Chapter 12
Just Penalties for Many Crimes

We may now proceed to analyze laws and penalties with regard to particular types of crimes. Mosaic laws with regard to crimes may conveniently be grouped together on the basis of the general nature of the crime. Crimes of theft and cases of accident both involve damage to the property, and so they relate most directly to the eighth commandment, "You shall not steal." Similarly, crimes involving damage to or destruction of human life are most closely related to the sixth commandment, "You shall not murder." We shall consider separately the crimes related to each of these commandments.

Similarly, crimes involving damage to or destruction of human life are most closely related to the sixth commandment, "You shall not murder." We shall consider separately the crimes related to each of these commandments.

Penalties for theft and accident

Let us begin with the matters concerning theft and accident, related to the eighth commandment. As we saw in chapter 9, the penalty for theft and for accidental destruction of property embodies a clear-cut reciprocity and balance. Accidental destruction must be balanced by restoration of a substitute (Exod. 22:5-6; 21:36; Lev. 24:18). If an animal engages in a destructive act, the owner is normally responsible in only a diminished way, and hence the penalty is correspondingly diminished (Exod. 21:28-36). A monetary payment given to the person damaged is the fit penalty. But if the animal has previously had a history of goring, and the owner does not keep it in, he is fully responsible (Exod. 21:29, 36). This type of case is obviously generalizable into a principle of full responsibility when there has been a previous problem.

Thievery must be balanced by double payment, restoration plus punishment, because there was evil intent. The thief restores the original item as a borrower would, and then gives a second item so that the thief suffers the same penalty that he inflicted on the owner. Both restoration and punishment are involved.

The sacrifice of Jesus Christ fulfills the principles of restoration and punishment in the fullest possible way. Full punishment for all the sins of the redeemed and full restoration of the cosmos to God are implied. His sacrifice is even construed in Scripture as like a monetary payment or ransom. "For you know that it was not with perishable things such as silver or gold that you were redeemed from the empty way of life handed down to you from your forefathers, but with the precious blood of Christ, a lamb without blemish or defect" (1 Pet. 1:18-19). But Christ's sacrifice does not eliminate the responsibility of the state to redress wrongs on its limited human plane. In fact, if the state properly executes its responsibility, it produces on earth little pictures or shadows of Christ's great work. It will be a positive but limited aid to the process of bringing the nations to Christ and causing God's will to be done on earth as it is in heaven. Since theft and accident still injure the owner in the same way that they did in the Old Testament, there is every reason to think that the human penalties should be the same now.

If my interpretation of Exod. 22:1 is correct, thieves who have destroyed or sold what they stole are required to pay fourfold to the owner. The general principle of balanced recompense, rather than some special situation in Israel, appears to lead to this result. If so, the same general principle applied today leads to the same result. The same penalties would be appropriate, namely fourfold restitution for items that the thief has disposed of. ¹ A thief who steals the most expensive and useful item in the culture that is subject to being easily stolen, namely an automobile or truck, is required to pay fivefold if the item has been sold or destroyed. But because of the uncertainties surrounding the intent of Exod. 22:1, it might also be argued that a general policy of double payment is best.²

But other considerations weigh in favor of a lesser amount of restitution. In typical cases in modern postindustrial societies, stolen items are resold to a "fence" at greatly reduced prices, partly because used goods typically bring a much reduced value even on the open market, partly because disposing of stolen items is not easy. Hence a thief who is required to repay double the market value will actually end up paying the victim many times what he gained through the sale of stolen items.³ Moreover, since the market resale value of used items is on the average something like half the price of a new item, payment of double the value of a new item already represents virtually fourfold compensation. Such factors regarding the differences between new and used manufactured products were not typically present in the Israelite situation. But the Old Testament law does recognize the general principle that the value of an item can be depreciated on the basis of its remaining useful life (e.g., Lev. 25:15-16, 50-52). On this basis, as well as because of the uncertainties in understanding the rationale for fourfold and fivefold payment in Exod. 22:1, I think that a general rule of double repayment is best.

