Chapter 7

Models in Science and in Biblical Interpretation

We need now to look at one major factor in the disciplinary matrices of natural sciences, namely, the use of models. It is important to consider models because of the influence that they may have on what investigators see or fail to see.

First, what do we mean by models? Models are detailed analogies between one subject and another. The subject needing explanation or visualization is called the "principal" subject, while the subject used to do the explaining is called the "subsidiary" subject.¹ For example, take the "billiard ball" model of a gas, in which a gas is represented as a large number of billiard balls moving in all directions through an enclosed space. The gas itself is the principal subject, while the moving billiard balls are the subsidiary subject.

As a second example, consider Newton's theory of gravitation. Newton's equation F = GmM/r\S2\s, along with Newton's laws linking force and motion, is a mathematical model for motion in a gravitational field. The mathematical equations are the subsidiary subject, while the moving physical objects are the principal subject.

Models can be of many kinds, depending on the type of subsidiary subject chosen, and the relations between the subsidiary subject and the principal subject. Thus we may speak of mathematical models, mechanical models, electrical models, scale models, and so on.

25. Influence of models in science

What purpose do models serve in science? Certainly they play the role of illustrating theories already considered established. A scale model of the solar system makes the astronomical theory of the solar system clearer to the neophyte. But, more important, models play an important role in the discovery and improvement of new scientific theories. The billiard-ball model of a gas was crucial to the development of the kinetic theory of gases and its predictions about gas pressure, temperature, and the like. Similarly, James Clerk Maxwell developed his theory of electricity and magnetism by creative use of analogy between electricity (principal subject) and an ideal incompressible fluid (subsidiary subject).² Nowadays physicists would be likely to say that Maxwell's equations are the real model (a mathematical model) and that we can dispense with the fluid. But in Maxwell's own day people were still thinking in terms of an ether that was a real physical object, and that might have properties analogous to a fluid.³

Models, in fact, are crucial to the development of new theories. A properly chosen analogy suggests questions to be asked, lines of research, possible general laws. Mathematical equations known to hold for the subsidiary subject can be carried over to the principal subject, albeit sometimes with slight modifications. The analogy needs to be used flexibly, because the principal subject is usually not analogous to the subsidiary subject in all respects.⁴

Everyone, then, agrees that models have a decisive role in discovery. But what happens after the theory is drawn up? Philosophy of science in the positivist tradition would like to say that models are dispensable when it comes to assessing the justification of theories and their truth content. Others, Max Black included, think that some models are an integral, indissoluble part of the finished theory.⁵ Even a mathematical model does not consist merely in a mathematical formalism, but also in rules of thumb for relating the mathematics to the phenomena. These rules of thumb cannot be completely formalized without losing some of the potential of the model to suggest extensions to other phenomena. Thomas Kuhn does not address directly this question about models in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. But from what he says about the role of exemplars and disciplinary matrices in directing further lines of research, one can infer that he agrees with Black about the indispensability of models.

Is biblical interpretation analogous to science in its use of models? Some models are to be found within the Bible itself. Adam, for example, is a model for Christ with respect to his role in representing humanity (Rom. 5:12-21). But analogies in biblical interpretation seldom have the detailed, quantitative character of mathematical models or physical models in science. Perhaps we had better talk about analogies rather than models.⁶

Now let us ask whether models (analogies) are dispensable in biblical interpretation. Even if we granted that in theory they were dispensable in natural science, it would be difficult to present an analogous argument for biblical interpretation. The less-than-exact character of models in biblical interpretation means that they are most often not dispensable.

As an example, take again Rom. 5:12-21. Can we eliminate the comparison with Adam and still retain the theological substance of the passage? We could, to be sure, paraphrase a good deal of the main points of Rom. 5:12-21 without referring to Adam. But even if we worked at this paraphrase for a long time, we would have missed something. Rom. 5:12-21 has a suggestiveness about it, a suggestiveness characteristic of metaphor. ⁷ It invites us to think of many ways in which Adam and Christ are analogous (and disanalogous). Once we eliminate completely any reference to Adam, we simultaneously eliminate the possibility of exploring just how far these analogies extend.

