theft, by contrast, the restitution is usually double (Exod. 22:7). What principle is at work here?

The logic behind simple singlefold restitution is fairly clear. In a typical case Bill borrows (say) an ox from Al and restores the ox to Al afterwards. The restoration of the ox restores balance or harmony and brings the situation back to its original normalcy. If the ox dies while Bill has it Bill is unable to restore full normalcy. So Bill does the best he can by supplying a substitute ox of equivalent value (Exod. 22:14). Or suppose that Bill makes a pit and Al's ox falls into it and dies. Bill accidentally caused damage to Al's property. Bill cannot bring Al's ox back to life (the best restoration), so again he does the best he can by offering Al a substitute ox. The dead ox undergoes a substitutionary exchange with the living one, and so the dead ox becomes Bill's (Exod. 21:33-34). The end result is that Al's property is restored to its original integrity (as best as possible), and that Bill suffers exactly the amount of loss for which he was actually responsible (the difference in value between a live ox and a dead one).

Note that a principle of restoration is at work. Even in as simple a case as this one, people are to imitate what they see in the tabernacle and in the general principles of God's justice. They are to take heed to abide by the created order of God. In a way the restoration is simultaneously a replication of the original situation. When the borrowed ox is restored to its owner, the borrower replicates the original order that was temporarily set aside by the borrowing. If the borrowed animal dies, the borrower can no longer restore it, but he restores a replica of it--a substitute animal. Thus the principle of substitution embedded in this practice is simultaneously an instance of replication. Once again, this imitates an aspect of the tabernacle and the creation of God, namely the principle of replication.

What decisive difference arises when we deal with theft instead of borrowing or accidental damage? In the case of theft the thief intended to appropriate the property permanently without the owner's permission. Bill steals an ox from Al. If Bill is apprehended with the ox alive in his possession, then the ox is returned to Al. The return of the ox restores the balance in the same way as with borrowing. But theft in distinction from borrowing carries with it the evil of intending specific damage to Al's total supply of property. Bill intended damage to Al and simultaneously advantage to himself. Hence the principle of "as you have done, it will be done to you" involves an act in the reverse direction, of damage to Bill and advantage to Al. An ox is forcefully taken from Bill and given to Al, just as Bill earlier forcefully took an ox of Al's and had it given to himself. The total result of this process is that Bill repays double. The repayment of the first ox is simple restoration, while the repayment of the second ox is punishment for the criminal intent.

The nature of the punishment is obviously significant. Not just any punishment will do, but only a punishment that matches the crime. A suitable match is achieved by replicating or reproducing the effect of the crime, only in the reverse direction. If Bill stole from Al, he must give to Al the same amount. This process of replication in reverse is exactly what we saw in the case of murder as well. As a general rule, punishment in similar measure implies that the punishment should replicate the effect of the crime, only in reverse. Such a punishment embodies the basic principle of replication that is integral to God's created order. Moreover, a punishment of this kind also embodies a kind of restoration of balance. Injury to one is balanced by injury to the guilty party. For convenience, however, I prefer to reserve the term "restoration" for the act of returning the original stolen ox. Restoration is appropriate in the case of borrowing, whereas punishment as an additional burden is appropriate in the case of theft.

In sum, double payment is the appropriate penalty for theft. The penalty must involve two parts, restoration of the original and punishment for evil intent. The double quantity involved is not an arbitrary amount, but is based on what is fitting. Through this rationale we also help to resolve an important exegetical question. Interpreters of Exod 22:4 and 22:7 are not sure whether these texts describe restoring the original plus one more or restoring the original plus two more.2 The linguistic data of the texts by themselves do not point with absolute clarity to either one of these alternatives. But on the basis of the general principle of due recompense, the interpretation involving restoring the original and one more seems much more likely. Moreover, once we have penetrated to the principle behind the particulars, we are much more confident that the instances of double recompense are the rule, while recompense of four or five times represents the exception.