According to Mosaic law thieves who cannot pay the penalty for their crimes are to be sold into servitude for their theft (Exod. 22:3). The same logic of justice is operative here. The thief must be forced to pay even if such action involves selling the price of his future work. The time in which the thief would be in servitude should be just enough to pay for the damage done. ⁴ We must beware of importing into this practice the modern connotations of slavery. In the Old Testament context the period of servitude is limited. The offender can always be rescued from servitude by a relative or friend who is willing to pay the value of the remaining period of labor. The offender can even rescue himself from servitude if he earns enough money through a second spare-time job (Lev. 25:49). The situation is somewhat similar to our modern system of parole, except that a private citizen buys the labor of the offender and simultaneously becomes the parole officer. The buyer receives authority to supervise the offender during the time of parole and also receives responsibility to care for the offender. The system is in fact probably more workable as well as more just than the present parole system, since the employer remains in much more regular contact with the offender and can discipline him immediately for transgressions of duty.

This last case concerning the thief who cannot pay is of course more difficult than the previous cases. But the principles of justice and balanced recompense suggest that the same solution is as valid in our day as in Israelite times. Variations are possible in which the state would more directly supervise the parole and the schedule of repayments.⁵ We may debate what arrangements in detail are most workable, and whether some variation on the parole system can be made into a suitable vehicle for supervision.⁶ But the general idea is clearly useful as well as just. Besides being a true execution of just recompense, such a penalty has practical value. When the thief loses what he hoped to gain, he is made to experience the other person's point of view. When a greater value of goods is involved, the thief must come to realize the greater value. Moreover, in being forced to serve other people for a time, he unwillingly receives an illustration in his own body of the principle that the person who has been a thief must learn to work hard and honestly (Eph. 4:28). If all goes well, the thief may at the end have found a useful vocation. The process far exceeds in its wisdom the present criminal system, which bottles thieves up in prison in a situation of frustration, groups them together with others of like mind, and frequently intensifies the inclinations to criminality.

Nowadays some criminals are allowed to "pay a debt to society" by doing meaningful work for the state or for some charitable cause. But such a course is still wrongheaded. The thief's debt is not to the state or to society but to the injured person. We help the thief understand better the nature of his crime as well as conform to biblical principles of restoration and punishment when we follow the Old Testament practice more directly.

Repentant offenders

According to Lev. 6:1-7, the robber who repents and wishes on his own initiative to make things right is required to restore the amount stolen, and to add a fifth (a tithe of the double payment of an unrepentant thief). In addition, he must make a guilt offering to God. The logic leading to this result is not completely certain. Apparently the guilt offering pays for the robber's sin against God. Such an offering is now fulfilled in the sacrifice of Christ. In addition, the robber must make restoration to the injured person. I take it that repentance plus the acknowledgment of guilt by the symbolic tithe compensates for the evil intent of the original act.⁷ Thus repentance plus the symbolic tithe fulfills the punishment aspect of repayment. This initial compensation moves the situation back to the equivalent of borrowing, and implies that only singlefold restitution or restoration is then necessary to bring the situation back to a just balance.

Thus this case does embody in a reasonable way the principles of just retribution. But the bearing of this case on judicial principles is still not so clear. Lev. 6:1-7 does not directly encompass all cases of theft, but only cases in which the robber or false witness has successfully evaded punishment. The offender has only to remain silent in order to continue to profit from its results. In fact, this passage may be even more specialized. The passage lists various types of fraud but lacks the usual term for theft (גנב); it explicitly mentions false oaths (6:3, 5). These and other features suggest that the whole passage concerns cases where the victim suspects the offender but cannot legally prove guilt. ⁸ In such a situation the victim takes the suspect before the court and the suspect swears an oath to prove that he did not defraud his neighbor of property (Exod. 22:11). But suppose the offender escapes by swearing falsely. Later, he feels guilty. Lev. 6:1-7 gives him a remedy. It requires a guilt offering not because of the initial fraud or robbery but because the offender has desecrated God's name by a false oath. This special case still appears to express a general principle, namely that repentance on the part of an offender who is not caught reduces the payment to singlefold recompense.

But now suppose that a thief is caught, and then begs forgiveness. The victim nevertheless demands double payment and takes the thief to court to obtain it. We are confronted with two possible alternatives. First, it may be that Lev. 6:1-7 is basically irrelevant to questions of judicial process. It contemplates only the case when the offender is not caught. Or it may be that Lev. 6:1-7 embodies a general principle to the effect that repentance on the part of any offender reduces the penalty to a simple restoration plus a tithe or token of previous evil intent.