26. Analogy in Romans 7

Do analogies really make a difference in interpretive controversies? Sometimes, at least, they do. Recall our discussion on the interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25. Ridderbos argues that Rom. 7 has in view primarily the contrast between two ages, before and after the resurrection of Christ and the day of Pentecost. Rom. 7:14-25, we might say, is analogous to the statements elsewhere in Scripture about the resurrection of Christ, the coming of the kingdom of God, and the fulfillment of the ages. The model that Ridderbos has in the background is the model of two ages and a redemptive transition between them. By contrast, the model in the background both the regenerate and the unregenerate interpretations is the model of the individual soul and its life. Using such a model, Rom. 7:14-25 is viewed as analogous to the statements on individual experiences of being saved.

These two models are not tight-knit mathematically describable structures like models in natural science. They are more like generalizations or clusters of patterns derived from a loose collection of biblical texts. Ridderbos shows us common patterns linking much of what Paul (and other NT writers) say about the death of Christ, the resurrection of Christ, the coming of the Spirit, the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, and events representing a global transition of redemptive epochs. Against this background he invites us to see Rom. 7:14-25 as an embodiment of the pattern. Likewise the regenerate interpretation collects verses describing the situation of individuals who are Christian and who are not Christian, and invites us to see Rom. 7:14-25 as embodying a pattern corresponding to the passages that describe Christians.

Both of these models do not so much exploit a particular analogy (say, with the resurrection of Christ, or with the conversion of Cornelius) as they use generalized patterns. They are less like a metaphor than like a generalization. Moreover, to a large extent these models describe what we may bring to any text whatsoever when we study it.

But we may also ask whether a particular text like Rom. 7 introduces its own analogies. For example, Rom. 7:2-4 clearly invokes an analogy using marriage as the subsidiary subject, in order to elucidate a principal subject, namely our responsibilities towards the law and towards Christ. What analogies, then, are operative in Rom. 7:7-25? It is difficult to decide whether there is any dominant analogy. But when interpreters come to the passage, they may have an analogical framework in which they understand biblical descriptions of sin. In the Bible as a whole there are a number of basic analogies or metaphors for explaining, illustrating, and driving home to readers the power of sin.

First, sin is viewed as like a sickness. Using this analogy, one can drive home the point about the power of sin by arguing that this "sickness" has "infected" every part of the body (e.g., Isa. 1:5-6; James 3:8). Second, sin is like darkness. One says that sin is powerful by pointing out that every part of people is dark (e.g., Eph. 4:18, Luke 11:33-36). Third, sin is like fire. One points out the power of sin by affirming that it is unstoppable (James 3:6). Finally, sin is like the relationship of a master to a slave. In this analogy, one points out the power of sin by showing that, however the slave may struggle to become free, the master will subdue him. Romans 6 uses this analogy in describing the situation before having died with Christ.

Which analogies are operating in Romans 7:14-25? If we have the analogy with sickness or darkness, we expect to find affirmations about the pervasiveness of sickness or darkness in the unregenerate. What is actually said in the passage appears to be inconsistent with such a pervasive sickness. Hence the regenerate interpretation appears to be more attractive. On the other hand, if the analogy is with master and slave (as it appears to be in v. 14), the struggles of the enslaved person to become free may have been introduced to make the point about sin's power more effectively. Hence the mention of the struggles of the "mind" in verse 23 might still be compatible with the unregenerate interpretation. When we use this perspective, the unregenerate interpretation appears more attractive, inasmuch as similar points about sin's mastery over the unregenerate are made in Romans 6. One's preference for the regenerate or unregenerate interpretation (or still some other interpretation) may therefore be influenced by what one sees as the governing analogy here.

Perhaps, however, the problem is still deeper. Do we come to Scripture expecting to find a single, uniform theory of sin, accompanied by a single, fixed, precise vocabulary to designate the various states of sin and righteousness? If so, we are predisposed to see difficulties in harmonizing Rom. 7:22-23 with statements elsewhere about unregenerate people. Hence the regenerate interpretation wins our allegiance.

Suppose, however, that we approach Scripture expecting to find a number of analogies making complementary points. Since each analogy is a partial one, the various analogies may sometimes superficially appear to be at odds with one another. For example, the analogy with slavery may appear to be at odds with the analogy of sickness. In the slavery analogy, the slave may attempt rebellion only to illustrate how inescapable is the master's dominion. But the slave's rebellious activity will appear to contradict what the sickness analogy says about the pervasiveness of the penetration of the sickness. We reconcile the two only by recognizing that each is a partial analogy about the nature of sin. Using this approach, we are then able to harmonize the unregenerate interpretation of Rom. 7:22-23, based on a slave analogy, with the texts elsewhere in Paul using the analogy of sickness or darkness.