This punishment for theft reflects on a human level the nature of our obligations to God for our sin. Payment for sin must include both restoration and punishment. In restoration we must restore or repair the damage done to others and to God's honor. In punishment we must in addition bear damage in ourselves corresponding to our evil intent.3

Both of these two sides to our obligations are fulfilled in Christ. Christ's suffering and death were God's punishment for sin. Christ's earthly life of righteousness and his resurrection are his restoration of righteousness to God. In the promise of new creation, based on Christ's work, we have hope for full restoration of the universe from the damage of all sin. In the suffering of Christ on the cross we have full payment for the punishment of sin as well as vindication of the honor of God.4

What do we now say about the fourfold and fivefold recompense in Exod. 22:1? 22:1 specifies that if an ox or a sheep is stolen and is not found alive, the thief must pay the owner five oxen in return for one stolen ox, or four sheep in return for one stolen sheep. Everyone has difficulty with this verse because no explicit reason is given why these cases differ from the general principle of twofold repayment (see 22:7). Several speculative reasons have been offered, but in the nature of the case none can be viewed as definitive. 5 I would suggest that we take our clue from the only direct information that we are given distinguishing the case of verse 1 from those of verse 4 and verse 7, namely the issue of whether the ox or sheep is found alive in the thief's possession. If the animal is alive, the thief restores double, according to the pattern that we have already seen. But if the ox or sheep is not in the thief's possession the process of restoration cannot take place according to the normal pattern. The thief's further action in disposing of the beast has introduced a further element of guilt, in that he has intentionally damaged the possibility of making things good to the owner. Before the action of disposition, he was liable for two animals. After the action the guilt is doubled. He must pay two animals to restore balance, and then two more animals for the additional guilt and liability. By this process we get a total of four sheep.

But now why five oxen for an ox? I do not know. We may have reached the limit of our ability to account for recompense in terms of the principle of balanced punishment and restoration. What distinguishes the ox? In Israelite times in an agricultural economy the ox was the single most expensive possession and simultaneously the least dispensable possession that an average Israelite might have--other than land or a house that could not easily be stolen. The theft of an ox could easily threaten an average family with poverty, and the additional guilt involved may be what warrants the additional payment. There may also be a principle at work similar to Exod. 22:5. For accidental damage to a field, restitution is made from the best of the field. That is, in order to make sure that restitution is complete, the best quality product must be given as a substitute. Such a principle would certainly be just in the case of other forms of substitutionary restoration. In the case of the five oxen, the serious threat to the owner's livelihood warrants a fifth ox to make sure about the fullness of repayment. I am not satisfied with this explanation, but neither am I satisfied with alternative explanations that I have seen. 6

My analysis also helps us to understand the appropriateness of recompense being made to the original owner. Just as in a case of borrowing the borrowed item must be restored to the original owner, so the thief must give back the original item to the owner. And since in the initial act of theft advantage flowed from (say) Al to Bill, in the second act of repaying double advantage flows back from Bill to Al. As James Jordan observes, "Restitution is not made to the state, but to the man robbed. The state is not wronged in any of this, and the wrong done to God is satisfied by sacrifice."7

One further question remains. Does Prov. 6:30-31 indicate that a person stealing on account of hunger must pay back sevenfold? The text runs, "Men do not despise a thief if he steals to satisfy his hunger when he is starving. Yet if he is caught, he must pay sevenfold, though it costs him all the wealth of his house." In context, the word "sevenfold" is a metaphorical way of expressing the completeness of the penalty rather than its literal quantitative proportion.8 Hence this text is not in tension with the principles developed above.

Using the same principles of recompense we can explain more thoroughly the penalty of capital punishment for murder (Gen. 9:6). Suppose Bill deliberately kills Al. In analogy with theft, proper recompense involves two elements. First, restore what has been damaged (restoration). Second, have the offending party subjected to the same process in reverse (punishment). The first stage would involve raising Al back to life, while the second would involve Al killing Bill under the supervision of legal process. But of course human beings are unable to achieve full recompense in this situation. Only God can bring Al back to life. Such a resurrection will indeed take place at the last day, but until then all human reflection of God's justice will necessarily partake in preeschatological imperfection. Since perfection cannot be attained immediately, what is actually done in a case of murder? The dead man must be left dead. There is no restoration. But at least the second part of the process, namely punishment, can be carried out. The avenger of blood, that is, the nearest family representative of Al, kills Bill under the supervision of legal process, as outlined in Num. 35. Note that the element of reciprocity is carried out as fully as is practicable. Since Al himself is dead and cannot participate in the judicial retribution, the nearest of kin substitutes for him.