Some tentativeness is called for here, because Lev. 6:1-7 by itself does not explicitly specify in what way it might illustrate a general rule. Other cases in the law do indicate that penalties are to be adjusted according to the degree of responsibility attached to the offender (see Exod. 21:28-30, 22). In general, the penalties mentioned in the Mosaic law are maximum penalties, some of which may be mitigated by extenuating circumstances.⁹ If the thief "turns himself in," in a manner parallel to Lev. 6:1-7, his repentance is clearly genuine and mitigates the evil intention involved. A reduced restitution would seem to be appropriate. But what if the thief repents only after he is caught and the wheels of justice begin to turn? Obviously an expression of apology is of some value, but how can the officers of the court tell for certain that repentance is genuine rather than merely a ruse to escape the due punishment?

Though there is room for leniency on the basis of mitigating circumstances, there is no provision for pardon in the modern sense, namely a release of a guilty, convicted criminal on the basis of mercy or promises of reform. For the convicted person, even an expression of repentance ought not to bring relief. Repentance pays for sin not because of its innate qualities but because it unites us to Christ and to the efficacy of his death and resurrection. Sin must always be punished. Repentance does not diminish the punishment, but by uniting us to Christ transfers the punishment from ourselves to Christ the substitute. All this process is a heavenly reality now for those who are united to Christ by faith. But the state's own limitations and its earthly character imply that it does not reflect this aspect of Christological substitution in its own sphere. The state does not have power to bring Christ down to earth to substitute for the criminal, nor does it have power to raise the criminal up to heaven to participate in the benefits of Christ's sacrifice accomplished once and for all. It does not have the church's authority to judge the sincerity of a profession of faith. Hence the state can find no just way to pardon parallel to the way that Christ grants pardon.

Penalties for murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter

We now turn to crimes involving destruction of human life, then to crimes involving damage to human life. Both of these types of crimes are related most directly to the sixth commandment, "You shall not murder."

We may begin with a comparatively clear case, namely murder. In Gen. 9:6 God specifies the civil penalty for murder. The context in which it is given, namely the context of instructions affecting all of Noah's descendants after the flood, indicates its universal scope. The special holiness of Israel cannot be in view, since Israel as a distinct, separated people had not yet arisen.

We have seen also how the death penalty for murder embodies the principle of balanced, reciprocal recompense. "As you have done, it shall be done to you." If Al kills Bill, the appropriate reciprocal penalty is for Bill to kill Al. Since Bill is not alive to do the deed, the avenger of blood, the nearest of kin, stands in his stead (cf. Num. 35:9-34).

The coming of Christ brings amazing redemptive and spiritual resurrection. Christ's atonement does have power for healing conflicts between human beings as well as the fundamental conflict between God and human beings. But his atonement does not immediately remedy all physical death; that remedy will come only at the resurrection of the dead. In the resurrection of the dead all unjust taking of human life is remedied and answered for. Christ on the cross bore the punishment of death in order that through his resurrection life we might participate in the resurrection ourselves. Thus Christ acted both to bear punishment for the violation of human life and to restore that life.

In the midst of the changes brought about by Christ's resurrection the authority of the state over civil penology is confirmed rather than abolished (Rom. 13:1-7). In particular, the mention of the sword in Rom. 13:4 indicates the legitimacy of the continuation of the death penalty. Only at the resurrection of the dead does the task of the state legitimately come to an end.

Hence the death penalty is still the appropriate penalty for murder. ¹⁰ Initially, we might presume that because of the reciprocity, the nearest of kin should execute the penalty. However, there is an argument (appearing below) in favor of shifting the responsibility of executing the penalty to the state.

What should we say about cases of attempted murder? The Mosaic law does not speak directly concerning the penalty for attempted murder, perhaps because it is difficult in many cases for judges to determine that a particular crime is attempted murder in distinction from attempt to cause serious injury (Exod. 21:18-19, 23-25). This case is therefore more doubtful in character. Deut. 19:16-21 seems to indicate that the intention to do a thing, if legally demonstrable, constitutes guilt on the same level as the actual doing of it. On this basis I deduce that attempted murder deserves the death penalty. As I have already observed, in this and other cases the maximum penalty is to be enforced only when (a) the crime is legally demonstrable beyond reasonable doubt; (b) there are no mitigating circumstances.