We may extend our example in another direction. Our reading of Rom. 7:14-25 depends on the kind of exposition of sin that we expect. Do we expect a colorful, imaginative, dramatic characterization? Then sin can be personified as the master, the individual as the slave, and the subsequent imaginary confrontation traced out. Or do we expect a careful, scientific exposition analyzing the ultimately ontological relations of parts of human beings as these are touched by sin? In the latter case we are predisposed to find Rom. 7:22-23 consistent only with what is said of the regenerate mind, because words like "mind" and "flesh" must always designate the same fixed aspects of human beings. In the former case, we are predisposed to allow that Rom. 7:22-23 might simply be making a different point by dramatization. Hence even if it referred to an unregenerate person, it would not contradict the point made elsewhere by characterizing the unregenerate as dead and unresponsive to God.

27. A role for analogy in theological controversies

What difference does it make to notice that biblical interpretation employs analogies? First, some people could say that this leads to the conclusion that biblical interpretation and theology is "mere" analogy, hence not really true to the facts. Knowing objective truth is impossible.

But this is a misunderstanding of the power of analogy. Analogies at their best are aids to the truth rather than hindrances. Remember that sciences use analogies in the form of models, and the Bible itself uses analogies. So there is nothing wrong with analogies in themselves.

What we really need to say is that when we read a passage of the Bible, the analogies or models that we have in mind influence what we see, and influence our judgements about which competing interpretations are plausible. Becoming aware of some of the analogies that we are using, and some of the alternatives that might be possible, may help us to understand the Bible better.

For example, in interpreting Rom. 7, are we better off when we are aware of the several alternative approaches? Knowing that there are these alternatives could wrongly make us think, "There is no right answer. Any answer is O.K., because any answer can be achieved if we start with some analogy."

But I would disagree. One answer is right. Of course, there can be overlapping partial answers, and more than one of these could be right as far as it goes. But the major alternatives in interpreting Rom. 7 are mutually exclusive, unless we claim that Paul was intentionally ambiguous (which is not plausible here). Hence only one of the alternatives is right. But we can properly judge the relative claims of the alternatives only when we view each one of them in its strongest form. As long as we are unaware of the possibility of using an alternate analogy (which Paul himself may have had in mind in writing), we are not in as good a position to make an accurate judgement.

The same holds true when we consider theological doctrines or theological systems rather than individual passages of the Bible. As an example of theological doctrines, we may take the dispute between creationism and traducianism. Creationism says that God, by an immediate act, creates the soul of each new human being who comes into the world. Traducianism says that the soul of the child derives by providential processes from the soul of the parents.

Each of these two views appeals to various biblical passages. Each passage must be studied and weighed in its own right. We can never eliminate this step in theology. But we should also be aware that each view is made plausible partly by the use of a governing analogy. For traducianism, the key analogy is the analogy between generation of the soul and generation of the body. After the initial direct creation of Adam in Gen. 1-2, the propagation of the race takes place by providence. The bodies of children are formed providentially from substance deriving from their parents. The traducianist claims that the generation of the soul is analogous. In addition, a realist view of human nature sometimes enters into traducianism, and such realism rests on an analogy between human souls and parts of a whole. The souls are related to human nature as parts are to a whole.

For creationism, on the other hand, the principal analogy is the analogy between the generation of the soul and the creative acts of God in Genesis, which create new beings. Both of these acts of making new things contrast with the later providential acts of God in which he sustains what he has already made.

Being aware of these analogies does not by itself tell us which of these two positions is right. (Or perhaps some combination or third alternative could be right). But it does alert us to some of the reasons why both positions are attractive and both have had their advocates.

Next, consider an example of theological systems. The systems of classic dispensationalism and classic covenant theology each give a certain important role to a key concept. For covenant theology, that concept is the covenant of grace; for dispensationalism, it is the dispensations, that is, epochs marked by distinctive arrangements in God's government of human beings. Covenant theology naturally leads to a concentration on the salvific purposes of God. Such purposes are embodied in the covenant of grace and form a main strand to which other purposes of God are linked. Dispensationalism, on the other hand, has classically been interested in the purpose that the dispensations serve by showing success or failure of human beings under different governmental arrangements. Salvation of individuals runs alongside this purpose.