Recompense in the case of manslaughter follows the same general lines. Manslaughter is the accidental taking of human life. Rather than being analogous to theft, it is analogous to the cases in Exod. 21:28-36 where there is accidental damage to property. If Bill is responsible for the death of Al's sheep, perfect restoration would involve Bill bringing the sheep back to life. Since Bill cannot do this, Bill substitutes a live animal. There is no double recompense here because there was no evil intent. Likewise in the case of human death with no evil intent only a singlefold repayment or restoration would be appropriate. Ideally, the raising of the dead person but not the death of the manslaughterer is called for. But the dead person cannot be raised. The requirements of recompense can only be met when the person guilty of manslaughter takes refuge in a "city of refuge" whose character symbolically anticipates the eschatological refuge of salvation in Christ. By pointing to the promise of restoration of all things, including the restoration of life, the city of refuge and the death of the high priest are crucial pivots responding to the desire of the avenger of blood for satisfaction.

We can also make sense of the provisions in Lev. 6:1-7 for repentant thieves. The thief must offer a sacrifice to deal with his sin against God. He must also restore singlefold to the person robbed (6:5). This situation corresponds to the distinction between accidental and deliberate damage to another person's property in Exod. 21-22. As a general rule, accidental damage results is singlefold repayment (restoration), while deliberate damage results in double repayment (restoration plus punishment). The difference between the two resides in the evil intent. Now in the case in Lev. 6:1-7 the thief has repented of his evil intent. The situation has thus become like one of accidental damage. But the thief adds one-fifth (6:5). The figure of one-fifth is not further explained in the text of Lev. 6, but the easiest supposition is that it represents a tithe of the double repayment. The thief thereby testifies that he would otherwise be liable to the whole penalty, just as the tithe of crops testifies that they are all owned by God.

Furthermore, we can now understand the principles regarding penalties for false witnesses. Deut. 19:15-21 contains the basic instructions for dealing with cases of false witness. The appropriate penalty is described in Deut. 19:19: "You shall do to him just as he intended to do to his brother." The immediate context of Deut. 19:19 appears to suppose that the case is resolved before the innocent party suffers damage. The first stage of recompense, namely restoration, is unnecessary, because no measurable damage has occurred. The false witness has been detected early enough, before the intended damage was achieved. But the second stage, punishment, where the false witness receives equal damage, is still appropriate. We may therefore generalize to cases not directly covered by the passage in Deuteronomy. Suppose that monetary damage had already been inflicted by a false witness whose testimony was believed. Due recompense would presumably require the double payment characteristic of theft, that is, it would include restoration plus punishment.

Up to this point I have concentrated on the questions concerning the type and quantity of recompense required for various crimes. Yet we should not suppose that God's wisdom is manifested only at that level. There are obviously practical social benefits to these arrangements. The provision for repentant thieves in Lev. 6:1-7 provides tangible, practical incentive for a thief to repent, since he will not have to repay as much. The provision for fourfold or fivefold repayment in the case of animals that have been disposed of (Exod. 22:1) also has practical value. It supplies practical motivation for a thief not to dispose of stolen property, and thereby makes it easier to get a full restoration. Moreover, the thief is not shut up in prison where he may become worse, but forced to do something constructive by paying someone else. The injured person rather than the state receives recompense, which not only helps to heal the injury but shows to the thief the proper direction in which his energies should be directed.

The basic motivational problems of the thief are also addressed as best they can be in the form of outward actions. The problems of crime are all rooted in the failure to love one's neighbor. For example, the thief is keenly aware of his own desire for someone else's goods but has little concern for the well-being of the owner. He is unable to love the other person who owns the property and unable to see things sympathetically from that person's point of view. When the thief is caught and forced to repay, the structure of recompense forces him at least in a minimal way to adopt the other person's point of view. He is made to feel the same deprivation that the other person felt. In the case of capital punishment, of course, the murderer cannot thoroughly feel the experience of death until he is dead, and then it is too late. But even the fact that death is approaching gives him some idea.

Capital punishment certainly does not solve the problems completely. Only the resurrection of the dead person, the repentance of the criminal, and the criminal's union with Christ's death and resurrection would suffice to deal with the root of the matter. Only the power of the Holy Spirit, sent to apply the work of Christ to human beings, can heal the root of sin in human hearts. Christ's work also includes the promise of dealing with the results of sin, including death itself. Because of the power of Christ's resurrection we have a sure hope for the resurrection of human beings at Christ's return (1 Cor. 15:12-58). Until then God has given certain powers of punishment to human beings, including the power of the sword (Rom. 13:4), that is, the power of the death penalty. But the judicial activity of human beings, important and legitimate as it is, cannot bring forth justice in a final, perfect form. The insufficiencies of the best human justice are one more pointer to the necessity for hope in Christ and his divine justice.