What do we say about manslaughter, that is, accidental killing of a human being? In ancient Israel the penalty for manslaughter was flight to a city of refuge until the death of the high priest (Num. 35:9-34). Some thought is necessary to perceive the principle here and adapt this case to our circumstances. We do not have cities of refuge or an earthly high priest.¹¹ No evil intention is involved in the case of accidental killing. The parallel with recompense for accidentally destroyed property (Exod. 21:33-36; 22:5-6) would indicate that the proper recompense would be for the offender to restore the dead person to life. Since this option is not possible, the offender goes to the city of refuge with its redemptive symbolism. The provisions of the law present us with a picture of a person fleeing to safety from the consequences of his acts. In addition, the cities are a special gift of God to the Levites, the special holy tribe (Num. 35:6). Deliverance from the offender's confinement comes with the death of the high priest, again suggesting holiness and sacrificial atonement through death. As if this much were not enough, the key passage in Numbers 35 gives as the reason for upholding the law the following: "blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made for the land, for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed it. You shall not defile the land in which you live, in the midst of which I dwell, for I the LORD dwell in the midst of the people of Israel" (Num. 35:33-34). In the case of murder this statute is fulfilled through the death of the murderer. In the case of manslaughter, this statute must be fulfilled through the death of the high priest as a substitute for the manslaughterer. In both cases blood must be shed to undo the pollution of the land.

Principles of general equity, as well as the specific content of Gen. 9:6, clearly enjoin the death penalty as a universal penalty for murder, even if the murder in unconnected with the promised holy land. But if the murder is connected with the land, the blood of the murderer has the additional value of cleansing the ceremonial pollution of the land. In the case of manslaughter things are not so clear. How might the fact of the holiness of the land, the holiness of Israel, the holiness of the Levites and their city, and above all the holiness of the high priest have affected the exact form of the penalty?

If we tried mechanically to match a modern penalty to the ancient one, no penalty that could be devised would exactly match the nature of the offense. One aspect seems to be that the offender must go to the special holy city until the land is purged by the blood of the high priest. A second aspect may be that the offender associates himself with the symbolism of refuge and redemption, thereby pointing forward to the hope of restoration of life. A third aspect may be that since the unrestricted freedom of the offender has been the occasion for death, his freedom is carefully restricted until there has been another death.

With this much information in view, the closest mechanical parallel might be for a manslaughterer to be required to appeal for refuge to a church in another city, and to remain in this city under the oversight of the church until the death of its principal pastor. But the symbolism is imperfect, since a pastor is hardly a high priest and a type of Christ. Moreover, the land is not specially marked as holy and hence is not polluted in the same way as was the land of Israel.

We penetrate a little deeper by reflecting on Exod. 21:28-30. If an ox gores and kills a person, the ox is to be stoned and its flesh not eaten (indicating its uncleanness). Just as the blood of a human murderer cleanses the pollution of the land, the blood of the ox cleanses the land from the death that the ox caused. Thus the death of the ox fulfills the provision of Num. 35:33-34 exactly. An interesting extra factor enters if it was known in the past that the ox was dangerous. The owner of the ox is partially responsible. The ox is stoned as before, but the owner also is put to death. Exod. 21:30 indicates that the owner may or may not be allowed to ransom himself by paying a monetary ransom. How do authorities determine whether or not a ransom is to be permitted, and if so how much? Exod. 21:30 does not say specifically, but the answer is clear enough. The degree of responsibility of the owner depends on his degree of negligence. How frequently had the ox gored in the past and shown an irascible disposition? Had the owner been warned privately by neighbors, or publicly by the authorities? Had the owner taken any measures to try to make sure that the ox was always penned up? Had he taken mere token measures or thorough measures? Obviously a whole continuum of cases might present themselves, and the authorities must be given some discretion to decide each case on its merits.

