Terms

Herman Hermeneut: In our discussion we have to become self-conscious about the terms that we use. Do we know what we are doing when we use words? Matters become especially crucial when we use key words in theology. For example, what do we mean by the word “God”?

Fatima Factualist: What the dictionary says it means.

Dottie Doctrinalist: No, we have to let God define himself. A dictionary can’t capture the full range of what God teaches about himself.

Laura Liturgist: We must encounter God in worship.

The insights that we have received concerning meaning can also be applied to meaning at a low level: the meaning of terms.

Infinite meaning belongs to the total discourse in John 17. Does such infinitude belong also to the term “glory” in John 17:5? “The glory I had with you before the world began” is infinitely rich. “Glory,” in the context of the total utterance, appears also to be infinitely rich, in that it encompasses and evokes the infinitely rich knowledge of the preexistent glory of God. Thus, individual terms confront us with mysteries analogous to what we already saw in John 17 as a whole.

Terms and Naming

What are the terms and names that we use, and where do they originate? God’s name identifies himself. By analogy, God gives names to creatures and to aspects of creation. We understand the names and the terms for creatures by analogy with the name of God himself. Since the name of God is Trinitarian (Matt 28:19), we expect other names to be dependent on God the Triune Lord.

To put it another way, human words are ontologically dependent on the eternal Word, revealed in John 1:1. Human words exist according to the pattern of the eternal Word. Hence human words show classificational, instantiational, and associational aspects.

For example, consider the word camel.

First, camel has an instantiational aspect. The word camel occurs in various instances. It may be pronounced rapidly or slowly. It may be used to refer to any of a number of different creatures in the camel class, both one-humped dromedaries and two-humped Bactrian camels.

We learn the word camel through instances of its occurrence in certain contexts and associations. Perhaps we see some pictures of camels. Or we just hear a verbal description. Either way, the particular pictures or the particular verbal descriptions are instances. The particularity of these instances or “instantiations” is necessary for learning.

Frequently if not always the particularities color our subsequent knowledge. Immediately after we have learned the meaning of the word camel, it means for us “an animal like the ones I saw in the pictures,” or “an animal matching the description that I heard and the impression that I formed in my mind.” We may of course modify our knowledge by further experiences in which we see camels, smell them, or have them mentioned to us. But these later experiences involve more instantiations. The further instantiations modify the impact of the initial instantiation. We never simply dispense with instantiations.

Second, camel has a classificational aspect. Every instance of occurrence of the word camel belongs to the class “camel.” We classify a particular occurrence as an instance of the word camel. There is a unity belonging to all such instances, namely the unity of the one word camel. That one word is recognizable as one in and through all the individuality of its particular occurrences.

As an expression of this classificational unity, we recognize this word as distinct from other words in English. It is distinct in pronunciation. It is identifiable as a certain sequence of sounds or letters (c + a + m + e + l) in contrast with other possible sequences. It is distinct in meaning. It singles out large mammals of the genus Camelus, with their characteristic features, in contrast with other kinds of animal. It contrasts with other words, dog, horse, pig, etc. Contrast is an integral feature of the classificational aspect of words.

Third, camel has an associational aspect. The word camel occurs in association, in contexts of other words that occur before and after, and contexts of human situations that may help to make plain what camel is being referred to, contexts of human communication in which we speak, listen, and think. It occurs in the context of the English language and speakers of English. We learn the word camel as children by observing contexts in which it is used.

Our word camel presupposes God’s word governing the creation of camels. The word camel is one in all its occurrences because God is stable and self-consistent; his word concerning camels has unity. The human word camel has a diversity of particular occurrences because God in his creativity and fecundity ordains a diversity of occurrences. There is an associational context of human words because any particular word of God has an associated context in a whole plan, according to the unity of God’s wisdom.

The three aspects, namely the classificational, instantiational, and associational, coinhere. Any particular instance of the word camel must be identified as an occurrence of this word, camel, rather than some other word. Hence the instantiational presupposes the classificational aspect. We can only talk about the class camel if we are able to produce particular occurrences or instances of the word. Hence the classificational aspect requires the instantiational. And so on.

In principle, we could conduct a similar analysis of any word in any human language. All words have classificational, instantiational, and associational aspects.¹ This situation derives from the fact that human language and human words are dependent on God’s language. Trinitarian speech is necessarily Trinitarian, trimodal, and coinherent. Human speech is dependent. Since it provides access to real knowledge of God, it is necessarily trimodal and coinherent by analogy.

We can see similar effects when we look not at words and language but at earthly creatures. Camels themselves, as creatures, were created through a Trinitarian operation of God. The Father is Creator (1 Cor. 8:6), the Son is Creator (1 Cor. 8:6; John 1:3; Col. 1:16), and the Spirit is Creator (Gen. 1:2; note Ps. 104:30, where there is a providential action analogically related to the original creating activity of God). What are some of the implications?

First, in accordance with the classificational aspect, all camels are camels. According to Genesis 1:24, they reproduce “according to their kinds.” In accordance with the faithfulness of God, they hold to a common pattern fixed by the word of God, the pattern of “being a camel.” Camels in their commonness display the faithfulness, the self-consistency, and the unchangeability of God, as Romans 1:20 indicates. The Word is who he is from all eternity (John 1:1a). So derivatively, analogically, camels are what they are in constant conformity to the pattern that God specified in the constant word.

Second, in accordance with the instantiational aspect, each camel is particular. It is this camel and no other. Each camel is an instantiation. It is a particular being, not simply camelness, not simply a camel, but this camel.

The Word is himself particular, in relation to the category of God. Derivatively, analogically, the Word calls forth particular creatures (Pss. 104:30; 147:15). These creatures exist and are sustained in conformity with the word that creates them (John 1:3; Heb. 1:3). Each camel displays the control of God over details, and each camel displays the creativity of God through its creational uniqueness in being what it is.

Third, in accordance with the associational aspect, all camels exist in contextual associations. Camels live in certain ways, eat certain foods, are used by human beings for certain purposes. The eternal personal association of the Word is the original to which all creational associations analogically relate. The existence of a camel in association with other things displays the universal presence of God by which he holds all things together (Col. 1:17).

Word and thought

So far we have focused almost wholly on words and expressed language rather than on thought. Do the same considerations apply to thought as well as to language?

In God there is a close relation between thought and word. His speech is in accordance with his thought. Isaiah 46:10 illustrates the relation: “I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come. I say: My purpose will stand, and I will do all that I please.” In the clause “I make known …” God speaks of what he is making known to human beings, and hence he includes his words to them. In the later clauses, “My purpose will stand,” and “I will do all that I please,” he speaks of his will, his inward thought if you will. Clearly his word is in conformity with his thought.

We might infer the same conclusion from John 1:1. The Word of God is an expression of his thought, in analogy with the fact that the words of human beings express their thoughts. In this close relation between thought and word, the thought belongs preeminently to the Father, while the Son is his Word. On a human level, we may say that the relation between human thought and human word is analogical to the relation between the Father and the Word. In consequence, the same fundamental mysteries confront us with respect to both thought and word. If we wished, we could analyze thoughts as well as words in terms of the classificational, instantiational, and associational aspects.

In both thoughts and words we deal with profound mysteries. In both cases we deal with matters that reflect the Trinitarian character of God. In neither case can we be complacent about our own supposed mastery.