The argument that we must not use capital punishment--or any punishment--because it does not achieve a perfect and final reciprocity of results must be set aside. Rather, we have hope for the return of Christ and know that until then human justice does contain imperfections.

In general, the whole structure of punishment and restoration of balance that is operative in Old Testament penalties points forward by virtue of its own nonultimacy to the final and perfect restoration to come in Christ. It is a subtle reminder of what sort of world we live in: a world in which there is evil, but also a world where God's justice is at work to abolish evil and repair its damage, a world whose hurts will be entirely repaired, restored, and balanced out in the final working of the justice of God at the last judgment.

The significance of the injured party: God and human beings

We should note that the injured party has a definite role in the process of recompense in all of the cases that we have discussed. Damage done to the injured party must be repaired, if possible, by restoration of the same amount or a substitute. In addition, if the party doing the damage has evil intent, the injured party is involved in a double repayment, punishment as well as restoration. In the case of theft the injured party receives whatever the thief loses. In the case of murder or manslaughter the avenger of blood, that is the nearest of kin who represents the dead person, kills the murderer or makes sure that the manslaughterer is forced to remain in the city of refuge.

Once we have understood this principle of recompense and the involvement of the injured party, we can make good sense of the relation of God to human beings in the process of recompense. First, note the obvious problems. Every sin is an offense against God, and as such merits not only physical death but eternal death in hell. Yet in the Mosaic law not every sin receives the death penalty. In fact for some sins no penalty at all is specified in the Mosaic law. If every sin is an infinitely serious offense against the majesty and holiness of God, how do we understand the differences in penalties in the Mosaic law?

In part the distinctions arise from differences in knowledge. God knows all things, including the secrets of the heart, and so is in a fit position to give judgment corresponding to the true facts of the case. But in many cases human beings cannot determine guilt. The testimony of only one witness is insufficient (Num. 36:30; Deut. 17:6; 19:15).

But in addition to the differences in knowledge we must take account of differences in the injured party. Any sin "injures" God in the sense of being an offense against him and an abomination to him. Moreover, though an attack against God's deity and lordship never succeeds, its intent is to escape God's authority. It aims at overthrowing God as God, by making oneself or some idol into a god. As we have seen from some of the examples above, action with intent to destroy receives the same penalty as would actual destruction (e.g. Deut. 19:19). Since the sinner attempts to destroy God, the fit penalty is the destruction of the sinner in hell--or else the destruction of a substitute, namely in the death of Christ as substitute for sin. Thus even the last judgment and its outcome can be understood as an operation of the basic principles of recompense and balancing: "as you have done, it will be done to you."

Short of the last judgment, God acts in history to punish sin by sending afflictions, suffering, and physical death. Though these penalties stop short of ultimate destruction, their tendency is in the direction of disintegration, and hence they are foretastes of the final judgment. In general, God can and does punish sins against himself according to the principles of his own just character.

What criteria do we use when human beings are involved in executing punishment? God's right to punish does not yet imply any right for human beings to punish. State governments have such rights only because God has given limited but genuine authority to governmental agents to bring wrath (Rom. 13:4). From the cases above and the way in which the injured party is involved, we can conclude that the authority of human beings covers only those cases in which human beings are injured.9 Only then is some human being fit to exact the penalty, namely the injured human being. Moreover, in the typical penal case in Mosaic law, the ruling authorities are mentioned either not at all or only tangentially (e.g. Deut. 17:9). Undoubtedly elders, judges, kings, and others with ruling authority would have played a role in making sure that proper procedure was followed in determining guilt (Deut. 17:6; Num. 35:24-25). But in the cases discussed above the injured party always has a central role in execution of the penalty. The injured party rather than the state as such has this central role because of the principles of reciprocity and balance involved in God's justice. When Al deliberately damages Bill, God's justice fittingly pronounces a recompense exactly in reverse. Bill, not merely God himself acting in his own person, receives authorization under the eye of governing authorities to restore the balance by bringing the same damage on Al. In short, biblical principles of justice enable us to begin to understand why human beings are involved in punishment and why some sins receive more severe punishment than others.

In all this process we must bear in mind the most fundamental reality, namely that human beings are created in the image of God. Israel in particular, as a redeemed nation restored to fellowship with God, is called to a life of imitating the holiness of God (Lev. 19:2). Human beings are to imitate or replicate the character and action of God. Human relations to one another must replicate the justice of God's relation to human beings. Just as offense against God calls for recompense from God, an offense against other human beings calls for recompense from human beings. Human judicial activity, partial and imperfect as it is, replicates the judicial activity of God.