The important points to see are (1) that the blood of the ox satisfies the provision of Num. 35:33-34 in a technical sense; (2) that the owner nevertheless bears some responsibility in proportion to his negligence. It appears that the blood of the ox satisfies the special provisions relating to the holiness of the land. If so, we may well suspect that the remaining penalties relate to the obligations of the owner apart from the holiness of the land. The owner receives the death penalty if his gross negligence shows him totally thoughtless of human life. The proper retribution is for the community in turn to show itself "thoughtless" about his life and put him to death.¹² On the other hand, if the owner has shown less than gross negligence, the death is treated more on the plane of accidental death. But he is still responsible to recompense the family of the deceased, just as an accidental destruction of property must be recompensed (Exod. 22:5-6). Since he is partially responsible for the death itself, he must be "partially killed." Of course one cannot achieve this result literally, but ransom money substitutes for the owner's life. A smaller amount of money would substitute for a smaller amount of the owner's life in case of lesser degree of responsibility. The ransom money would naturally be paid to the family of the deceased, and so would function simultaneously as ransom (substitutionary punishment) and as restoration.

The case in Exod. 21:28-30 therefore agrees with the solution at which we might arrive merely by reasoning from general principle. The manslaughterer has done damage accidentally, just as in Exod. 22:5-6. Hence, the just penalty is a singlefold recompense or restoration to the deceased. Since the deceased cannot be restored to life, the manslaughterer pays money as a substitute, thereby also repairing what can be repaired in the economic damage done to the family of the deceased.

Now let us return to the modern context. Actually the full structure of Num. 35:22-28 is preserved in our modern context. Christ has died the death of the great high priest once and for all. His blood is permanently efficacious, since he lives for ever to make intercession (Heb. 7:25). He continually recleanses all the pollutions of the earth. Hence, the manslaughterer need not seek out a special city of refuge in order to protect the holiness of the land. In fact, to introduce a provision today such as waiting for a pastor's death would obscure the finality and permanent efficacy of Christ's sacrifice. The manslaughterer may thus remain where he was, but must still indemnify the family, in an amount weighted by his negligence. Even if no negligence is involved, the families ought justly to split the cost of the disaster (cf. Exod. 21:35).

Penalties for bodily injury

Cases of bodily injury are in some respects like cases of death. In both cases the full remedy and full rectification is found only in the resurrection of the body, which restores human beings to full bodily integrity. Christ bore bodily injury on the cross partly in order that he might pay the penalty to God for our bodily injuries to one another. He was raised to life in order that we might be restored to full health ourselves. But the full restoration comes only at the time of the resurrection of the dead. In the meantime, the justice of the state must operate on the same basis as in the case of murder. The state cannot repair damage to people's bodies, neither can it unite people to Christ. It must operate on earth.

In cases of human bodily injury, the principal passages Exod. 21:18-32 and Lev. 24:19-20 speak of cases where one human being directly inflicts injury on another. Modern cases like car accidents or accidents at work for which the employer might be partially responsible would be handled like other cases of accidental damage discussed above. In cases of injury where there is evil intent, full recompense would involve responsibilities analogous to the responsibilities for theft. Just as the thief restores the original property, the offender should restore the hurt by causing the person to be healed and paying for time lost (Exod. 21:18-19). Just as the thief pays a second amount in punishment, in order to suffer the same damage that he inflicted, the offender suffers equal bodily damage (Exod. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:19-20).

But there are still some difficulties in the process. The two sides of the penalty can seldom both be carried out together. In the case where the person is injured and recovers (Exod. 21:18-19), it would be impossible for human beings to inflict exactly equivalent injury on the offender. On the other hand, in the case where there is permanent loss of eye, hand, or tooth (Lev. 24:19-20), no full repair of the damage is possible. In addition, in cases where two people fight together, it is usually difficult if not impossible to assign responsibility to only one side. It is more appropriate to divide the responsibility and see to it that both suffer equally. Hence if one has already suffered loss of eye or tooth, the other must suffer the same loss. And if one has suffered the pain and inconvenience of temporary incapacitation, the other must suffer the pain of paying for it. Presumably the victim could ask for ransom money instead of the literal loss of eye or tooth, as is suggested by Exod. 21:30.