Dispensationalism and covenant theology are both complex systems. They cannot simply be reduced to some one analogy. And yet analogy has an important role. In covenant theology, the covenant of grace is understood as embodied in (and therefore analogous to) the concrete covenants mentioned in the Bible. These in turn are analogous to treaties or contracts made between human beings (except that God sovereignly lays down the conditions). In dispensationalism, we might argue that the governing analogy in understanding dispensations is the analogy between God the great king and a human ruler who inaugurates a new form of government.

28. Types of analogies

We have already uncovered a considerable diversity of analogies used in biblical interpretation. It is time to see whether we can distinguish some different types.

First of all, analogy and metaphor occur in the Bible itself. We distinguish six distinct uses of analogy.

First, a one-line comparison, a small-scale analogy, in the form of a simple metaphor or simile. For example, Ps. 23:5, "You prepare a table before me in the presence of my enemies," compares God's provision with that of a host.

Second, an extended analogy, constituting a controlling force in a whole passage. Most of the parables of Jesus use an analogy in this way: the Parable of the Lost Sheep, the Parable of the Great Banquet, and Parable of the Mustard Seed, the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares, and so on. But analogies can also be used in direct exposition of theological truths. For example, analogies with dying and slavery control the extended discussion in Rom. 6. The analogy between Adam and Christ controls Rom. 5:12-21. Sometimes the use of an analogy may be more subtle than in these instances. For example, the interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25 partly turns on the question of whether Paul is here using a sort of dramatic, theatrical analogy between sin and a human being on the one hand, and two personal opponents striving with one another for mastery on the other. Because Paul does not say in so many words, "Now let us compare one thing to another," it is more difficult to assess what he is doing.

Third, an analogy used repeatedly in different passages in the Bible, so that it constitutes a biblical theme. For example, comparisons of God with a king or a father form a biblical theme. So do comparisons between God's relations to human beings and agreements (covenants) between human beings.

Fourth, an analogy used to help interpret a passage, even though it is not the governing analogy for the passage itself. For example, in discussing Rom. 7, if we wanted to defend a dramatic understanding of what Paul is doing, we might not only appeal to an analogy with drama in general, but also to an analogy with other passages of the Bible which present moral conflict in more dramatic terms: for example, the personifications of wisdom and folly in Prov. 7-9. Neither drama in general nor Prov. 7-9 is a governing force in the actual structure of Rom. 7. Yet both of these might make it easier for someone to see that it is possible that Paul could be speaking in a more dramatically colored, semipersonified way about sin in its relation to human beings.

Fifth, an analogy used in formulating a particular doctrine. For example, the analogy between generation of the soul and generation of the body is used by traducianism.

Sixth, an analogy used as a key element in a theological or hermeneutical system. For example, the covenant of grace, analogous to covenants between human beings, is a key element in classic covenant theology.

To a certain extent, these different types of analogies are related to the different types of disciplinary matrices discussed in section 21. Just as in science, so also in biblical interpretation, a disciplinary matrix within a given field is likely to make use of some controlling analogy. Some analogies function as master analogies controlling a larger field. Thus the idea of covenant, analogous to human treaties or agreements, influences the whole system of covenant theology. Other analogies function as useful analogies only within a smaller area--perhaps the area of a single doctrine, or perhaps in the interpretation of a single text.

We should note, however, a certain uniqueness to the largest disciplinary matrix or context for biblical interpretation. As we argued in section 21, the deepest factor influencing biblical interpretation is the factor of the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration. Without this work of the Spirit, a person cannot understand what the Spirit teaches in Scripture (1 Cor. 2:6-16). This work of the Spirit affects the heart and mind of people in the deepest and fullest way. We cannot fully describe the Spirit's work by saying, for instance, that regeneration is merely making available to a person in an intellectual way some new analogy. Doubtless the Holy Spirit enables the person involved to see the relevance of certain relations and analogies, not only analogies in the Bible itself, but relations between the biblical teaching and the person's own life and experience. But it would be false to say that the work of the Holy Spirit is exhausted in making clear any one analogy. Nor could we say that an unregenerate person would in principle be unable to use a particular analogy. The use of particular analogies is a salient characteristic of less comprehensive disciplinary matrices, but regeneration has a more comprehensive character.