The fulfillment of human justice as well as the fulfillment of divine justice is found in Christ. Christ fully bears God's penalty for sin on the cross (2 Cor. 5:21). He simultaneously bears the penalty of unjust human judicial activity by the Jewish leaders, by Herod, and by Pilate (Acts 4:27-28). The injustice of human judges is overruled by the justice of God who accomplishes salvation. In Christ's resurrection God pronounces his approval on Christ's work and simultaneously judges the injustice of the human courts (cf. Acts 3:13-15). Christ will come at the end of this age not only as the divine judge, the Word of God (Rev. 19:13), but as the man whom God has appointed to judge the world (Acts 17:31). Thus the judicial activity of all human judges throughout history will find its completion in this final judgment of Christ the perfect king and and governor (Isa. 9:6-7; 11:1-9).

In the meantime, during this age, human state authorities have a limited but legitimate role, as we have said (Rom. 13:1-7). All rule and authority, power and dominion, have been subjected to Christ, according to Eph. 1:21-22. Hence even human governments are included under his rule. When they fulfill their duties properly, they are reflecting Christ's justice on an earthly plane and are to be submitted to for the Lord's sake (1 Pet. 2:13).

Footnotes

1. C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (reprinted; New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 93.

2. Cf. John I. Durham, Word Biblical Commentary: Exodus (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), p. 325.

3. A more secularized discussion of the restorative element in lex talionis is found in David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (New York: Ktav, 1969), pp. 102-153.

4. In confirmation of the idea of singlefold punishment, see Meredith G. Kline, "Double Trouble," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32 (1989):171-79.

5. For a list, see James B. Jordan, The Law of the Covenant (Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1984), pp. 261-63.

6. Jordan in his book The Law of the Covenant, pp. 263-71, proposes an ingenious symbolical explanation based on inferences from symbolic associations of the numbers four and five and symbolic associations of cattle and sheep. But the distant and doubtful character of the associations make me think that his solution is no less speculative than mine or those solutions based on general speculations concerning what practical differences Israelites might see between cattle and sheep. More recently, in an unpublished communication, he has pointed out that Deut. 12:15-25 includes special provisions governing the slaughter of these animals, and that such indicates that "God had a proprietary interest in ox and sheep." Perhaps so. And perhaps this circumstance makes appropriate the more severe penalty when a thief slaughters or sells such an animal. But the focus of Deut. 12 seems to be on what people are supposed to do with the blood and with first-born or vowed animals. The procedures with respect to blood apply equally to wild and domestic clean animals. The procedures with respect to first-born or vowed animals do not apply to all animals of their class. Thus neither of these provisions says anything directly about the class of all oxen or all sheep. It is not clear that oxen and sheep are being treated in a special way principally because all animals of this kind are potentially sacrificial animals.

One crucial fact to weigh is that Exod. 22:4 appears to classify donkeys in the same class with oxen and sheep. "If the stolen animal is found alive in his possession--whether ox or donkey or sheep--he must pay back double." Does this verse assert merely that twofold restitution is appropriate for all cases of live animals? Or does it also indirectly suggest that a more severe penalty is appropriate for all cases when the stolen animal is no longer alive, including donkeys? If we ignore the context, the verse merely states what is true for living animals, and need not warrant any implications for dead ones. But when the entire passage (verses 1-15) is taken into account, implications do seem to follow.

Verses 1-15 specify restitution in cases involving various stolen, borrowed, or otherwise misplaced or destroyed items. Introductory "if" clauses in each major division specify the type of case in view. Verses 2-3 are rightly seen as parenthetical, in that they specify how one disposes of other matters of concern relating to theft. Hence the operative contrasts are found in the "if" clauses of verses 1 and 4. When the two verses are compared, the fundamental contrast appears to be between animals that have already been disposed of and animals that are still alive in the thief's possession. In verse 4, not only the general phrase "the stolen animal" (Hebrew הַג׃ְנֵבָה, "the stolen thing") but the explicit inclusion of donkeys pushes us towards understanding the fundamental distinction as disposed-of versus still-alive. Jordan's interpretation, on the other hand, makes sense only on the assumption that the operative contrast is between ox-and-sheep and all-other-animals, or perhaps between animals-offered-in-sacrifice and all-other-animals. But if such were the operative contrast, we would expect a different type of wording, such as, "if another kind of animal is stolen, whether found in the thief's possession or slaughtered, the thief must restore double." The main plausibility for Jordan's reading arises from the mention of oxen and sheep in verse 1, apparently with no other animals included. But the Hebrew word for "ox" is a general name for cattle, both male and female, and the Hebrew word for "sheep" is general enough to include both sheep and goats. Together these two terms included the entire range of the most common livestock animals in Israel. Hence a perfectly general principle concerning disposed-of animals might naturally be formulated in this way. Cases of stolen camels, horses, and donkeys would be less common and might easily be left as a matter of inference from the more common case.