As we have noted, Exod. 21:18-19 and 21:22-25 involves cases of fighting where responsibility for the results may in a sense be divided between the two people involved. But in some cases clear-cut responsibility for bodily injury can be assigned to one party alone, as in the case of mugging or armed robbery, if the criminal inflicted an injury on his victim. General principles of equity suggest that a double penalty is called for, in the form of restoration plus punishment. On the other hand, the usual intention in mugging or robbery is not really to injure people but get their money. Injury, if it occurs, is an "accidental" though still culpable result. On this basis one might argue that only a singlefold penalty is called for, combining restoration and punishment. I am not sure which of these arguments represents greater justice. Lev. 24:19-20 appears to be a general statement about penalties, not qualified in the same way as is Exod. 21:18-25 by the context of fighting. Thus it may be some evidence in favor of the idea of a singlefold penalty.

If we were to decide that a double penalty was appropriate, how would it work? In the case of a bodily injury that is later healed, double payment for the cost of healing and loss of time would be appropriate. In the case of permanent bodily injury, equivalent injury to the offender (punishment) plus payment to the injured person roughly equivalent to loss in earning capacity (restoration) would be appropriate. In all these cases the victim and the offender could negotiate a monetary payment to avoid the court-imposed punishment.

Penalties for verbal crimes

Verbal crimes are those related to the ninth commandment, "You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor." These crimes also are related to Christ's atoning work. Christ was put to death due to an accusation of being a false prophet, which is the most grievous form of false witness. By faith we receive the benefit of his punishment and we are united to his truthfulness. Our new status in Christ does not relieve but rather confirms our obligations to our neighbor. The state still has responsibility to redress wrongs in this area.

In the Mosaic law an act of false witnessing, if proven, receives the same penalty that would have fallen to the person witnessed against (Deut. 19:16-21). This penal structure is a simple embodiment of the principle of just reciprocity; hence it should have the same form today. Slander and libel outside the context of courtroom testimony can be handled on the same basis. If malicious intent to do harm is proved, the slanderer must repay for damage already caused and pay a second amount as punishment for intent to do harm. If no evil intent is involved, single restoration is appropriate as in the case of unintentional damage to another person's property (Exod. 22:5-6).

False witnessing represents a case in which exact balanced reciprocity appears to be violated in one respect. Deut. 19:19, 21 appears to indicate that the penalty is to be inflicted by the people, "you," rather than by the person witnessed against. But false witnessing attacks the integrity of the courts as well as the person who is witnessed against. It thereby threatens to pollute the society (Deut. 19:19b). Hence the larger society as well as the injured party has an interest in the punishment. The mention of "purging evil" in 19:19 should make us cautious. Such language may indicate a particular concern to protect the special holiness of Israel. But such language by itself does not constitute conclusive evidence that the holiness of Israel is decisively affecting the nature of the penalty. For example, the discussion of murder in Num. 35:33-34 includes a note about how blood pollutes the land. The pollution of the land makes the execution of the murderer all the more necessary, since otherwise God's wrath comes on Israel. But the appropriateness of the death penalty for murder is not confined to Israel, as Gen. 9:6 shows.

Penalties for profanation of the holy community

We now turn to those crimes having to do with violations of worship and holiness, that is, violations related most directly to commandments 1-4 of the ten commandments. Penalties for seduction to false worship and for false worship have been discussed in chapter 10 and appendix A. False worship within the church, if not repented of, leads to excommunication. No civil penalty follows, since excommunication together with the resurrection power of Christ in the community fully answers the reciprocity involved in justice.

If false worship is repented of, the same procedures are involved as in the case of the repentant thief in Lev. 6:1-7. Singlefold restoration to the church, that is, restoration of its purity, is enough. Such purity is indeed restored through the presence of Christ, and excommunication need not be employed as an additional penalty. The result at which we have arrived by applying the logic of retribution is in exact agreement with the New Testament instructions given for dealing with offenses in the church (Matt. 18:15-20; 1 Cor. 5:1-13).

Blasphemy, witchcraft, sorcery, and other crimes involving occult worship would appear to belong to the same category as false worship. As usual, we may begin by asking who is injured by such acts. The Old Testament does not give much explicit information about the reasons for penalizing these crimes, but presumably they attack the holiness of Israel in the same way as does false worship. Just as in the case of false worship, Israel must meet the offense by waging holy war and destroying the pollution from its midst. Hence the death penalty is the specific punishment within the context of Israel as the holy nation.