Granted this understanding of the relation of verse 1 and verse 4, it follows that stolen donkeys are handled with double payment only when the animal is found still alive. A bigger payment (four or five?) is appropriate if the animal is killed or sold. Since Jordan's type of symbolic explanation does not apply to donkeys, it presumably does not offer the correct explanation of the penalty for oxen or sheep either.

However, it is still possible that my explanation is wrong and that Jordan's is right. Why are donkeys and horses not mentioned in verse 1? In the absence of more explicit information, we should be cautious. Despite the disagreements, Jordan agrees with me concerning the general rule of double payment and its motivation, and that is enough for us to build on (see ibid., pp. 134-35).

7. Ibid., p. 134.

8. James Jordan's book The Law of the Covenant, p. 135, acknowledges the possibility of my interpretation, but prefers a literal interpretation of "sevenfold." So I should set forth reasons for my preference.

(1) The Book of Proverbs sets forth wise advice about life similar to the advice that a father would give to his son (cf. Prov. 1:8, 10; 2:1). The mention of Solomon (1:1; 10:1) hints that the advice is most pertinent to a future king. But it is not exclusively advice to judges, much less legal, statutory additions to the law code. Prov. 6:30-31 is therefore most naturally interpreted as an observation about the realities of actual life, not a legal statute specifying what ought to be done. In particular, 6:30 does not match the character of a case law, since the language about not despising appears to be a description of actual life ("men do not despise") or possibly a prohibition to any arbitrary listener ("do not despise"), but is technically irrelevant to the judicial decision of the judge. The form of language does not suggest that this verse is formally introducing a new case law. But if such a case law is not introduced here, where is it introduced?

(2) Jordan justifies the severity of the penalty by arguing that the poor man is despising God's mercy as expressed in the laws about gleaning and the tithe (Deut. 14:28-29). But (a) the argument has greatest force only if the rich and prosperous consistently observed their obligations with regard to the poor, which was far from being the case in Israel. (b) The argument shows only that the poor man has offended God grievously, not that he has offended more grievously the person from whom he has stolen. As we shall see, the severity of offense against God has no direct role in the reckoning of debt to other human beings.

(3) It is impossible to deduce sevenfold repayment from the principles of justice enunciated in the time of Moses. During Mosaic times, judges would have acted on the basis of the principle of double payment or possibly fourfold payment in the case of items that had already been consumed or sold by the thief. Thus Jordan's interpretation implies that Prov. 6:30-31 introduces a change in penalty in comparison with Mosaic times. It is difficult to supply a motivation for such a change.

In an unpublished personal communication Jordan has informed me he has changed his mind and now agrees with my interpretation.

9. Greg Bahnsen comes close to this position by speaking of the social nature of crime (Theonomy in Christian Ethics [2d ed.; Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1984], pp. 436, 438, 440):

While all crime is sinful, not every sin is a crime. An offense against God's law is a crime when it is a social misdeed punishable by the governing authorities; sin, on the other hand, is always judged and punished by God. The magistrate cannot presume to punish a man's sin, but he is obligated to enforce penal sanctions against a man's crime. Thus a crime bears two punishments: one before the magistrate (as a social misdeed), one before God Himself (as a sin).

. . .

The penalties imposed upon social crime are just as appropriate, equitable, and just with respect to their sphere of reference (civil society) as the eternal punishment for that crime (considered now as sin) is just with respect to its sphere of reference (the God-man relation with respect to eternity).

. . .

The civic punishment upon a man's crime could not be eliminated even though he was required to make atonement and find God's ultimate forgiveness by means of sacrifice for sin (cf. Lev. 4-6). Social restitution (the penal sanction) was not incompatible with being forgiven by the trespass offering (6:4-7; Num. 5:5-8). Therefore, the civil punishment was required to be executed upon every criminal unconditionally--without consideration of his status, without mercy, without cancellation through atoning sacrifice. Such are the demands of justice in the realm of civil judgment; a crime always receives what it, with respect to the context of social life, deserves as equitable for the nature of the offense.