The modern equivalent of these crimes is an attack on the holiness of the church from within its midst. Thus I conclude that the same penalties are appropriate as for false worship. The church excommunicates unrepentant offenders, but no civil penalty follows in the case of offenders already outside the bounds of Christian fellowship.

We must recognize, however, that some forms of occult practice involve additional crimes. For example, Molech worship and some forms of Satanism can include human sacrifice. These practices are instances of murder and merit the same penalty as other forms of murder. Or take a more difficult case. Some forms of blasphemy involve slander of Christians and of the church as a societal institution. Such blasphemy involves the same type of liability as would other cases of slander. Since a direct attack on the holiness of the church is not in question, it appears to me that the completed work of Christ does not radically change the nature of reciprocal responsibilities involved in such slander. Christians individually and the church corporately should obviously endeavor out of love to pray for the offender and exhort him to repent. But if repentance is not forthcoming, the responsibilities of love may also include giving the offender through the justice of the state a reminder of his responsibilities and a shadow-picture of the more ultimate consequences of his acts. In short, Christians may in some cases take unbelievers to court, though always with reluctance.

Though I accept this possibility in principle, I must also say that in practice most cases of slander are likely to be so puny in comparison with the responsibilities of spiritual warfare that wise Christians will not divert their energies in such directions, even as Paul shrugged off the slanders by non-Christians against his ministry (1 Cor. 4:13; 2 Cor. 6:8). Christians must always bear in mind their responsibilities before the Lord to return good for evil (Matt. 5:43-48; 1 Pet. 3:9).

Some practices of witchcraft and black magic involve the attempt to cause evil to come on other people through preternatural means. In actual fact, practicers of magic do not accomplish what they think they are accomplishing. Christ rules even over the demons (Eph. 1:20-22) and his people are protected from the evil one (1 John 5:18). But there are nevertheless some complexities to this issue. For example, sometimes Satan is permitted by God to attack human beings (Job 1-2). But one of Satan's deceptions in occult practices is to seduce people into thinking that the power is theirs rather than Satan's, and to think that they rule rather than God. In any case, people using black magic intend evil. We have already argued on the basis of Deut. 19:15-21 that a legally demonstrable attempt to do harm is punishable on the same basis of reciprocity as a successful attempt. Hence I judge that black magic ought to be punished when the attempt to do evil is legally demonstrable. The type of punishment would correspond to the nature of the attempt.

Next, what about violation of the fourth commandment, that is, sabbath breaking? Sabbath breaking attacks the holy day of Israel and the sign of God's covenant with Israel (Exod. 31:13-17). Some theologians believe that sabbath observance is fulfilled in Christ is such a way that no distinction of days remains in the NT period. If they are correct, the sin of sabbath breaking in the Mosaic period corresponds to the sin of breaking covenant with Christ in the NT period. Any sin is in a broad sense breaking covenant with Christ, but the definitive form of breaking covenant is apostasy (such as is discussed in Hebrews).¹³ If not repented of, the penalty is excommunication from the church and the final penalty from God is eternal destruction in hell.

I see the sabbath as an institution deriving from creation and continuing until the consummation, so that God still requires a distinction of days. Christ through his resurrection and ascension has entered the sabbath rest. Christians are united to Christ and so already share in the first installment of the rest. Still, Christians have not yet entered rest in its consummate form (Heb. 4:11). Their citizenship is in heaven (Phil. 3:20) but they also live on earth in bodies of earth. As long as we are on earth, we celebrate Sunday, the day of Christ's resurrection, as our distinctive day of rest. The sin of sabbath breaking in the Old Testament does indeed point forward to the sin of breaking covenant with Christ. But we must also continue to deal with sabbath breaking as a sin on a literal level.

Supposing this is the case, we must still consider the issue of penalties. Once again this crime pertains to the special holiness of Israel. "This is a sign between me and you throughout your generations, that you may know that I am the LORD who sanctifies you" (Exod. 31:13). Profaning the sabbath pollutes Israel's covenantal relation to God. Hence sabbath breaking in our own day has a status similar to false worship and blasphemy. No civil penalty is appropriate for unbelievers, though believers need to be protected from being forced by unbelieving employers to work on the sabbath.

What ought the church to do with church members who break the sabbath? If we reasoned in a mechanical fashion, we might conclude that excommunication is the appropriate penalty. However, (1) the passage from the Old Testament to the New Testament involves moving from shadows to realities. The role of the sabbath changes in the process. Literal sabbath-keeping does not now play nearly so central a role in our worship as it did in the Old Testament. (2) In view of the theological uncertainties involved in assessing whether there is any literal sabbath observance at all, we must follow Paul's advice to live in harmony with Christians with whom we disagree on minor points (Rom. 14:1-15:7). Of course we should endeavor to convince other Christians of the view that we think is right, but we should not penalize Christians who disagree with us.

Finally, we should consider briefly Mosaic laws involving penalties for aggravated, serious violations of the ceremonial distinctions and separations of the law. Irremediable violations are punished by being "cut off" from Israel. Such is the penalty when a person eats yeast during the feast of unleavened bread (Exod. 12:15, 19), makes holy anointing oil or incense (Exod. 30:33, 38), works on the sabbath (Exod. 31:14), eats a fellowship offering while unclean (Lev. 7:20-21), eats the fat of an offering (Lev. 7:25), eats blood (Lev. 7:27; 17:14), sacrifices an animal other than at the tabernacle (Lev. 17:4, 9), eats a fellowship offering on the third day (Lev. 19:8), lies with a woman during her monthly period (Lev. 20:18), officiates in a sacred offering while unclean (Lev. 22:3), does not deny himself on the day of atonement (Lev. 23:29), fails to celebrate the passover when able (Num. 9:13), sins defiantly (Num. 15:30-31), or fails to be purified after touching a dead body (Num. 19:13, 20).

What does "cutting off" involve? Conceivably the language could imply exile or being deprived of special privileges of holiness. But Exod. 31:14-15 undeniably uses the language "cut off from his people" in a context where the death penalty is in view. Similarly a comparison of Lev. 18:29 with Lev. 20:11-14 seems to show that the death penalty is in view. On the other hand, comparison of Lev. 18:29 with Lev. 20:20-21 appears to present us with a case where "cutting off" corresponds to a penalty of childlessness. We cannot be completely certain how to reconcile all these texts. The most plausible solution is to regard the language of "cutting off" as a general expression for God's curse. It indicates that God undertakes to punish the offender, perhaps by bringing him to an early death. In fact, such appears to be the meaning of the phrase in Lev. 20:1-5, where the text explicitly identifies God as the one who accomplishes the "cutting off," and indicates that God will undertake to cut people off even if the community fails to execute the death penalty (20:4-5).¹⁴ If so, the penalty of "cutting off" involves punishment by God for sins against God, but does not in itself specify a punishment for damage to horizontal relations among human beings.

All the sins for which "cutting off" is a penalty, with the possible exception of sabbath breaking (Exod. 31:14-15) and sexual crimes (Lev. 18:29),¹⁵ are violations of temporary symbolic distinctions and separations. Several features might potentially alert Israelites to their temporary, symbolic character. (1) The general dominion given to human beings in creation seems to be restricted. (2) The symbolic associations with death, the fall, the curse, and remedies for sin indicate how these distinctions function to separate Israel from the other nations and confirm her status as a kingdom of priests with unique privileges and responsibilities deriving from the presence of God in her midst. (3) The lack of awareness of such distinctions among the nations surrounding Israel reinforce Israel's uniqueness. These factors would alert Israelites themselves to the shadowy but nevertheless temporarily serious character of the distinctions. The distinctions symbolize the necessity of utter and consistent holiness on the part of Israel as she dwells in God's presence and especially as she approaches God at the tabernacle and on special holy days. These symbolic distinctions therefore point forward to the utter consecration of Christ as well as his being cut off as a substitute for our unholiness. The penalty is fulfilled in the crucifixion of Christ and in the cutting off of unbelievers in hell. In addition, these statutes remind Christians of their obligations to "be holy because I, the LORD your God, am holy" (Lev. 19:2; 1 Pet. 1:15-16) and of the seriousness of apostasy (Heb. 10:26-31).¹⁶

Clearly, then, these ceremonial laws in their literal form are all irrelevant to the duties of the modern state.